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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays studying firms in low in-
come countries. The first chapter explores how relational contracts that
substitute for formal contracts in the presence of weak institutions, are
affected by changes to the outside option of one of the parties. I investi-
gate this question by assessing how a change in the pay-off of cultivating
an alternative crop by farmers affects the relationship with downstream
buyers in the sugar industry in colonial Taiwan (1895-1945). Using novel
historic sugar mill level data, I analyse effects on interlinked lending and
the provision of inputs by mills to farmers following a reversal of the
downward price trend of the main alternative crop, rice. In the second
chapter, which is co-authored with Anna Baiardi, we empirically assess
the importance of ethnic networks in facilitating international trade. In
particular, we investigate the impact of ethnic Cantonese networks in
the United States on the export performance of firms based in Southern
China. In the third chapter, I investigate whether the dominance of small
firms in developing countries can be explained by the production of cus-
tomised goods, which allows smaller and less efficient firms to compete
with larger and more efficient modern firms. I incorporate this hypoth-
esis in a model, in which the key variables impacting the profitability
of the customised technology and thus firm size are transport costs and
income.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Why some countries are poorer than others is one of the most important
questions in development economics. The current consensus seems to
be that income differences cannot be explained purely by differences in
capital and labour, but instead are accounted for to a large extent by
differences in total factory productivity, or TFP (Caselli, 2005). At the
same time, this difference in aggregate productivity is attributed in part
at least to the misallocation of scarce resources. The idea is that mar-
ket distortions are causing resources not to be allocated to the firms for
which the marginal product is the highest (see for example Hsieh and
Klenow (2007) or Restuccia and Rogerson (2013)). Therefore, the study
of the constraints and distortions faced by firms in developing countries
is key in understanding productivity and hence income differences. It
is therefore unsurprising that this topic has sparked a vast literature
which investigates how firms are affected by a numerous constraints
and distortions in many different settings. The constraints and distor-
tions highlighted by this literature range from credit constraints and
distorting labour laws to weak institutions (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005,
2012). However, there is still not a clear consensus which factors are the
most important in explaining misallocation. This thesis adds to this lit-
erature by studying a related question, namely what mechanisms firms
and other agents develop in order to (partially) overcome the constraints
and distortions they face.
In this vain, the first chapter focuses on the topic of relational con-
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tracts 1, which allow credit to be supplied despite of weak enforcement
institutions. I study how sustainable these contracts are to changes of the
outside option of one of the parties in the context of the sugar industry
in colonial Taiwan. More specifically, I analyse how interlinked lending
provided by mills to its suppliers - sugar cane farmers - is affected by
a change in the outside option of a subset of the farmers. The outside
option is affected by a change in the trend in the price of rice, the main
alternative exportable crop. Due to the particular institutional environ-
ment, which allocates to each mill a specific fixed area from which it
can source cane, I am able to implement a difference-in-difference strat-
egy with a continuous treatment intensity according to the suitability of
this area for rice cultivation. I digitalise novel historic data regarding
lending, production as well as a number of mill level variables. The re-
sults indicate that the improvement in the outside option of farmers has
a large and significant effect on lending: A one standard deviation in-
crease in the suitability for rice is associated with a decrease of loans by
up to 26%. These results have important policy implications as if these
adjustments made by downstream buyers are not taken into account
policies that strengthen the bargaining power of small-scale producer
could have unanticipated negative effects.
The second chapter, on the other hand, analyses how firms are
able to overcome informational and contractual barriers to exporting
with the help of ethnic migrant networks in the destination country.
More specifically, the chapter considers how firms in southern China
that are located in counties that saw a large share of its population em-
igrate to the United States in the 19th century (referred to as sending
counties), benefit from their closer relationship to the American-Chinese
population. Access to the network is assumed to vary along two dimen-
sions: Firms are assumed to have better access to the American-Chinese
network if they are located in one of the original sending counties and are
active in an industry that employs a larger number of ethnic Cantonese
in the U.S. This interaction allows us to control for geographic and in-
dustry characteristics by including fixed effects. The results show that
1Relational contracts are defined as informal contracts that cannot be enforced
through formal institutions, but are sustained by the value parties place on the overall
relationship.
2
networks play an economically significant role in facilitating trade both
through the extensive and intensive margin. In addition, we find sup-
porting evidence that networks predominantly promote trade by lower-
ing information barriers.
Finally, the third chapter investigates how firms respond to high
transport costs by adopting technologies which allow different degrees
of product customisations and in how far transport costs in this way can
explain the fact that the firm size distribution in developing countries
is skewed to the right. My hypothesis is that small firms are able to
customise their goods by using a more flexible production technology,
which is, however, associated with a higher marginal cost. Large firms,
in contrast, use a more mechanised and cost-efficient technology, which
limits them to producing a single variety. Finally, while standardised
goods can be shipped across markets, the customised firms are only able
to sell one specific location. This is key in explaining the size difference:
customised firms are smaller due to higher marginal costs and due to
being limited to a single location. I incorporate these assumptions into a
spatial competition model with heterogeneous productivity. My model
predicts that larger transport costs are associated with a larger number
of small firms. Furthermore, income has a non-monotonic effect on the
share of small firms. When incomes are below a threshold, increases
will lead to a decrease in the share of small firms. However, as income
rises further, the share of small firms increases again.
3
Chapter 2
Farmer Bargaining Power &
Relational Contracts in the Sugar
Industry in Colonial Taiwan
2.1 Introduction
Farmers in rural areas of developing countries often do not have access
to formal financial institutions. Instead, they rely on other agents in the
supply chain for credit, such as intermediary buyers of their products
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). Through sustaining relational contracts, these
agents are thus able to supply credit profitably despite the weakness of
formal contracting institutions. Relational contracts are contracts that
are self-enforcing due to the value placed on continuing the relationship
i.e. in order to be sustainable, the rents associated with long-term rela-
tionships need to be sufficiently large compared to the parties’ outside
option. For example, a buyer might be willing to supply credit as the
threat of termination of the buyer-seller relationship, which is valued
by the farmer, reduces the likelihood of default. Given the prevalence
of such informal contracts and their importance for a possible supply
of credit, understanding which factors determine the sustainability of
these informal contracts is an important question in development (Deb
and Suri, 2013).
This paper focuses on how a change in the outside option of sugar
cane farmers affects the interactions with intermediary buyer i.e. sugar
4
mills in Taiwan during the Japanese colonisation (1895-1945). In this
setting, the outside option of a subset of sugar cane farmers is the cul-
tivation of the main alternative cash-crop, rice. As there were few non-
agricultural opportunities, a change in the pay-offs of rice cultivation
is likely to be salient. Specifically, I investigate how the reversal in the
trend of rice prices in mainland Japan affects sugar cane production
through its impact on mill-to-farmer lending and provision of inputs
(e.g. fertilisers and seeds).
Rice prices could affect the sustainability of relational contracts in
the following way: Consider for example an increase in rice prices. This
increase lessens the relative rents associated with maintaining a rela-
tionship with sugar mills for the relevant subset of sugar cane farmers.
Therefore, the termination such relationships becomes less severe and
as such farmers have a greater incentive to default on loans provided
by mills. In anticipation, mills will reduce the amount of credit they
supply. This reduction in the supply of credit, however, reduces overall
farmer welfare. The mechanism described here is similar to the effect
highlighted in Macchiavello et al. (2015), who investigate the effect of
competition between downstream buyers on relational contracts, which
is seen to be significant and negative.
In general, the challenges encountered within the empirical study
of factors affecting the sustainability of relational contracts are twofold
as not only credible measures of relational contracts have to be recorded,
but also exogenous variation in the factors have to be identified. As such,
this setting lends itself to studying the effect for a number of reasons.
Focusing on only one specific industry allows for the identification of
credible measures of relational contract practises. More importantly, the
particular cultivation environment required by rice and sugar allow me
to implement a difference-in-difference strategy with continuous treat-
ment intensity, where the suitability for rice cultivation determines the
intensity of treatment by the change in rice prices.
More specifically, the identification strategy relies on the speci-
ficity of the contracting environment of the sugar industry in colonial
Taiwan: In order to better align the incentives of farmers and mills, in
1905 the Japanese administration passed a law which allocated to each
mill an exclusive "command" area, i.e. an area within which all farmers
5
were only allowed to sell sugarcane to the respective mill. In return,
mills committed to purchase all sugarcane grown at a previously an-
nounced price. Figure (2.4) shows a map of all command areas in 1918.
The command areas were fixed over time and new mills’ areas were re-
stricted to land that was not within the command area of another mill.
Thus the area from which sugar mills could source cane from was fixed
over time. It is important to note that these policies are common across
the developing world and is not restricted to sugar cane.
At the same time, fields in Taiwan could be roughly divided into
two types: paddy (or wet) fields, which can be sufficiently flooded to
grow rice and dry fields with insufficient irrigation for growing rice.
Sugarcane however, can be grown both on paddy and dry fields, due to
lower irrigation needs.
As the price of rice increased, the outside option of farmers that
farmed paddy fields increased, while it remained unchanged for farmers
with dry fields. Therefore, keeping the share of paddy fields in each
mills catchment area fixed at their 1918 level, I implement the difference-
in-difference strategy with continuous treatment intensity according to
the field composition of the catchment areas and using both the change
in trends of rice prices as well as year on year variation. The identifying
assumption is that mills with different shares of paddy fields would have
experienced the same time-trend in the absence of treatment.
The information about mill and farmer performance is taken from
the Taiwan Togyo Tokei (1913-1944) (Taiwan Sugar Statistics), which records
yearly statistics about the universe of modern sugar mills during the
second half of the colonial period. I digitalise the data for the period
of 1929-1939. To my knowledge, I am the first to have digitalised and
translated the data to this degree of detail. The main outcomes of in-
terest are measures of relational contracts such as lending and provision
of inputs by mills to farmers. I further collect data on other farmer and
mill outcomes, such as area cultivated with sugarcane, yields, fertiliser
use, and information about manufacturing activities.
The results found in this paper indicate that the permanent change
in rice prices had a significant effect on mill-farmer lending: A one stan-
dard deviation increase in the share of paddy fields of the total area
suitable for cane cultivation is associated with an up to 26% decrease in
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fungible loans provided by the mills. On the other hand, I find that the
provision of non-fungible inputs remains unchanged. Short run price
changes seem to have the opposite effects: a short-run price increase has
no effect on monetary lending but increases the inputs provided, which
could be indicative of improvements of farmer bargaining position. The
result is robust to the inclusion of various control variables as well as
prefecture-year fixed effects and mill-level linear trends. I also find no
evidence that would lead me to reject the parallel trends assumption.
Further I investigate how other decisions by farmers and mills are
affected. I find that the overall area cultivated with sugarcane remains
nearly unchanged, though the composition changes. The share of paddy
fields is reduced, while the share of dry-fields increases. In addition,
I find that though fertiliser usage remains stable, yields are reduced
significantly, by nearly 8% overall and by up to 14% for paddy fields.
This could be indicative of both adverse incentive effects for farmers
but also changes to the field composition. Concerning mill behaviour, I
find very little changes except for an increase in the days of inactivity
of mills caused possibly by mis-coordination in the harvesting process,
which might be indicative of a further breakdown of the mill-farmer
relationship.
The closest related paper is Macchiavello et al. (2015), who analyse
the effect of competition on the sustainability of relational contracts in
the Rwandan coffee industry. Here, the outside option of farmers is af-
fected through variations in their ability to sell to other mills with which
they do not have a relationship. The authors instrument the location of
coffee processing mills using geographic characteristics as inputs to an
engineering model that predicts the best location of mills. They then
investigate how this arguably exogenous variation in competitiveness of
the environment of a given mill affects the relational contract between
mills and farmers. They find greater competition leads to a deterioration
of relational contract practises, which are at the same time associated
with a negative effect on mill efficiency, capacity utilisation and qual-
ity of coffee produced. This in turn seems to constrain farmers’ access
to credit and inputs, which is likely to reduce farmers’ well-being. In
contrast to this paper, however, Macchiavello et al. (2015) rely on cross-
sectional data, which does not allow for the analysis of dynamic changes
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to the outside options of farmers. Thus, the main addition of this paper
is in allowing the dynamic study of how much and how fast existing
informal contracts are affected.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 gives historic and
contextual background on the Taiwanese sugar industry and Japanese
rice policies. Section 2.3 gives a description of the data and section 2.4
outlines the empirical strategy. The results are presented in, section 2.5
and in section 2.6. Finally, section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Background & Variation in Exposure
2.2.1 The Sugar Industry in Colonial Taiwan
Japanese Colonisation
Previous to Japanese colonisation, Taiwan had been colonised already by
both the Spanish and the Dutch in the 17th century, though both nations
only controlled a small share of the total territory. Eventually it offi-
cially came under Chinese control in 1683 and gained prefecture status
in 1887. At the time, Taiwan was characterised by its under-development
and lack of rule of law relative to mainland China. After the first Sino-
Japanese War in 1895, Taiwan was seceded to Japan under the Ma Kuan
Treaty and became a Japanese colony until 1945, when Japan surren-
dered unconditionally. The first years of the Japanese colonisation were
characterised by fierce resistance by the Taiwanese population against
the coloniser and thus Japanese policy was focused on controlling the is-
land. After 1915, however, conflicts had essentially ended. The Japanese
government then invested heavily in the modernisation of the island
including infrastructure, sanitation and schooling (Chou et al., 2007).
Before the Japanese colonisation, agriculture, with the exception
of tea and sugar, was either subsistence crops or focused on domes-
tic consumption. Figure A.1 shows the distribution of production in
1905, ten years after the begin of the Japanese colonisation, but before
any modernisation interventions had taken place. While both rice and
sugarcane were grown before the arrival of the Japanese, the production
was characterised by a low degree of mechanisation. Both rice and sugar
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were therefore also imported in certain years.
Sugarcane was the main cash crop and export good in colonial
Taiwan. Sugar had been produced in Taiwan since the 16th century,
with the knowledge having been brought by immigrants from mainland
China. However, both the agricultural as well as the industrial technol-
ogy remained essentially unchanged until the arrival of the Japanese
colonialists, which invested heavily to modernise the industry. The
traditional production technique was characterised by low yields, high
labour intensity and the production of low quality product. While some
larger mills existed, which were able to produce white sugar, the ma-
jority of mills were very small and produced brown sugar for domestic
consumption. Before the arrival of the Japanese colonisers, Taiwan was
thus far behind the world frontier: while Java and Hawaii, the most
productive sugar producers in the 19th century, produced 30-34 tons of
cane per acre, Taiwan produced merely 12 (Davidson, 1903). Even before
colonisation, the main export destination for sugar was Japan. Farmers
operated under share-cropping agreements and were able to obtain lim-
ited loans from sugar merchants. Even under this system farmers were
supposed to sell their cane to their lender, however, there was free com-
petition between lenders and there was no formal enforcement mecha-
nism of this rule. Hence, unsurprisingly, defaults were common, leading
to credit rationing and high interest rates (?).
Modernising the sugar industry was one of the main objectives of
the Japanese government with the aim of increasing production and thus
reducing Japan’s reliance on imports. The key areas for improvements
were the planting of high-yielding cane varieties and the increased use
of fertiliser, the construction of irrigation systems and the manufactur-
ing of sugar in so called modern mills, which use modern machinery,
such as steel crushers and vacuum pans (Shih and Yen, 2009). While
the Japanese administration invested in irrigation and developed im-
proved seeds suitable for the cultivation in Taiwan, one of the key steps
was the passing of the Sugar Industry Incentive Regulations in 1905. In
order to decrease hold-up problems and increase the incentives for the
sugar mills to invest in improving cane cultivation, mills were allocated
exclusive procurement or command areas within this regulation. This
implied that farmers within a mill’s command area were only allowed
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to sell to that specific mill. Further farmers were not allowed to trans-
port cane across Prefecture borders. On the other hand, mills had to
announce a purchasing price for the cane before planting took place, i.e.
around one and a half years before harvests. These prices were recorded
centrally and published in an industry publication. Mills then had to
commit to purchase all cane produced within their command area for
the announced price (Ka, 1991). In order to ensure sufficient supplies,
mills were providing fertiliser, seeds and other loans. The interest rate
for these loans had to be announced at the same time with cane prices
before the first planting i.e. 18 months in advance and published cen-
trally, making it easier for farmers to enforce prices. Mills however were
allowed to and did often price discriminate and charged differentially
for paddy and dry fields, but also paid higher prices per ton to farmers
with more productive fields (Koo and Wang, 1999).
Under these measures, the sugar industry developed successfully.
By 1910, 29 modern mills had been founded, a number that rose to 45
by 1939. With the outbreak of World War II, the sugar industry became
strategically important, as one of the side products of sugar production,
molasses, could be used for ethanol production, which in turn was used
to power various war machinery. Thus the industry became much more
regulated and production targets were set centrally.
2.2.2 Sugar Production
All sugar production follows the same basic principle: sugarcane is first
crushed, and a sucrose-rich juice is extracted. Afterwards the juice is
cleansed of impurities, then reduced through boiling and finally the mo-
lasses are separated from the sugar crystals. However, each step of the
process can be mechanised to a differential degree. Mechanisation, such
as mechanical cutters, vacuum pans and centrifuges, does not only lower
marginal costs, but equally importantly increases the quality of sugar.
An important managerial aspect is the timing and coordination
of harvest, as sugarcane needs to be processed within hours of harvest-
ing. On the one hand, the large cutters functioned best when a certain
amount of sugar is being processed at any given time. On the other
hand of course maximum capacity constrains the amount of sugar that
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could be processed at any given time. In addition, preventing machine
breakdowns and organising swift repairs can influence efficiency signif-
icantly, as otherwise the cane at the mill will start to deteriorate. For a
more detailed discussion of sugar production see Sukhtankar (2016).
The growing period of sugar varies according to the climate it is
grown in: in the tropical south of Taiwan, the growth period is around
one year, while it averaged around 18 months in the sub-tropic north.
The crop is water- and fertiliser intensive, however in Colonial Taiwan it
was traditionally mostly rain-fed. Fertiliser, which was previously rarely
used, as well as new seed varieties were subsidised by the Japanese
Governor General. The harvesting period in Taiwan started between
December and continued until May. In the tropical south in principle
cane can be grown during the entire year; however, possibly due to irri-
gation needs, this was not done during the period. The quality of cane
is predominantly defined by its sucrose content, which causes mills and
farmers to have opposing incentives regarding the optimal harvesting
period: While later harvesting leads to a higher sucrose content, it also
implies lighter and dryer cane. Since prices are paid to the farmer per
ton of cane, drier cane implies a lower income to the farmer (Koo and
Wang, 1999).
2.2.3 Rice Cultivation and Agricultural Rice Policy in Japan
Japanese rice prices experienced a period of extreme volatility from 1910-
1940, which is characterised by a number of trends caused by economic
policy interventions into the rice market in Japan.
During the 1910s rice prices were rising rapidly. Bad harvests in
1918 caused the price to peak further, which lead to widespread riots
by urban workers. To respond to the rising prices, the Japanese gov-
ernment focused on expanding rice production both in Japan as well
as in the colonies, Korea and Taiwan. Previously, Taiwan had not ex-
ported any rice to Japan as the rice varieties produced in Taiwan did not
suit Japanese tastes and were used only for domestic consumption. On
the other hand, rice varieties planted in Japan were not suitable for the
tropical climate of Taiwan. Thus, in order to start importing rice from
Taiwan, the Japanese needed to develop new rice varieties, which suc-
11
ceeded in 1925. Similar schemes were under way in Korea, which was
the dominant source of rice for the Japanese market.
Due to the expansion in the rice production capacity from the
1920s onwards, the rice price started to decrease dramatically form 1925.
This was partly due to the increased production in the colonies, partic-
ularly in Korea, but also in Taiwan. However, domestic production had
also increased significantly. Coupled with the economic recession after
1929, the overproduction lead to collapse of prices. In 1930, the price
of rice fell by up to 30%, leading to unrest of rice farmers in Japan.
The Japanese government responded through several measures between
1931 and 1933. In 1931, a revision of the rice law was passed, which
stated that the state would put upper and lower bounds on the price
of rice and further subsidised rice storage. Furthermore, in 1932 the
government quite suddenly committed to unlimited rice purchases, and
further expanded the purchasing schemes in 1933. At the same time,
with the military actions in Manchuria in 1931, the demand for rice in-
creased independently (Sheingate, 2003). As a result the trend of rice
prices was reversed and prices continued to increase until the outbreak
of World War II.
[] Overall, the Japanese rice prices followed rice prices in most
South-East Asian countries until the early 1920s, when all countries ex-
perienced a spike in their prices. However, the Japanese reaction to the
price spike of aggressively increasing production, changed the price tra-
jectory in the Japanese market. While Japanese prices started to decrease
dramatically from 1925 onwards, most other countries in the region ex-
perienced a continuous increase in prices until 1930. This increase how-
ever, was reversed dramatically in 1931 when rice prices in many coun-
tries nearly halved. This was due to the Depression in general, as well
as protectionist policies among others in Japan in particular. Japan was
one of the largest markets and importers of rice in the 1920s and there-
fore the trade restrictions heavily affected rice prices in its neighbouring
countries. Table A.2 shows the prices for the example of Thailand. Prices
in the region slightly recovered until the end of the 1930s, however never
came close to the 1920 levels (Boomgaard and Brown, 2000).
Clearly, Japanese rice prices experienced a very different trajecto-
ries than those of most nations in the region. This can be explained by
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the heavy protectionism Japan imposed as well as the aggressive inter-
ventions in the rice market. Rice prices fell earlier than in most other
countries due to the development of overproduction in Japan and its
colonies, and were increasing and not falling in the 1930s due to the
extensive purchasing scheme imposed by the government, which pur-
chased sufficient rice to positively affect prices. []
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, I give a brief overview of the most important datasets
and the main variables of interest as well as some summary statistics.
2.3.1 Outcome Variables
Data on Lending and Input Provision
The data on lending and the provision of inputs by mills to farmers is
digitalised from the Taiwan Togyo Tokei (1913-1944) (referred to as Tai-
wan Sugar Statistics). The data was self-reported by the factories and
published annually at the mill level. The Taiwan Sugar Statistics was
published by the Governor Generals Office from 1913 until 1944. Infor-
mation on lending and similar activities, however, only becomes avail-
able from 1929 onwards. Furthermore, I exclude data after the outbreak
of World War II, as not only did the Japanese intervene more forcefully
in the market during this period, but also sugar factories were targeted
by allied bombing during the later stages of the war. Thus, I focus on
the period of 1929 to 1939.
The Japanese administration recorded information on three differ-
ent types of mills: so called traditional mills, which received no subsidies
and which did not have to register, so called improved mills, which were
Taiwanese owned mills and which received subsides for capital invest-
ment but in return had to register and supply a limited amount of data
and finally the so called modern mills, which were registered, listed, re-
ceived significant subsidies and had to publish detailed data on a yearly
basis, which includes the information on lending. In the analysis I focus
exclusively on the modern mills.
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As mills are identified by name, I am able to construct an unbal-
anced panel of 45 modern mills. As the the empirical strategy applied
requires that firms exist already in 1918. This leaves me with 35 mills
that were founded before 1918 and exist until 1939. Table A.3 lists all
of the modern mills active over our period of interest and whether the
firm is in our sample, as well as its ownership, age, capacity and share
of paddy fields of the total catchment area.
Loans are recorded in Japanese Yen and include both loans made
for working capital as well as miscellaneous (consumption) loans. Fur-
thermore, loans made in kind for inputs are also recorded in Yen value
and include the provision of fertiliser and seeds. One outcome variable
is the log total value of loans by type provided. However, a decrease in
the total value of loans provided could not only be caused by a decrease
of supply by the mills due to the decreased willingness to lend, but
it could derease mechanically if the area cultivated with sugarcane de-
creases and thus the number of sugar cane farmers is decreased. Thus,
I also create an adjusted loan ( ˜Loansi,t) variable for each type of lending
or input provision activity, which is normalised by the area cultivated
with sugarcane within each mill’s command area at a given time t in the
following way:
˜Loansi,t = Loansi,t/area sugarcanei,t (2.1)
Figure 2.1 depicts the density of the normalised total value of all
loans and inputs provided in the year 1930. It is clear that there is large
variation of the amount of inputs and loans provided by mills. The total
value per hectare farmed with sugarcane ranges from around 90Yto up
to over 450Y, with a mean and median of 234.7Yand 212.3Yrespectively.
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of the four types of loans over time.
Working Capital and Fertilizer make up the biggest share of total loans.
What is noticeable is that both experience a strong drop previous to
1931, but while fertilizer provision rebounds strongly, working capital
only reaches pre-1931 levels late in the 1930s. Overall, however, there
seems to be an upward trend in the provision of credit during the 1930s,
possibly as the industry was maturing.
[] The reason for the steep decline of total loans and input pro-
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Figure 2.1: Density of Total Value of Loans and Inputs per Hectare
Farmed
vided is not completely obvious. In addition to overall effects of the fi-
nancial crisis, which might have decreased the liquidity of the Japanese
parent companies, i t has been documented historically, that the sugar
industry in Taiwan suffered severely during the early thirties, due to the
fall in sugar prices in Japan (Fan, 1967). As can be seen in Figure 2.3,
the total amount of loans tracks the sugar price quite closely. As sugar
prices fell, investment in sugar becomes less profitable from the point
of view of the mills and therefore they might have had less incentive to
supply costly credit.
[]
Mill and Farmer Data
In addition to the data on lending, I obtain a number of other outcome
variables from the Taiwan Sugar Statistics on the behaviour of mills and
farmers. Concerning the farmer behaviour, I digitalised data on the
amount of fertiliser used, the area planted with sugarcane and yields
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Figure 2.2: Loans by Type over Time
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Figure 2.3: Correlation between Total Loans and Sugar Prices in Japan
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by the type of field. It is important to note, that this data was reported
by the mills and thus is aggregated at the mill level. Concerning the
mills, I have information on the area planted with sugarcane by the mills
distinguishing between paddy and dry fields and the respective yields.
From this I calculate what percentage of total paddy fields or dry fields is
being cultivated. Furthermore, I have information on sugar production:
In addition to detailed information on sugarcane used and the amount of
sugar produced, I have also a measure of technical efficiency - referred to
as the sugar yield- that takes into account the quality of sugar produced.
Further, I have detailed information on capital investment as well as
information about the length of the harvest as well as how many days
the factory was inactive during this period. The latter is of particular
interest, as it is very costly for the factory to be inactive but at the same
time reducing this time relies heavily on a close cooperation between
farmers and mill. I further digitalised a number of variables to be used
as controls, such as the equity level of the parent company in 1918, the
size of the parent company in terms of number of factories, the total
size of the command area as well as mill age. Unfortunately, I have
no information on labour employed. It should be noted, however, that if
mechanised production methods are used, labour costs are a small share
of total costs in sugar milling. Table 2.1 gives the relevant summary
statistics.
Finally, I also include a number of controls on the prefecture level:
prefecture population, total cultivated land and per capita ownership of
livestock.
2.3.2 Measures of Exposure to Rice Price Changes
The key variation of the empirical strategy is the degree to which mills
and the farmers in their command area are affected by changes in the
outside option of the farmers due to changes of rice prices in Japan. The
effect of rice prices on the average farmer outside option is assumed to
be a function of the average suitability of the command area for the cul-
tivation of rice. Thus the measure of treatment intensity is the averarge
rice suitability of each mill’s command area.
Given Taiwan’s climate, irrigation, more than soil quality, is a key
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Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Command Areas
Share of Paddy Fields 391 .437 .298 0 .998
Command Area (h) 391 117349.8 708380.7 3866.285 4726422
Farmer Outcomes
Fertilizer (jin)
Share of Paddy Fields - Farmers (%) 303 66.8 5.4 0 79.5
Farmer Paddy Fields Yield (Jin/h) 470 126.418 161.228 11.941 3558.427
Share of Dry Fields - Farmers (%) 312 20.8 10.2 3.3 77.8
Farmer Paddy Fields Yield (Jin/h) 469 119.1 28.7 11.9 237.9
Farmer Dry Fields Yield (Jin/h) 496 97.4 25.7 31.4 169.8
Mill Outcomes
Share of Paddy Fields - Mills (%) 342 9.1 3.53 0 44.4
Share of Dry Fields - Mills (%) 338 6.8 8.7 0 56.2
Mills Paddy Fields Yield (Jin/h) 496 130.5 37.4 34.7 258.2
Mills Dry Fields Yield (Jin/h) 496 113.4 40.3 18.19 364.1
Cane Used for Production (tons) 481 236.5 176.8 223.4 978.4
Sugar Output (tons) 482 30.6 22.5 0.7 121.4
Sugar Yield (%) 482 12.1 2.5 5.5 15.5
Capital (tons)
Harvest Duration (days) 482 133.8 31.6 50 240
Share of Days not Operation (share) 479 .415 .378 0 .98
No. of mills: 38
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
determinant in whether a given field is suitable for rice cultivation, as
the field needs to be flooded at the beginning of the growth cycle of
rice. Fields that can be naturally or artificially flooded thus are referred
to as paddy fields. The Japanese colonial administration distinguished
thus between three types of fields: Paddy fields that are rain-fed, which
means that they are only sufficiently irrigated for rice plantation once a
year, paddy fields that are linked to man-made irrigation channels and
thus can be cultivated twice a year and finally so-called dry fields that are
not suitable for rice production. Sugarcane on the other hand requires
less intense irrigation and thus can be grown on all three types of fields
1.
For certain years, the Taiwan Sugar Statistics contains information
on the area within each command area that is of either of the three
types and that is also suitable for the cultivation of sugarcane. Thus, as
one of my measures of rice suitability, I calculate the share of the total
land suitable for sugarcane cultivation within the command area that
1While sugarcane is an irrigation intensive crop, it does not however require as
intensive irrigation at the one point in time as is the case with rice
18
are paddy fields i.e. the area within the command area that are paddy
fields and suitable for sugarcane divided by the total land suitable for
sugarcane:
suitabilitypaddyi,t = paddyi,t/total landi (2.2)
Note that while the total land within a command area is fixed over
time, as the border of command areas remained unchanged, the area of
fields that are paddy fields could and does indeed change over time due
to improvements in the irrigation system. This causes an endogeneity is-
sue, as mills that gain better access to irrigation might be fundamentally
different from those that do not, and thus these unobservable charac-
teristics might be driving the results. Thus, I restrict the area of paddy
fields at its 1918 level, the earliest year for which the information is made
available. As a result, the suitability becomes a time-invariant variable.
This restricts the sample to mills that have been active since 1918 and
are still active in 1930.
suitabilitypaddyi = paddyi,1918/total landi (2.3)
As a further robustness check, in some specifications, I restrict the
measure of suitability to the share of land that are only rain-fed paddy
fields and exclude all artificially irrigated fields, i.e.
suitabilityrain− f edi = rain-fedi,1918/total landi (2.4)
In some occasions, I further use the rice suitability measure from
the Food and Agricultural Organization (2016) crop-suitability data. Specif-
ically, I use the land-suitability for wetland rice using low-level inputs,
i.e. assuming no man-made irrigation is available, again to avoid en-
dogeneity concerns. I calculate the treatment intensity variable using
information about the exact GIS coordinates of the boundaries of each
mills command area in 1918. While this measure is less subject to en-
dogeneity concerns, it is also likely to be less exact as the earliest point
measured is 1962. Thus, in most specification, I use the measures based
on the Japanese data.
Figure 2.4b shows the suitability for rice of each of the command
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(a) Cane Suitability (b) Rice Suitability
Figure 2.4: Command Areas by Crop Suitability
Notes: Maps are based on the FAO crop suitability index, which ranges from 1 to 9.
GIS Data on the boundaries of the command areas has been compiled by the Academia
Sinica’s Institute. Higher suitability is indicated by darker colouring.
areas, using the FAO measure. It is clear to see that rice suitability is
not randomly distributed: mills in the north have command areas that
area significantly more suitable for rice cultivation than in the south. The
suitability for sugar cane follows the opposite pattern as shown in Figure
2.4a. This gives rise to concerns that mills in the north are fundamen-
tally different from those in the south and thus would have developed
differently independent from the treatment. Further discussion of these
concerns and what I do to address them follows in Section 2.4.3.
2.3.3 Prices of Rice, Sugar and Other Agricultural Goods
The price data for the agricultural products is taken from Japanese and
not from Taiwanese markets, in order to avoid reverse causality concerns
i.e. to rule out that price data is influenced by changes in the supply and
demand of farmers and mills.
The data on rice prices comes from the historic records of the
Nagoya Rice Exchange, founded in 1877 and one of the largest rice ex-
changes in Japan. Prices are expressed in Yen per Koku, a measure of
volume equivalent to 278.3 litres. The dataset records the yearly mini-
mum, maximum and average price for long-grain rice from 1877 until
1939. I use the minimum rice prices as a measure of prices, though re-
sults are robust to using the average price instead. Figure A.2 shows the
correlation between both measures.
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While changes to rice prices affect the outside option of paddy
farmers, it does not take into account possible changes to the outside
option of dry field farmers. Thus, similarly to before, I proxy changes
to the outside option of dry farmers with the changes to the price of
the main crop produced on dry fields, namely red and black beans.
Bean prices are also reported in yen per Koku at the Tokyo market.
The data is taken from the Taiwan Statistical Yearbooks (1922-1939) that
were compiled by the Taiwanese Governor General’s office, under the
Japanese administration. They are reported annually and distinguish
between red and black bean prices. I take a simple average of the two
prices. In my analysis, I then focus only on changes to the relative price,
which is the rice prices divided by the average bean price.
Information on the sugar prices are taken from the Taiwan Sugar
Statistics, which records monthly prices for refined sugar on the Tokyo
market. Prices are measured in yen per 100 jin (60kg) from 1918 until
1944. I calculate a yearly average in order to correspond to rice prices.
Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of all three prices over time. There
is a clear downward trend for rice until 1931, indicated by the second
dotted line. After 1931, the price begins to rise steeply. The first dotted
line indicates the introduction of Ponlai rice in Taiwan, only after which
the shown rice prices became salient for Taiwanese farmers. While both
sugar and beans also reach their lowest point in 1931, they do not ex-
perience the same dramatic reversal as rice. Sugar prices, in particular,
decrease until 1931 but remain relatively low thereafter.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section I first determine which characteristics predict or correlate
with the suitability for rice cultivation of the command area of a given
mill. Then I continue by describing the empirical strategy, a difference-
in-difference framework, and discussing possible concerns about identi-
fication.
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Figure 2.5: Agricultural Goods Prices on Japanese Mainland
Sugar and Bean prices are prices are measured in Tokyo while rice prices are measured
in Osaka. Refined sugar price: 1 yen purchases 100 jin (60kg). Rice & Bean prices:
one yen purchases one Koku (278.3 litres). Ponlai rice was available for cultivation
in Taiwan only from 1925 onwards, as indicated by the first dashed line. The second
dashed line indicates the timing of the change in rice policy on the Japanese mainland.
1 Japaneses Yen was equivalent of 0.5 USD at the time.
2.4.1 Patterns of Firm Characteristics and Rice Suitability
As can be seen in Figure 2.4b, command areas that are larger and further
in the north have a larger share of paddy fields. This indicates that rice
suitability is not allocated as if random, which might also imply that the
common trend assumption could be violated.
In Table 2.2, I show which of the mill characteristics used as con-
trols in the baseline regression predict the suitability for rice cultivation
of its command area (i.e. the share of paddy fields). The firm charac-
teristics included are limited to those that remain fixed after the firm
is established and are in turn not affected by the share of paddy fields.
I include the year the mill was established, the total size of the com-
mand area, equity of the mother company and the prefecture the mill is
located in. The results are shown in table 2.2. Firstly, we can observe
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that a higher share of paddy fields is associated with a later year of es-
tablishment,though it disappears somewhat once prefecture fixed effects
are included. This negative correlation between age and paddy share is
supported by the historical literature. It is seen to be a consequence of
the exclusive command area legislation, which implied that new mills
could only be founded on land that was not yet within the command
area of another mill. Therefore, older mills had an advantage in estab-
lishing themselves in their preferred location, which are usually in the
dryer south that is more suitable for sugar cane cultivation. The results
for the variables regarding the parent company are more surprising, as
they indicate that larger companies are more likely to establish a mill in
a location with paddy fields.
Share of Paddy Fields of Total Area
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year of Establishment .026** .033*** .019 .013
(.011) (.011) (.014) (.016)
Size of Command Area (100 000h) .010*** .014*** .014***
(.001) (.002) (0.02)
Number of Factories owned by Company .015 .013** -.018
(.011) (.006) (.027)
Company Equity in 1918 (million Yen ) .007
.007
Prefecture FE N N Y Y
R2 .10 .23 .53 .65
N 35 33 33 33
Table 2.2: Mill Characteristics that Predict Paddy Share
Robust standard errrors are in parantheses.***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
I then plot the main outcome variable, total monetary loans pro-
vided, on the residual from column (4). Figure 2.6 shows that reassur-
ingly there is little correlation.
2.4.2 Difference-in-Difference Estimation
The aim of this paper is to analyse the change in the outside option of
a subset of farmers caused by a change in rice prices. Due to the long
growing period of sugarcane, mills and farmers base their decisions in
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Figure 2.6: Correlation Between Residual Paddy Share and Log Total
Monetary Loans
period t on the expected rice price in period t + 1 and t + 2. Thus, unex-
pected shocks to rice prices should only have a small impact (assuming
all agents are rational). Instead, they should adapt their behaviour pri-
marily if the change is assumed to be permanent or the trend in prices
are changing. As outlined in section 2.2.3, in 1931 there were a num-
ber of policies that could be reasonably expected to change the level and
also possibly the trend of rice prices for the future. Figure 2.5 shows that
indeed the rice price experiences a dramatic change in terms of trend.
Thus, in my main specification, I analyse the change of lending before
and after 1931 in a difference-in-difference estimation strategy with con-
tinuous treatment intensity.
[] To highlight this point, one could consider the incentive con-
straint in a simple credit model of strategic default with a single model
as is proposed in (Ghosh et al., 2000). Suppose that there is a single
lender, which in this case is the mill. There are three periods: In period
t-1, the mill announces a contract consisting of Lt, which is the loan it
is willing to supply, r, the interest rate of said loan and yct , which is it’s
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payment for the sugarcane sold by the farmers. Farmers observe this
contract and in period t decide whether to plant sugarcane or rice. For
simplicity assume that this is a binary decision. The planting decision
is an essence already a decision on whether the farmer wants to default
on the loan: If the farmer plants sugarcane, he or she is forced to repay
the loan, as the mill is a monopolist and will simply deduct the loan
repayment, i.e. if the farmer decides to plant sugarcane, in period t+1 he
or she harvests the cane and sells it to the monopolist, for yct − (1+ r)Lt.
If the farmer, however, has taken out a loan and decides to plant rice, the
mill imposes a large fine. Therefore, repayment is likely to be impossible
or not desirable. Therefore, if the farmer has planted rice, in period t+1,
he or she will default on the loan. In this case, the farmer earns income
yrt form his or her rice harvest. Suppose that y
r
t < y
c
t The time line can
also be seen below:
Figure 2.7: Timeline
In the case of default, the mill historically imposed heavy fines,
which I assume in this case implies that the farmer is no longer able to
either borrow from nor sell to the mill and therefore is no longer able to
produce sugarcane. Supposing that the farmer has a discount factor of
δ, it can be shown easily that the farmer only repays his or her loan if
the following incentive constraint is satisfied:
IC :
∞
∑
t=0
δt
(
Et
[
yct
]− (1+ r)L) ≥ ∞∑
t=0
δt
(
Et
[
yrt
])
+ L (2.5)
The equation above implies that the farmer only repays the loan
if the future expected pay-off of planting cane minus the repayment
value is larger than the future expected pay-off from planting rice. It
can easily be seen from the above equation that this incentive constraint
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is more likely to bind if expectations about future rice prices are higher
keeping cane prices fixed. In this way contemporaneous prices should
only matter for informing expectations about future prices. This is in
part, because decisions about defaulting are made at the planting stage
and therefore by design future prices are the relevant statistic and in part
due to the fact that by defaulting the farmer closes off the possibility of
selling sugarcane to the mill in the future. The latter means that while
the first period’s prices are important, expectations about the price trend
are even more important for the decision. As a result, the empirical
strategy will primarily focus on the change in trends, though I also use
contemporaneous prices in some specifications []
As variables are reported at the mill level, the treatment intensity
varies also at the mill level and depends on the share of fields within a
command area of the mill that are suitable for rice production. In my
baseline specifications this is measured as the area of paddy fields as
a share of the total area within the command area that are suitable for
sugarcane cultivation, as outlined in equation 2.3.
The panel data structure of the data allows me to include both
year and mill-level fixed effects, which implies that all unobserved time
invariant mill and farmer characteristics, as well as any year effects that
are common across all mills are absorbed. However, imbalances between
factories with a high and low paddy share could be associated with dif-
ferential time trends. As most paddy fields are in the north of Taiwan,
the two samples are indeed not balanced. Thus, I further include prefec-
ture specific time trends. In addition, I include time-varying prefecture
controls to capture non-linear trends, such the population working in
agriculture, the total cultivated land in the prefecture and the number of
cattle per capita as a proxy for rural incomes.
I do not use factory level time-varying controls except age, since
these are potentially endogenous to treatment and could lead to bias
(see for example Angrist et al. (2009)). I do include two time-invariant
mill characteristics that I interact with the post-dummy, namely parent-
company capital in 1918 as well as total size of the command area. The
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final specification therefore becomes:
yi,t = α0 + α1postt · paddyi + θi + γt + pre f ecturep · t + agei,t + Xi · posti + εi,t
(2.6)
where yi,t are the factory-level outcomes at time t, θi and γt are the fac-
tory and time fixed effects respectively, and pre f ecturec · t are the region
specific time trends. agei,t denotes the age of mill i at time t, and Xi are
time-invariant mill controls The main variable of interest is the interac-
tion of postt, a dummy that equals 0 at time t ≤ 1931 and equal to 1
otherwise and paddyi, the share of paddy fields of total area suitable for
sugarcane cultivation within the command area of a given mill measured
in 1918. The effect thus represents the average change in lending across
all time periods after 1931 proportional to the share of paddy fields.
The main regression analyses the effect on the value of loans dis-
pensed and inputs provided. However, a decrease in total value might
simply be caused by a reduction in the amount of sugarcane being cul-
tivated. Thus the main variable of interest is the value of loans (and
inputs provided) in Yen normalised by the area in hectares that is used
for sugarcane cultivation in the same year. While this does not exclude
that the effects observed are caused by a reduction in demand, it does
rule out the purely mechanical channel of reduced production that could
be driving a possible reduction in lending.
Trend break vs. Price Changes
The empirical strategy outlined in the previous section, concentrates on
the the break in trends of rice prices, and not primarily on the actual
price in each period. This is due to the fact t
2.4.3 Identification concerns
The coefficient in the above regression captures a causal effect only if the
so-called parallel trend assumption is satisfied, i.e. that mills with differ-
ent shares of paddy fields would have experienced the same trend over
time in absence of any treatment. This would ensure that the observed
effect is not caused by differential trends that are not due to the change
in rice prices.
27
One way of addressing this concern is to check whether mills with
different treatment degrees exhibit parallel trends before the treatment
takes place. This is somewhat challenging for the main variables of in-
terest, lending and the provision of inputs, as these are recorded the
earliest in 1929. Therefore, there are just two time periods before 1931,
the year price trends changed. Figure 2.8 shows the average total value
of all loans as well as of the inputs provided over time split up for mills
with a higher or lower than median share of paddy fields. Note that
given that rice prices are not constant before 1931, we do not necessarily
expect the pre-trends of the two groups to be perfectly parallel. It would
be important however, that the pre-trends are not such that they con-
tribute in explaining the treatment effect we observe. Figure 2.8 shows
that, in the two periods before treatment, 1929 and 1930, the two groups
experiencing a near identical trend. Figure A.3 shows the same trends
for loans and for the two inputs, seeds and fertiliser, separately. Again,
pre-1931, the trends seem very similar. Though this is reassuring, it
is important to note the two periods may not be sufficient in order to
establish a parallel trend.
Next, as a second test, I interact the share of paddy fields with
9 yearly dummies, leaving out 1931 as a reference year, which allows
for a more explicit test of the parallel trends. If we mills with a higher
share of paddy fields experienced lower lending before the change in
price trends, this should appear in the coefficients. Finally, I conduct the
same tests as above on other mill and farmer outcomes, which I observe
over a much longer time period and in earlier years. More specifically,
I make use of the fact that the exportable, long-grain Ponlai rice was
only introduced in Taiwan in 1925. Thus, previous to that date, rice
prices in Japan should have no (or lesser) effect on mills and farmers
in Taiwan, and thus we would expect to observe a parallel trend before
1925. Results of both tests are presented as robustness checks in section
2.5.2.
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Figure 2.8: Average of Log of Total Value of Loans and Inputs Provided
The total value of loans and inputs for mills with less than median share of paddy
fields is normalised to equal those of mills with above median share in the year 1929.
Values are expressed in loged Yen.
2.5 Results on Lending
2.5.1 Baseline Results
Table 2.3 shows the results of the regression as described by equation
2.6. The main outcome variable is the total value of loans and inputs
provided by the mill to the farmers divided by the number of hectares
farmed with sugarcane, which is shown in columns (1) to (3). Column
(1) shows the basic difference-in-difference estimation without any con-
trols or fixed effects. Interestingly, while a higher share of paddy fields
is associated with a higher value of loans and inputs provided, the inter-
active term is negative and significant at the 95% level. A one standard
deviation increase in the share of paddy fields decreases the value of
loans and inputs provided by close to 19Y. Inclusion of prefecture and
year fixed effects as well as prefecture time trends in column (2) only
strengthens the result and total lending is now reduced by 24.4Y. This
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represent around 11% of the average value of loans and inputs pro-
vided. Column (3) includes further time-varying prefecture controls as
well as time-invariant mill controls interacted with a post-1931 dummy.
The coefficients remain nearly unchanged; however, the sample size is
somewhat reduced due to missing values for some of the mill control
variables. Column (4) to (7) show that the decrease is clearly driven by
a decrease in monetary loans. Column (4) and (5) show that a one stan-
dard deviation increase of paddy fields causes loans to fall by 25.6 Y
per hectare, which increases to 26.8 Y per hectare when mill and prefec-
ture controls are included. Given that average value of loans provided
is around 103Y/hectare, this constitutes a fall of over 26%. Inputs pro-
vided by the mills of the farmers, however, remain unchanged as can be
seen in columns (6) and (7). Table A.4 conducts the same exercises using
the logged value of the same outcomes as in Table 2.3. While the mag-
nitude of the coefficients represent a slightly larger percentage change,
they are less precisely estimated and lose significance, when the full set
of controls are used. Table A.6 goes further in splitting loans according
to type, which support the findings in Table 2.3.
The results of the baseline specification are consistent with a de-
crease in the sustainability of relational contracts between mills and
farmers. The fact that the effect is driven exclusively by the decrease in
fungible loans and that non-fungible inputs are nearly unchanged sup-
ports the hypothesis that this effect is driven by the increase by farmers’
incentive to default. If the effect was purely caused by a decrease in field
quality used for can cultivation or a decrease in demand for cane related
inputs, there should be a similar negative effect on the provision of in-
puts. However, compositional effects may well play an important role as
more credit worthy farmers might have switched to rice production.
One concern with my findings is that the results might be driven
by serial auto-correlation within the dependant variable. While, this is
a stronger concern when the number of states is small relative to the
number of time periods, I investigate this concern following the method
proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004), by collapsing the data into a single
pre- and post-period. While likely reducing power, this should remove
the auto-correlation without relying on parametric estimates that do not
usually perform well with such small sample size. The results are shown
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in Table A.5. While the effect on total loans per hectare cultivated with
cane looses its significance, the results for monetary loans remain robust.
Total Lending & Inputs Monetary Loans Inputs Provided
Y/hectare Y/hectare Y/hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
post* paddy -18.923** -24.420** -24.662** -25.593*** -26.828*** 1.201 2.739
( 8.094) (11.983 ) (10.799) (9.200) (7.691) (4.696) (5.191)
post 19.153
(12.879)
paddy 153.097***
(48.561)
Factory FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls N N Y N Y N Y
Mill Controls N N Y N Y N Y
N Mills 38 38 33 38 33 38 33
N Observations 360 360 291 360 291 360 291
R2 .014 .853 .860 .837 .824 .802 .816
Mean 209.74 209.74 209.74 102.93 102.93 106.89 106.89
Table 2.3: Loans and Inputs Provided Per Hectare Cultivated with Cane
Notes: The dependent variables are expressed as the total amount divided by the area
on which sugarcane is being cultivated in the same year. The independent variable
has been normalised such that one unit equals one standard deviation. Prefecture con-
trols include prefecture population, the population employed in agriculture, number
of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill controls are age as well as parent
company equity, the number of factories owned by the parent company and total size
of the command area, which are all interacted with a post-1931 dummy. All standard
errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
Finally, I replace the treatment variable with the interaction be-
tween the average price of long-grain rice in Japan and the share of
paddy fields, in order to see the direct effect of rice prices. It is important
to note that I use here the lagged prices, as these are the relevant prices
at the time when loans are issued and inputs given out. The results are
shown in Table A.7. Interestingly, as can be seen in Columns (6) and (7),
when using rice prices, we can find a positive effects on input provision.
This could be explained by mills substituting away from more fungible
loans are are due to the improved bargaining position of farmers, as rice
prices increase in the short run. Table 2.4 then investigates this further
and includes both variables in the regression. Column (2), (4) and (6)
show the results with both variables. It seems that prices have no direct
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effect on lending, but instead the change in trends, as captured by the
post-1931 dummy, has a significant negative effect. The opposite is true
for the inputs provided. Here, the short run price shocks seem to have
a positive effect on the value provided per hectare. This again could be
caused by the improved bargaining position of farmers or mills trying
to compensate for the decrease of fields cultivated with sugarcane.
Total Lending & Inputs Monetary Loans Inputs Provided
Y/hectare Y/hectare Y/hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pricet−1 ∗ paddy -3.380 11.328 -12.351** 2.131 9.306*** 10.611**
( 7.678) (10.162 ) (5.718) ( 6.811) (3.520) (4.282)
post ∗ paddy -29.737** -27.891** -2.516
(12.408) (9.336) (5.817)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mill Controls Y Y Y Y Y y
N Mills 38 33 33 33 33 33
N Observations 291 291 291 291 291 291
R2 .854 .861 .811 .823 .819 .820
Mean 209.74 209.74 102.93 102.93 106.89 106.89
Table 2.4: Baseline Specification Including both Prices and Post-1931
Dummy
Notes: The dependent variables are expressed as the total amount divided by the area
on which sugarcane is being cultivated in the same year. The independent variable
has been normalised such that one unit equals one standard deviation. Prefecture con-
trols include prefecture population, the population employed in agriculture, number
of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill controls are age as well as parent
company equity, the number of factories owned by the parent company and total size
of the command area, which are all interacted with a post-1931 dummy. All standard
errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
2.5.2 Robustness
In this section, I investigate the robustness of the baseline results. The
key assumption that needs to hold in order for my results to be valid is
that mills with different levels of rice suitability would have experienced
parallel trends in absence of treatment. As outlined in Section 2.4.3, I try
to test for this assumption in two ways: firstly, I include prefecture-year
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fixed effects as well as mill-specific linear trends. Secondly, I allow for
non-linear effects.
Table A.8 shows the results on fungible lending when prefecture-
year fixed effects and linear mill trends are included. Prefecture-year
fixed effects capture all the variation that is caused by non-linear pre-
fecture specific trends. Including linear mill time-trends means that our
coefficients no longer capture any linear changes at the mill level over
time. Columns (2) and (3) display the effects for the prefecture-year fixed
effects, first without and then with mill controls. The negative effect on
lending remains robust and the magnitude of the coefficients also re-
mains similar. Columns (4) shows the coefficients for the baseline equa-
tion is augmented for linear mill time-trends, and Column (5) shows the
same when prefecture controls are included. Again, the results remain
robust.
The results for the non-linear effects specification are shown in
Table A.9 as well as in Figures 2.9 and A.4. As mentioned above, un-
fortunately, lending data is only recorded for two time periods prior to
treatment and thus there is a limit how informative this is about the pre-
trends. Due to missing values for the area farmed in 1929, here the log
total values are shown. Reassuringly, Figure 2.9 and Table A.9 show that
the negative effect of treatment on lending only sets in after 1931.
Another concern I address is the endogeneity of my measure of
rice suitability, i.e. the area suitable for rice cultivation as a share of
the total area that is suitable for growing sugarcane. As the majority of
paddy fields are created through the construction of irrigation channels,
more productive mills or farmers might invest in better irrigation. Even
though in most cases, this endogeneity should work in the opposite
direction than indicated by the coefficients, as a robustness check I limit
my measure to the area of fields that are rain-fed paddy fields and thus
arguably a more exogenous measure. The results are shown in Table 2.5.
The basic pattern remains the same as in the baseline specification: Total
loans decrease, which is driven by a fall in loans while the provision of
inputs remains unchanged. The effect seems around half as big as the
The share of rain-fed paddy fields capture actual rice suitability much
more imperfectly and thus it is to be expected that the coefficients are
smaller and somewhat less precisely estimated.
33
Figure 2.9: Time-varying Treatment Effect Estimates on Log Loans (mon-
etary)
Notes: The outcome variable is the log value of all monetary loans. Confidence inter-
vals shown are at the 99%, 95%, 90% and 80% levels. The reference year is 1931.
2.6 Other Outcomes
In this section, I present the effects of the change in rice price trends on
other behaviours of farmers and mills.
2.6.1 Farmer Outcomes
The outcome variables concerning farmer behaviour are firstly the area
cultivated with sugarcane, the use of fertiliser and subsequent yields of
fields farmed.
The changes to the area of fields cultivated with sugarcane, dis-
tinguishing between paddy and dry fields, are shown in Table A.10. The
results are as would be expected independent of any breakdown of rela-
tional contracts: Column (1) and (2) display the effects on the total area
cultivated with sugarcane, where we see a small but non-significant de-
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Total Lending & Inputs Monetary Loans Inputs Provided
Y/hectare Y/hectare Y/hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post* paddy -11.651 -13.955** -10.950** -14.396*** -.564 .613
(7.243) (7.040) (5.468) (4.450) (3.961) (4.632)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls N Y N Y N Y
Mill Controls N Y N Y N Y
N Mills 38 33 38 33 38 33
N Observations 360 291 360 291 360 291
R2 .841 .829 .830 .815 .772 .816
Mean 209.74 209.74 102.93 102.93 106.89 106.89
Table 2.5: Baseline Results Using Rain-Fed Paddy Fields Only
Notes: The dependent variables are expressed as the total amount divided by the area
on which sugarcane is being cultivated in the same year. The independent variable
has been normalised such that one unit equals one standard deviation. Prefecture con-
trols include prefecture population, the population employed in agriculture, number
of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill controls are age as well as parent
company equity, the number of factories owned by the parent company and total size
of the command area, which are all interacted with a post-1931 dummy. All standard
errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
crease in the total area. When splitting the regression by type of field,
we see that there is a large and highly significant decrease of paddy
fields that are used for sugar cultivation of between 47-51% (see Column
(3) and (4)). Column (5) and (6) show that this decrease is offset by an
increase in dry fields on which sugarcane is grown of between 12.5%
and 21.5%. While these effects are not very surprising, they do however
give support to the hypotheses that the post-1931 captures only an effect
related to rice prices, as it affects the two types of fields such an asym-
metric way.It is also important to note that the results do not simply
indicate the straight forward propositions that a permanent increase in
rice prices decreases the area cultivated with sugarcane, but instead that
this increase decreases sugarcane cultivation more than proportionally in
areas with a larger share of paddy fields.
Another outcome of interest is the usage of fertiliser by farm-
ers.Firstly, I use the data on actual fertiliser usage to see if my presump-
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tion that the fertiliser provided is non-fungible and thus it should be
employed for cane cultivation. Figure A.5 shows the correlation between
fertiliser provided and fertiliser consumption. The correlation is around
1.111 and very strong. Indeed there are only few observations clearly
below the 45 degree line. Note that we would expect that the actual fer-
tiliser consumption should be larger than what was provided from the
mills, as fertiliser consumption also includes traditional fertilisers, such
as animal manure. The effect on fertiliser consumption are displayed in
Table 2.6. Column (1) and (2) show the effect on the logged value in Yen,
which is virtually unchanged by treatment. Further, column (3) and (4)
show the effect on the fertiliser used per hectare cultivated with sugar-
cane in the same year. Again there is no significant effect. Finally, in
column (5) and (6), I investigate whether the treatment has an effect on
fertiliser consumption relative to the value provided by the mills. A neg-
ative coefficient could for example imply that farmers divert provided
fertilisers to other crops, or would decrease their spending on additional
fertiliser. However, again the coefficients are insignificant.
The final farmer outcome are sugarcane yields shown in Table
A.11. Column (1) and (2) show the effect on all field types, while the
subsequent columns distinguish between paddy and dry fields. The
treatment effect is negative overall, which however could have been ex-
plained by the change in the share of paddy fields of the area being
cultivated with sugarcane, given that the yield of paddy fields is signif-
icantly higher than for dry fields. When running separate regressions
for each type of field, it can be seen that the negative effect exists within
both field categories. This could be due to decreased yield per field or
instead due to compositional changes of fields, due to both the increased
outside option but also possibly due to the lower provision of credit by
the mills. Unfortunately, I do not have field level information and thus
cannot distinguish these two channels.
2.6.2 Mill Outcomes
Finally, I analyse how the production of sugar by mills with a higher
share of paddy fields is affected after the permanent change in the trend
of rice prices. The information available on various stages of produc-
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Fertiliser
Log Total Value Y/hectare Actual Usage/Provision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post* paddy -.007 -.005 3.189 2.382 -.094 -.067
(.068) (.073) (6.529) (5.206) (.090) (.049)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls N Y N Y N Y
Mill Controls N Y N Y N Y
N Mills 42 33 42 33 42 33
N Observations 360 360 291 360 291 291
R2 .841 .829 .830 .815 .772 .816
Mean (piculs) 251827.3 114.468 1.643
Table 2.6: Effect on Fertiliser Consumption
Notes: In the last two columns the dependent variable is divided by the value of inputs
provided by the mill. The independent variable has been normalised such that one unit
equals one standard deviation. prefecture controls include prefecture population, the
population employed in agriculture, number of cattle owned and total land under
cultivation. Mill controls are age as well as parent company equity, the number of
factories owned by the parent company and total size of the command area, which are
all interacted with a post-1931 dummy. All standard errors are clustered at the factory
level. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
tion is quite detailed, however, I use information on the total amount of
cane used in production, the amount of sugar produced, the mechanical
efficiency of converting cane into sucrose, called the sugar yield, and
daily crushing capacity. Further, I have information about the harvest
duration as well as on the percentage of days during the harvest sea-
son that the mill is inactive. The results are shown in Table A.12. None
of the production variables seem affected except for the share of days
during harvest time that the mill remains inactive, shown in Column
(5). Mills with a one standard deviation higher share of paddy fields are
inactive for 2.2% more of the harvest duration. Ensuring a coordinated
and consistent harvest schedule is one of the key managerial aspects in
increasing productivity and requires close coordination with the farm-
ers. A deterioration of the coordination of the harvest may be caused by
the relationship with mills becoming less important for farmers, as rice
becomes a more profitable crop.
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2.7 Alternative Explanations
While the above results are consistent with a reduction in the supply
of credit caused by an increased fear of default, they could also be ex-
plained by alternative hypotheses. There are two alternative explana-
tions: Firstly, the observed effect could be caused by a decrease in the
demand of credit and secondly, the supply of credit by mills could be
reduced due to reasons unrelated to the fear of default. I find suggestive
evidence, however, that these alternative hypotheses are not supported
by the data.
2.7.1 Decreases in Demand for Credit
Understanding whether the decrease in credit is caused by demand or
supply effects is crucial for understanding the effect on farmer welfare
and market efficiency: If the demand for credit is simply reduced, mar-
kets should function equally efficiently and the policy would have in-
creased farmer welfare. On the other hand, if the observed effects are
caused by credit rationing, then this would imply a decrease in efficiency
and ambiguous effects on farmer welfare. Even though I normalise the
amount of loans by the area planted with sugarcane in a given year, in-
crease in the price of rice caused by the policy might lead to a decrease in
the demand for credit for a number of reasons. First of all, farmers might
have a reduced need for credit due to increased incomes from rice. This
is, however, contradicted by the negative effect on revenues earned per
hectare farmed with rice. Furthermore, areas with more paddy fields
might have been cultivated longer and thus have better access to infor-
mal networks or even formal lending. This is not supported by the data,
as in a cross section a larger share of paddy fields is actually not cor-
related with a higher amount of loans being provided in 1929, as was
shown in Figure 2.6.
The most serious concern is that the demand of credit is reduced
due to compositional effects. This would be the case if more credit con-
straint farmers happen to have a higher relative suitability for rice cul-
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tivation, for example as small farms produce higher yields in rice com-
pared to sugarcane. However, I can use the timing of the effect to rule
out this explanation. While the policy was announced in 1931 and the
treatment effect on loans is large and significant immediately, as was
shown in Figure 2.9, the actual rice price took several years to rise above
the 1929 level. Interestingly, as can be seen in Figure 2.10, the share of
paddy fields planted with cane only decreased in later years and fol-
lows the actual rice price quite closely. Therefore, the decrease in loans
preceeds the fall in the area planted with cane, making compositional ef-
fects less likely though not impossible, due to the aggregate nature of
the data.
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Figure 2.10: Time-varying Treatment Effect on Share of Paddy Fields
Planted with Cane
Notes: The outcome variable is the log value of all monetary loans. Confidence inter-
vals shown are at the 99%, 95%, 90% and 80% levels. The reference year is 1931.
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2.7.2 Other Decreases in Supply of Credit
Even if the results are not caused by a reduction in demand, the contrac-
tion of the supply of credit might be unrelated to the perceived risk of
default. For example, mills might have found alternative more lucrative
investment opportunities, for example in rice production. In this case,
however, we would expect there to be a reduction in other mill variables
that are affected by decreased investment but unaffected by default rates,
such as sugarcane farming undertaken by mills themselves or the provi-
sion of inputs. Results on the cultivation of sugarcane by mills is shown
in Table A.13, which shows the area cultivated and yields for both types
of fields. In contrast to farmer cultivation, the change in rice prices does
not seem to have any significant effect. Similarly, the provision of inputs,
both seeds and fertilizer, are unaffected by the treatment as can be seen
in Table A.14.
A further concern might be that mills themselves become more
credit constraint due to a reduction in their expected profits. As a result
they are more liquidity constrained and less able to provide loans. If
this were the case, we would expect this effect to be larger for mills that
belong to smaller parent companies. I measure size of the parent com-
pany as a) the equity of the company in 1918 and b) as the number of
mills belonging to the parent company. Table A.15 shows, however, that
there is no heterogeneous effects according to size. Finally, I investigate
whether the negative effect is higher or lower for mills whose command
area includes a district court in 1928, which I use as a measure of en-
forceability. Table A.16 shows that the negative effect of the policy is
mitigated by around a third for mills who have a court located in their
command area. This mitigation, however, only occurs for loans and
not for inputs provided, reducing concerns that the presence of a court
proxies for lower credit demand or unobservable mill characteristics.
2.7.3 Other Types of Contracts
Even if the effect is driven neither by changes in the demand for credit
nor in outside changes in the supply, unrelated to repayment rates, it
is not yet clear that relational contracts need to be crucial here. Instead
there could be alternative contracts that underlie the observed changes.
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I discuss two possible alternative sets of contracts.
Strategic Default within a Spot Contract
One of the most obvious alternatives to a relational contract is the pos-
sibility that credit rationing occurs due to strategic defaults in a single
period contract. Lending under relational contracts can be self-enforcing
due to the threat of losing the long-run trading relationship in the case of
default. However, the increase in rice prices could lead to an increase in
defaults even in the absence of a longer term trading relationship, as the
incentive to default and grow rice instead of sugar is increased in each
period. In this case, we would have a similar incentive compatibility
constraint as in equation 2.5. However instead of the farmer compar-
ing the total expected future value of the relationship, he or she simply
compares the pay-offs in each period, i.e. it would simply become:
IC : δt
(
Et
[
yct
]− (1+ r)L) ≥ (Et[yrt]) + L (2.7)
This could be the case for example because farmers are myopic
or because the threat of severing the trading relationship is either not
enforced or not believed.
While the baseline results are consistent with this set of contracts,
we would expect in this case the most important factor to be the con-
temporaneous rice price and not the break in the rice price trend. This,
however, is inconsistent with the results in Table 2.4, which shows that
if we include both actual prices and the trend-break dummy in the re-
gression it is the latter that explains the changes in loans. However, if
switching costs are large, one could imagine that the planting decision
becomes a forward-looking decision and should depend on the expecta-
tion of future prices instead. In this case, we can no longer distinguish
between a spot lending contract and a relational contract.
Asymmetric Information
A more serious concern is that the increase in rice prices causes a change
in the composition in borrowers, which leads to credit rationing by
aggravating asymmetric information issues. Asymmetric information
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about the ’quality’ of the borrower could lead to credit rationing as
mills cannot charge high enough interest rates to make lending prof-
itable given the riskiness of cane production. Similarly as discussed in a
previous section, it could be that land that is more suitable for rice culti-
vation is also a more suitable or less risky land for sugarcane cultivation,
and therefore as farmers switch to rice production the composition of the
pool of lenders is changed. Therefore, in the presence of switching costs,
such a mechanism could also produce a negative relationship between
the expected rice price and lending.
However, in this case we should most likely see that a change
in lending to go hand in hand with a switching of farmers to paddy
fields. However, as mentioned in section 2.7.1, we see a strong decrease
in loans to sugarcane farmers before we see a change in the area of
paddy fields or dry fields farmed with rice and sugarcane. Of course the
data is aggregated and not on a field by field basis and I cannot rule out
that the composition of fields has changed. I further test whether land
that is particularly suitable for rice cultivation is particularly suitable for
sugarcane at an aggregate level by regressing the FAO suitability index
for rice on that for sugarcane. I find a strong negative correlation, as can
be seen in Figure A.6.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper analyses the effect of a change in the outside option of a sub-
set of farmers on mill-to-farmer lending and provision of inputs. More
specifically, I investigate how a permanent change in the price of rice, the
main alternative crop for a subset of farmers, affects lending in the case
of the sugar industry in colonial Taiwan. Under perfect contract enforce-
ment, improving farmer outside option should improve their bargaining
position and thus increase lending, if such demand exists. However,
under the weak contract enforcement during the colonial period, such
lending was likely to be supported by relational contracts. In this case,
improvements to outside options reduce the relative importance farm-
ers place on the relationship with the mill, which might reduce informal
lending and thus contribute to reducing farmer welfare. The evidence
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presented in this paper shows that the latter seems to be the case. I ob-
serve that more affected mills provide significantly less monetary loans
to their farmers, even though the provision of inputs remain the same.
The area farmed with sugarcane remains stable and fertiliser usage re-
mains unchanged, but yields are severely decreased, pointing at either
incentive or compositional effects. Further, mills that are more exposed
to the change in rice prices seem to be less able to organise harvesting
efficiently. While the current evidence presented indicates a deteriora-
tion of relational contracts, there is little yet to be said about farmer
welfare. Thus in current work in progress, I am digitalising data on the
sub-prefecture level, which gives me information about the majority of
crops produced and thus allows me to more accurately make statements
about the welfare implications.
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Chapter 3
The Benefits of the Bamboo
Network in International Trade
3.1 Introduction
Non-tariff trade costs have been the focus of the empirical trade litera-
ture since the seminal contribution of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001). These
trade costs appear to be large and important determinants of trade flows
across countries. However, they are still not well understood. The key
empirical challenge is that non-tariff barriers are inherently unobserv-
able. The study of the role of ethnic networks in facilitating trade allows
us not only to document the importance of unobservable frictions, but
also to shed light on their nature; in fact, ethnic networks are helpful for
overcoming only some of these barriers. Although the importance of eth-
nic networks in promoting trade has been widely documented (Rauch
and Trindade, 2002; Rauch, 2001, 1999; Parsons et al., 2014), there is still
little consensus on the exact channels at play, which is often due to the
aggregate nature of the available data.
In this paper, we add to the literature by studying the effect of
ethnic networks using firm level data from Guangdong Province, China.
The network in question was created after a mass migration wave of
ethnic Cantonese people from Guangdong to the United States in the
late 19th century. We study the effect of improved access to the the ethnic
network in the U.S., which we define as the network of American-born
ethnic Cantonese residing in the United States.
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Our identification strategy makes use of the diversity of ethnicities
and languages in Southern China. We calculate the degree of exposure
to ethnic networks of firms in Guangdong as the interaction of two di-
mensions. Firstly, an industry dimension: we assume that a given firm’s
exposure to the network increases with the number of ethnic Cantonese
workers employed in industries that it is likely to have trading rela-
tionships with. We propose that a Chinese firm is more likely to trade
with U.S. firms operating in the same 4-digit industry, with downstream
manufacturing buyers, or with retailers and wholesalers, which sell the
goods it produces. Therefore, we calculate three different measures of
network exposure at the industry level, corresponding to the number of
ethnic Cantonese workers in each of those related industries.
Secondly, according to our measure, firms’ network exposure in-
creases with cultural closeness to the ethnic network in the U.S. For this
measure we exploit the geographic location of firms: “cultural expo-
sure” to the network is higher for firms located in one of the sending
counties of migrants in the 19th century. This flows through two chan-
nels. Firstly, there may still exist kinship ties, i.e. the descendants of the
migrants in the U.S. may have maintained relations with individuals in
the place of origin. The second channel is language, as the main lan-
guage spoken in the sending counties is a dialect belonging to the Can-
tonese group, which is not intelligible for individuals speaking dialects
of other groups. In order to shed light on the relative importance of
the two mechanisms, we also employ another measure of cultural close-
ness, namely a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is located in
a Cantonese speaking area.
We then construct our final measure of exposure as an interaction
of the two dimensions and our main analysis follows a difference-in-
difference framework at the county-industry level, where we control for
county and industry fixed effects.
Our main data set is the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises
from the year 2004 conducted by the China’s National Bureau of Statis-
tics for the province Guangdong. The survey covers all manufacturing
enterprises with output larger than 5 million RMB, which in Guang-
dong amounts to around 34,500 firms. The data set provides information
about a number of firm variables in addition to exports. Furthermore,
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we have access to the Chinese Economic Census, which records employ-
ment and revenues for the universe of registered firms. We use this data
set to analyse how the firm size distribution is affected and whether
there were additional effects on smaller firms or firms in other sectors.
Finally, we construct our measure of network exposure from U.S. census
data.
The main findings indicate that more connected firms are more
likely to export, and have higher export value. This means that the ben-
efits of the ethnic network affect both the extensive and the intensive
margin of trade. The effects are economically significant: for a one stan-
dard deviation increase in network exposure, the probability of export-
ing is about 3 percentage points higher for each of the three measures of
industry network, and the value of exports conditional on the firm being
an exporter is about 6 to 14 percent higher, depending on the measure
of network exposure.
We conduct a number of exercises to investigate which -direct and
indirect- channels may be driving our results. The literature has pro-
posed two channels through which ethnic networks can directly impact
exporting behaviour. Firstly, when formal contract enforcement mecha-
nisms are weak or non-existent, ethnic networks can overcome this void
through collective punishment, thus facilitating trade. Secondly, ethnic
networks can overcome important information barriers that potential ex-
porters face, such as lack of knowledge about the tastes of consumers in
the destination market or play an important role in matching buyers
and sellers. Moreover, ethnic networks can have indirect effects on ex-
ports through aiding the spread of technological knowledge or through
promoting foreign direct investment.
We find little evidence that exports are driven by technological
knowledge flows that are aided by the network, as profitability does not
increase nor is the effect larger for high-tech firms. We do, however, find
a positive effect on labour productivity for smaller manufacturing firms,
which could be indicative of knowledge flows playing a role for this
subset. Similarly, while foreign direct investment does seem to increase
with exposure to the network, it cannot explain our results.
Concerning the direct channels, we further investigate whether
the results can be explained by improvements in contract enforcement
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or by the flow of information through the network. Following Rauch
(1999), we study whether the effect is driven by differentiated goods, for
which the information channel should be of greater importance. We do
find a larger effect for differentiated goods, supporting Rauch (2001)’s
finding, that the information channel is of particular importance.
Finally, we also find effects on other firm-level variables: More
connected firms have higher output and profits but lower domestic sales.
They also have significantly higher fixed assets and capital, while keep-
ing the total number of workers constant. Firms with more exposure
to the network also have a higher share of workers with a university
degree, pay higher wages and have higher management expenses.
While these findings are consistent with a number of hypothe-
ses, one possibility is that ethnic networks lower informational barriers,
which then allows firms to specialise in products for the U.S. market
that are not demanded by Chinese consumers. Therefore, these firms
sell less in the domestic market but exports are increased. The fact that
more connected firms employ more high-skilled workers and more fixed
assets is consistent with quality upgrading of the main product, which
is in higher demand in the American market.
Our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we estimate the effect of eth-
nic networks on international trade at the firm level. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the first to distinguish between the effects of
ethnic networks on the intensive and extensive margin of trade at firm
level. Moreover, we have access to a rich data set of firm level variables,
which allows us identify the channels though which ethnic networks
affect trade.
Secondly, our identification strategy captures the effects of an eth-
nic network formed through historic migration. Other papers have mea-
sured ethnic networks with past migration patterns (Kerr and Lincoln,
2010; Kerr, 2013; Griffith et al., 2006; Parsons et al., 2014) to mitigate
reverse causality concerns. However, our very narrow definition of net-
work allows us to further overcome the possibility that recent migrants
may selectively settle in U.S. counties that have a high prevalence of
industries which are well performing in China.
The paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 describes the related
literature; section 3.3 outlines the mechanisms through which ethnic net-
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works can affect international trade; section 3.4 provides an overview of
the migration of Cantonese people to the U.S.; section 3.5 describes the
data sources and how we construct the data sets; section 3.6 describes in
detail the empirical strategy. We illustrate the results regarding exports
and other firm variables in sections 3.7 and 3.8, and finally section 3.9
concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
This work relates to several strands of literature, which analyse the ef-
fect of ethnic networks on several aspects of the economy: international
trade, labour markets, knowledge diffusion and innovation, and firm
growth in developing countries. Moreover, it relates to the literature on
the impact of language and culture on international trade.
Firstly, it contributes to the literature on the role of co-ethnic net-
works on international trade. Rauch and Trindade (2002) are among the
first to empirically document the role of Chinese ethnic networks in in-
ternational trade in a cross country study; they find a higher volume of
bilateral trade among China and countries with a higher share of ethnic
Chinese population. Rauch (2001) provides a review of the literature
on the effect of social networks on international trade focusing mainly
on two channels: reduction of information barriers and better contract
enforcement. A closely related paper in terms of research question and
empirical strategy is the recent contribution by Parsons et al. (2014): the
authors use a natural experiment - the migration of the Vietnamese Boat
People to the U.S. - to provide empirical evidence of a link between eth-
nic migrant networks and exports of American firms, thus focusing on
the benefits of ethnic networks for the receiving country of migrants.
Their findings establish a causal link between the geographical location
of Vietnamese people in the U.S. and the volume of exports to Vietnam,
suggesting that networks play a role in international trade between the
two countries.
A number of papers examine the effect of networks on trade, how-
ever with a focus on the role of social networks rather than ethnic net-
works. Combes et al. (2005) study how migrant and business networks
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affect trade across French regions, measuring the latter with the number
of connections between plants which belong to the same business group.
Moreover, a recent cross-country study by Head et al. (2010) analyse the
long term impact of countries’ independence on bilateral trade with the
former colonizing country and the rest of the world; they find negative
effects on trade flows, and a small but positive effect on the extensive
margin (i.e. probability to export) with other former colonies of the
same colonizer and with the rest of the world.
The importance of migration networks in the labour market has
been reviewed by Montgomery (1991) and has been the focus of a num-
ber of recent empirical papers. The work by Munshi (2003) examines
their role on labour market organizations: he empirically analyses the
network of Mexican migrants in the U.S. and its effect on the labour
market in the destination country, by measuring the size of network as
the share of individuals in the community of origin who are located
in the U.S. The findings indicate that more connected individuals have
higher probability of being employed and have higher wages. McKenzie
and Rapoport (2007) investigate the empirical relationship between mi-
gration and wealth using data from Mexico, highlighting that migration
costs decrease with the size of the migrant network originating from the
same community. They find an inverse U-shaped relationship between
migration and inequality in rural Mexico, and that migration contributes
to decreasing inequality in sending villages with high rates of historic
migration.
The role of ethnic and migrants networks has been studied in the
context of knowledge and technology diffusion. Griffith et al. (2006)
present evidence for the existence of knowledge spillovers across coun-
tries; with firm-level data from the U.K., they test the effect of "tech-
nology sourcing" exploiting pre-1990s technology boom location of U.K.
affiliated firms in the U.S. for identification. Kerr (2008) focuses on the
role of the U.S. as a frontier country in the diffusion of scientific knowl-
edge and recognises the role of ethnic networks in knowledge transfers
across countries. In a more recent paper, the same author studies the ex-
tent to which comparative advantage is an determinant of trade, using
the geographic overlay of the location of past migrants communities and
innovation in the U.S. to identify differences in technology diffusion and
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therefore comparative advantage (Kerr, 2013). Kerr and Lincoln (2010)
and Moser et al. (2014) study the effect of skilled migration on innova-
tion in the U.S., the first exploiting changes in the H-1B visa regulations
to overcome endogeneity, and the latter focusing on the contribution to
innovation of Jewish migrants from Germany to the U.S. at the time the
Nazi party was in power.
As we explore the effect of networks not only on exports but also
on other firm variables, our work also relates to the work on co-ethnic
networks and firm growth. Banerjee and Munshi (2004) demonstrate
that social ties of businessmen to the local community play a role in
the allocation of capital, which is not necessarily in favour of the most
productive firms; they show that among textile firms in Tirupur (India),
those owned by locals entrepreneurs have higher fixed capital and cap-
ital intensity of production compared to firms owned by outsiders. The
paper by Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) analyses the impact of the mi-
gration networks in Mexico on the development of microenterprises, and
find evidence of migration networks playing a role in alleviating capital
constraints in the most capital intensive industries. Another example
of this literature is Nanda and Khanna (2010), which find that in India
entrepreneurs rely more on ethnic networks if firms are located outside
software hubs, indicating that networks are most important in environ-
ments with limited access to information and financial institutions.
Focusing on foreign direct investment (FDI), the recent work by
Javorcik et al. (2011) find that the presence of migrants in the U.S. in-
creases FDI in the country of origin, and Burchardi et al. (2016) show
similar results by instrumenting ancestry composition with measures
of “push” and “pull” factors, which refer to factors causing migration
from a country to the U.S. and migration from all countries to a specific
county in the U.S. respectively.
Besides Rauch and Trindade (2002), others have documented the
role of Chinese migrant networks on many aspects of the economy. Sax-
enian (2002) highlights the role of first generation migrants from China
and India working in the Silicon Valley, for sharing both information
about technology and investment in business partnerships with their
counterparts residing in their country of origin. Felbermayr and Toubal
(2012) revisit the evidence found by Rauch and Trindade (2002) finding
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more modest effects on international trade, although still positive. Ro-
tunno and Vézina (2012) document the importance of Chinese networks
on tariff evasion, measured by the difference between exports reported
by other countries and imports reported in China. Finally, Zhang and
Song (2002) document the role of FDI on Chinese exports since China’s
open door policy.
Furthermore, our paper relates to the literature documenting the
effect of culture and language on economic activities. Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2009) empirically estimate the role of culture, includ-
ing language and genetic similarities, on bilateral trade and investment
across countries. Melitz (2008) investigates the importance of a common
language for international trade and finds that direct communication is
more effective than having to resort to translation. Specific to the Chi-
nese context, Chen et al. (2014) find that, although nowadays Mandarin
is commonly spoken in all provinces in China, fluency in the local di-
alects has positive consequences on individuals’ income in both services
and manufacturing, and particularly in sales jobs.
3.3 Mechanism
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) have put forward the hypothesis that the
trade patterns empirically observed - for instance strong border effects
- indicate the presence of large non-tariff trade costs. Ethnic networks
can reduce non-visible trade costs in two ways, as discussed in Rauch
and Trindade (2002): Firstly, by reducing informational barriers and sec-
ondly by providing enforcement mechanisms for contracts in the pres-
ence of weak institutions. However, ethnic networks can also increase
trade flows indirectly, either through increasing the flow of technology
and knowledge, which makes firms more competitive in the export mar-
ket, or by facilitating foreign direct investment, which in turn might
increase trade, for example by allowing firms to outsource production.
Finally, migrant networks could affect trade simply by changing tastes
and preferences across countries. In contrast to both the direct and indi-
rect channels, which are welfare enhancing by decreasing frictions and
distortions, the latter would not necessarily imply an improvement in
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welfare.
Information barriers are likely to play an important role in im-
peding trade as has been highlighted by Rauch (2001). Firms might hold
imperfect information about, for instance, the taste of foreign consumers
or the products sold by foreign competitors. Obtaining this information
might be an important fixed costs that impedes firms from exporting.
Furthermore, such information about tastes and markets might become
more costly to obtain with both geographic as well as cultural and lin-
guistic distance. Additionally, when trading specialised or customised
goods, the detailed requirements might be harder to communicate across
linguistic and cultural hurdles. Ethnic migrant networks can facilitat-
ing information flow by reducing these costs, as connected individuals
face lower cultural and linguistic impediments. In our case, Chinese-
Americans might have a distinct advantage in communicating the pref-
erences of American consumers and the market structure to Chinese
producers. In addition networks can play an important role by acting
as intermediaries and aid matching of importers and exporters. If we
assume that there are search frictions due to asymmetric information,
matching between exporters and importers can be costly (Ahn et al.,
2011). Networks hold information about the types and trustworthiness
of available producers and buyers and thus reduce search costs for their
members (Rauch and Trindade, 2002).
The fact that this channel plays an important role in our setting is sup-
ported by qualitative evidence such as by Weidenbaum and Hughes
(1996), who describe the role of the “bamboo network” - the ethnic Chi-
nese networks overseas - in facilitating trade. They claim that “[t]he
leading business men know each other personally and do deals together, with
information spreading through an informal network rather than through more
conventional channels”. Moreover, Kotkin (1993) writes that “Chinese en-
trepreneurs remain in essence arbitrageurs, their widespread dispersion a crit-
ical means of identifying prime business opportunities”, which indicates the
importance of information flows.
The second direct channel through which ethnic networks can fur-
ther trade is through enforcing informal and formal contracts. Contract
enforcement may be particularly problematic in the context of interna-
tional trade: Imperfections of the justice system are likely to be enlarged
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by distance and thus firms find it harder to enforce contracts across bor-
ders than domestically. Furthermore, contractual details are harder to
pin point in the presence of geographic and linguistic barriers. Finally,
in the case of international trade a large number of sunk costs may have
to be paid before it can be observed whether all parties complied to the
agreement. These imperfections might be particularly salient if domes-
tic institutions are weak, such is the case in developing countries, and
thus particularly relevant for China (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002).
As a result, firms are likely to rely on informal and relational contracts.
Ethnic networks can play an important role in enforcing such relational
contracts by providing punishment mechanisms, as has been empha-
sised in the seminal contributions by Greif (1989, 1993). This channel
has also been described by Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996), who write
that “[i]f a business owner violates an agreement, he is blacklisted. This is far
worse than being sued, because the entire Chinese network will refrain from
doing business with the guilty party”. In addition, in many cases, if the
quality of a product is hard to observe, network intermediaries often are
willing reduce risk for the importer by guaranteeing quality and deep-
ening reputational concerns (Chaney, 2014).
Another channel through which ethnic networks may affect inter-
national trade, albeit indirectly, is promoting technology diffusion across
countries. The relationship between ethnic networks and knowledge
flows has been analysed widely in the innovation literature (Kerr, 2008;
Kerr and Lincoln, 2010), though rarely in relation to exporting behaviour
(an exception is Kerr (2013)). We suppose that increased technology and
knowledge diffusion allows connected firms to increase their produc-
tivity or product quality through imitation or innovation. This in turn,
might make firms productive enough to make exporting profitable, thus
indirectly leading to an increase in exports. It is important, however,
to acknowledge that there might also be a reverse effect: For example,
Keller (2002, 2004) argues that trading differentiated intermediate goods,
which embed innovation, facilitates technology flows across countries.
A second indirect channel through which ethnic networks can af-
fect trade is through fostering foreign investment. This channel has been
the focus of recent studies, which show that the presence of migration
networks in a country increases FDI flows towards their origin country
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of migrants (Javorcik et al., 2011; Burchardi et al., 2016). This may hap-
pen because networks help information flow across countries, or because
they enhance transactions in environments with weak institutions. High
levels of FDI in turn have been hypothesised to promote international
trade: Zhang and Song (2002), for example, explore this channel in the
context of China, showing that increases in FDI over time can be linked
to improvements in manufacturing export performance. In this way, an
observed link between connectedness to the ethnic network and trade
may be caused by increases in FDI.
The final mechanism highlighted in the literature is the so-called
"preference channel", first discussed by Gould (1994). This channel sup-
poses that a large migrant community in a destination country leads
to an increase in trade simply by increasing the share of the popula-
tion with tastes that favour goods from the sending country. We argue
that this channel is less relevant in our setting, as we exploits industry-
level differences in ethnic Chinese employment in the U.S. As a result,
we do not capture aggregate effects caused by a large number of eth-
nic Cantonese from the sending counties in China in the U.S. but only
differences across industries. Moreover, whereas the preference channel
is generally consistent when analysing trade of differentiated and final
goods (Rauch and Trindade, 2002), we explore network effects also for
both intermediate and undifferentiated goods.
3.4 Historical Background
3.4.1 Emigration From China
Emigration from China has a long history starting in the 10th century
with merchant emigrants building a trading network all over Southeast
Asia. Mass emigration, however, only became prevalent in the middle
of the 19th century. This first emigration wave started around 1842 with
the loss of the first Opium War, when China was forced to open itself to
Western influences. Emigration accelerated in the 1860’s, when the Qing
government lifted its ban on emigration, which had been imposed since
the seventeenth century (Woon, 1990). By the outbreak of World War II,
between 8.5 to 9 million Chinese were living outside Chinese borders all
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over the world from South East Asia to South and North America and
Australasia. Migration only came to an abrupt halt in 1949 when the
People’s Republic of China was declared and the borders were closed.
During this first emigration wave, individuals emigrated mostly
through informal networks in order to overcome credit and informa-
tional constraints. As a result the origin of migrants for a given des-
tination country were extremely localised: While an estimated 90% of
all emigrants during this period originated from Guangdong or Fujian
(Woon, 1990), nearly all of the 19th century Chinese immigrants to the
U.S. and the Kingdom of Hawaii originated from eight counties ad-
jacent to Guangzhou. Historians estimate that 80-90% came from the
Siyi districts, comprising Taishan, Xinhui, Kaiping, Heshan and Enping
counties (Hsu 2000). Somewhere between 10-20% percent of immigrants
came from Sanyi districts, comprised of Panyu, Nanhai and Shunde
counties. These counties, which used to be seven counties at the time
of emigration, are our main focus and will be referred to as the sending
counties. A third, smaller group of immigrants came from Zhongshan,
south of Guangzhou (for a Map of the counties see Figure 2). The mi-
grants to mainland U.S. were mostly members of the Punti ethnic group,
while those in Hawai’i were primarily Hakka (Voss and Allen, 2008). It is
important to note that these counties, however, were not necessarily the
ones that saw the most out-migration, but only saw the most migration
to the U.S. Emigrants to other destination countries in South East Asia
or Oceania originated from other counties. The general pattern that in-
dividuals originating from a given county migrated to the same country
seemed to hold all over southern China (Voss and Allen, 2008).
Emigration was motivated by push-factors, such as overpopula-
tion, and by the political instability that was spreading all over China,
which caused the Taiping and the Boxer rebellions and the more lo-
calised Punti-Hakka Clan Wars, which culminated in around a million
casualties. The two provinces in general, and the sending counties in
particular, were some of the areas most characterised by over-population
and food shortages, which were exacerbated by droughts and floods
throughout the 19th century.
At the same time, there were a number of “treaty ports” estab-
lished in both provinces, the most notable being Guangzhou (Kanton)
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in Guangdong. Treaty ports were ports ceded by the Qing dynasty to a
number of Western powers as well as Russia and Japan after the Opium
wars, where free trade was allowed to take place. Thus shipping routes
from these locations were already established (Faure and Siu, 1995).
The reasons why emigrant to the U.S. originated nearly exclu-
sively from the sending counties are not well documented. The initial
pattern could have originated because of the proximity to Guangzhou
and Hong Kong, which were the main shipping destinations from San
Fransisco. Initial patterns of migrations were likely to be predictive of
future migration due to the need of a network in the destination coun-
try, coupled with the linguistically and culturally diverse landscape of
Guangdong; the latter implied that individuals of the same linguistic
group could benefit from a particularly close knit network, which oth-
ers could not have accessed. Furthermore, the fact that emigration was
banned until the end of the century could have contributed to informal
networks being of particular importance.
Table B.1 shows the number of Chinese migrants that arrived in
Canada. As migrants from China arrived to the entirety of North Amer-
ica nearly exclusively via San Francisco, immigrants to Canada have the
same origin as immigrants to the U.S. The data has been assembled by
Yu (2011) using the Canadian Head Tax records from 1885 to 1949 and
covers almost 100,000 individuals of Chinese origin. While such data
exists for the U.S., to the best of our knowledge it has not been digi-
talised and made available. The Table shows that the sending counties
identified above constitute around 98.3% of all the Canadian-Chinese in
the sample.
3.4.2 Ethnic-Chinese in America
At the beginning of the first migration wave during the 19th century,
the main pull factor was the gold rush. Like many Europeans, Chinese
emigrants were drawn to the U.S. in the hope to make their fortunes
extracting gold. Therefore, and for geographic convenience, most early
Chinese immigrants settled in California. Later Chinese immigration
was encouraged in order to provide labour for the construction of the
Transcontinental Railway, as well as to a limited degree to replace former
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slaves in the southern plantations. By 1882, around 380 000 Chinese left
China and settled in mainland U.S. and a further 46 000 settled in Hawaii
(Voss and Allen, 2008).
The mass migration came to a stop because of the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act in 1882, which was subsequently extended under the name of
Geary Act in 1892. It was the first major law that restricted immigra-
tion to the US and is seen a response to anti-Chinese sentiments that
started from California, and then spread in the whole country, during
the second half of the 19th century.
The act prohibited migration of Chinese "skilled and unskilled labour-
ers and Chinese employed in mining", under penalty of imprisonment or
deportation. Effectively, however, it impeded all kinds of Chinese mi-
gration, as it was hard for migrants to prove their intentions of not be-
come labourers. There were few exceptions, for instance for wealthy
merchants or students. Further State laws forbade interracial marriages,
limited civil rights and restricted the possibility of employment by non-
Chinese. Following the Act, more laws restricting migration were ap-
proved, until the National Origins Act of 1929, which capped immi-
gration to 150,000 people per year and prohibited all immigration from
Asia. It also prohibited Chinese from becoming U.S. citizens. In ad-
dition, other legislation excluded the Chinese from certain occupations,
especially in California, which for example barred Chinese form own-
ing property, testifying in court or for Chinese children to attend schools.
The situation only improved with the repeal of the Exclusion Act in 1943,
motivated in part by the alliance between China and the U.S. during
World War II (Lee, 2003).
Upon their arrival, the ethnic Chinese had mostly settled in Chi-
natowns, among which the largest were in San Francisco and New York.
Due to discrimination, the Chinese continued predominantly to live
within the borders of the Chinatowns. Before 1950, the American Chi-
nese like most other Asian-Americans, were employed in rural farm-
work or in service jobs such as launderettes or restaurants (Hing, 1993)
Figure 3.1 shows Chinese settlements in the U.S. in 1890 on the left, just
after the Act was passed, compared to the location of Chinese people
in 2000. Although the numbers are much larger in 2000, the Chinese
nowadays are concentrated in the similar areas as the early migrants.
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Figure 3.1: Chinese Settlements in the U.S. in 1890 and in 2000
Even after the abolition of the Exclusion Act, the number of Chi-
nese migrants was limited predominantly to family reunification and to
105 persons per year (Zhao, 2002). Large-scale Chinese immigration did
not occur until 1965 when the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965
lifted national origin quotas (Hing, 1993). The 2004 United States Cen-
sus reports over 2.8 million Chinese in the United States, about 1% of
the total population and 23% of the Asian population.
3.5 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
In this section we briefly outline the main data sources and provide some
summary statistics.
3.5.1 Firm information
We have access to two data sets containing firm data in Guangdong.
Firstly, the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises of 2004, which is a
survey of all large manufacturing firms. Secondly, the Chinese Economic
Census of the same year, which includes all registered enterprises, but
only minimal information about each firm. We use the first data set for
our main analysis as it includes information on exports, while we use
the second data set to analyse spill-over and direct effects on small firms
and for industries other than manufacturing.
The Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises is an annual survey
conducted by the China’s National Bureau of Statistics. It collects infor-
mation about all state-owned firms and all privately owned firms with
revenues higher than 5 million RMB in the manufacturing sector. This
also includes firms that are partially or fully foreign owned. Overall,
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around 5% of all firms in our sample are state owned, while around
12% are at least partially foreign owned. Our data set covers the Guang-
dong province only. We exclude state owned firms from our analysis, as
their operation is generally regarded to be fundamentally different and
access to the overseas Chinese network less important than for private
firms.
The data set is very detailed in terms of firm-level variables ob-
served. The main variable of interest is the value of total exports mea-
sured in thousands of RMB. We create two variables from this informa-
tion: Firstly, a dummy variable indicating firms’ export status; secondly,
the log of export value. Around half of the firms in our sample are
exporters. While this is a much higher share compared to other data
sets (Bernard et al. (2009) for example find that in 2000 only 3.1% of all
U.S. firms export), it is important to keep in mind that this is foremost
driven by the fact that our sample only includes large firms. Further-
more, Guangdong is one of the main exporting regions of China, and
thus we would expect the share of exporters to be large. Unfortunately
we do not have firm-level information on bilateral trade between China
and the U.S.; thus as a robustness check we weigh reported exports by
the average share of a given Chinese industry’s total exports that is pur-
chased by U.S. firms1.
Other variables of interest for our analysis are: 4-digit Chinese
Standard Industry Classification, total number of workers employed,
capital by origin (domestic, foreign, state), profits, wages, age of the
firm, R&D expenses and management expenses. We further calculate
TFPR, as described in section B.1.
Table B.2 shows some summary statistics of key variables in our
sample. We show the summary statistics for the entire sample and for
exporting firms separately. Regarding the whole sample, as mentioned
previously, slightly less than 50% of all firms are exporting. Around 5%
of the sample is state-owned and 10% of total capital is provided from
foreign sources. In terms of employment, the average firm is medium
sized, with 289 workers.
Comparing exporting and non-exporting firms, we find similarly
to the general literature that exporting firms are significantly larger than
1For more details see section 3.7.2, which describes the robustness checks
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non-exporters in terms of the number of workers, total wages paid and
output. They have slightly more capital in total and fixed assets. They
are, however, less likely to be state owned and have a smaller share of
foreign owned capital. Furthermore, the average share of high-skilled
workers is lower.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Firms According to Ownership
Notes: Data from the 2004 Chinese Economic Census.
3.5.2 Cultural Exposure Measure
In this work, we are investigating the effect of having better access to
the American-Cantonese network, which was formed in the late 19th
and early 20th century. Our main measure of access to the American-
Cantonese network measures whether the firm is located in one of the
sending counties. As explained in section 3.4.1, this network’s native
language is two subgroups of the Cantonese language group: Siyi and
Sanyi. Therefore, we use whether a firm is located in a Cantonese speak-
ing county as a robustness check. Figure 3.3 shows the geographical
distribution of both the two dialects of interest (Siyi and Sanyi) as well
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as the distribution of Cantonese.
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Languages in Guangdong
Notes: Data from Lavely (2001).
The information about language distribution in Southern China is
obtained from a coding scheme developed on the basis of the Language
Atlas of China, which was compiled jointly by the Australian Academy
of the Humanities and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1987.
The data we use in this paper has been encoded by Lavely (2001) at
the county level, such that it provides for each county on the Chinese
mainland the five most widely spoken language groups and sub-groups.
3.5.3 Industry Exposure: Cantonese Workers by Industry
in the US
We obtain the data on the number of workers Cantonese from the 5 per-
cent sample of the 2000 Population Census, which gives us information
at the four digit industry level. We consider only workers who claim
to be of Cantonese origin, speak Cantonese at home and were not born
in China. We impose the first two restrictions to accurately measure
the network that we are interested in, i.e. the descendants of the early
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Cantonese migrants in the late 19th and early 20th century. Further, we
exclude individuals who were born in China in order to mitigate the
endogeneity concerns caused by possible selective settlements of more
recent migrants. This means that we reduce the possibility that our ef-
fects are driven by Cantonese workers moving to the U.S. in order to
work in industry that are particularly strong in their place of origin in
China. Note that we use the absolute number of workers and not per-
centages, because of aim is to capture the probability that a given firm
in industry i that has access to the Cantonese network has at least one
contact in the same (or downstream) industry.
Figure 3.4 shows the number of Cantonese workers across indus-
trial sectors according to the U.S. census 2000 industry classification. The
Cantonese workers are distributed across a wide range of sectors. The
sectors with the largest number of Cantonese workers are education,
health and social services, manufacturing, professional services and re-
tail trade, while relatively few Cantonese work in fishing, mining, utili-
ties and the armed forces.
Tables B.4 and B.5 show the ten 6 digit NAICS industries with the
highest and lowest number of Cantonese workers. Table B.4 reassures
us that we are capturing a wide range of industries, which employ both
high skill workers (e.g. in universities, IT related manufacturing and
services) as well as low skill workers (e.g. in restaurants, grocery stores).
Our measure is likely to be relevant with regards to all of the chan-
nels discussed above. Firstly, a larger number of Cantonese workers in a
related industry may lower the information costs related to exporting by
providing specific information regarding the market for a given product.
This information is likely to be available to a large number of workers
within an industry. Secondly, the workers may be possible points of
contacts to share tactical knowledge and thus allow Chinese firms to
learn about production techniques. This channel, however, should only
be present when using the number of workers in the same industry. The
third channel through which networks can increase trade is through im-
proving contract enforcement. We should be capturing this particular
channel if the Cantonese workers are in a higher management position.
We therefore investigate whether our measure correlates with he num-
ber of Cantonese in management positions. However, even a large num-
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Cantonese Workers Across Sectors
Notes: This graph shows the distribution of ethnic Cantonese workers by sector in the
U.S. in 2000. Data from the U.S. Census.
ber of lower level Cantonese workers may improve contract enforcement
by improving communications and thus increasing the contractability of
a given transaction. However, we regress our measure of Cantonese
workers on the number of Cantonese Workers that are self-employed, as
unfortunately, we do not have information on whether an individual is
in a management position. The correlation can be seen in Figures B.1
and B.1.
3.6 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy exploits the interaction between two measures of
network exposure, one at the industry level and the other at the geo-
graphic level.
The treatment variable for all regressions is network exposure, which
measures the exposure or access of each firm to the network of overseas
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ethnic Cantonese in the United States at the county industry level. In
our framework, a firm can be potentially connected along two dimen-
sions: an industry dimension and a cultural dimension. Thus our final
measure is the interaction of industry exposure and cultural exposure:
network exposurei,c = industry exposurei × cultural exposurec (3.1)
where i stands for four-digit industry and c stands for Chinese
county. Firms are grouped according to the Chinese industry classifi-
cation system. In China, counties are the third level of administrative
divisions, after provinces and prefectures. As of September 2016, there
are 2,852 county divisions. In our data set we observe firms in all 123
counties in Guangdong.
3.6.1 Industry Exposure
Industry exposure captures the degree of exposure of a Chinese firm to
its ethnic network in the U.S. We analyse three ways in which a Chinese
firm is linked to a U.S. industry.
Firstly, we analyse the link between Chinese manufacturing firms
and related retailers and wholesalers in the U.S. We assume that, if a
Chinese firm in Guangdong operates in an industry that produces, say,
leather jackets, it is likely to be more exposed to the network if more
workers of Cantonese origin (as the early migrants to the U.S.) work
in an industry that sells leather jackets. Thus, if ethnic networks do
increase exports for Chinese firms a major effect should be seen between
manufacturing firms in China and wholesale and retail firms of the same
products in the U.S. We measure this effect by calculating the number of
workers of Cantonese origin in the U.S. that work in wholesale and retail
industries which are likely to sell products manufactured by Cantonese
or Chinese firms:
industry exposure retaili = number o f Cantonese workersj
where i denotes the main 4-digit industry in which a Chinese firm
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operates and j is a retail or wholesale industry in the U.S. who is likely
to buy the final goods produced by industry i.
Secondly, we analyse the link between Chinese firms and related
downstream manufacturing industries in the U.S. These are manufac-
turing industries which use goods of the same category as the ones pro-
duced by Chinese firms in their manufacturing process, and are there-
fore potential buyers of their products. To illustrate the relation of this
specific type of network to exports with our previous example, we as-
sume here that a producer of raw or processed leather in China ben-
efits more from the network if more ethnic Cantonese in the U.S. are
employed in industries that use leather for production. We measure
the effect of this specific network with the number of workers that are
employed in related downstream manufacturing industries, which are
likely to purchase products such as those produced by the Chinese firm.
This measure is calculated as follows:
industry exposure manu f acturingi = number o f Cantonese workersk
where k is 4-digit a industry in the U.S. which uses the category
of goods produced by industry i in its manufacturing process.
The third measure of industry-level network which we analyse
measures the potential benefits for exports of being more connected to
the same industry in the U.S. A Chinese firm is considered more con-
nected to its ethnic network if it operates in a four-digit industry that
employs a larger number of ethnically Cantonese workers in the U.S.
Specifically, this is calculated as:
industry exposure same industryi = number o f Cantonese workersi.
In summary, the three definitions of ethnic network exposure at
the industry level capture different effects. The first and the second
measure have a direct effect on exports: they focus on the importance
of networks in order to sell goods to a foreign country. However, the
effect of the third measure, which computes exposure to ethnic networks
within the same industry, is both direct and indirect; the indirect effect
is related to the fact that networks flowing along the same industry may
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help knowledge and technology flow to firms across countries. Note
that the three different definitions of industry exposure to the Cantonese
ethnic network may not necessarily be defined for the same number of
industries, as firm may operate in an industry which includes only final
goods, or only intermediate goods. Conversely, an firm can operate in
an industry which includes both intermediate and final goods.
3.6.2 Cultural Exposure
The other dimension according to which a firm can be connected is its
cultural similarity with the network of ethnic Cantonese workers in the
U.S. This relies on the assumption that a firm located in a county in
China whose population shares close cultural ties with early immigrants
in the U.S. has better access to the American Chinese network.
To identify cultural closeness, we exploit the fact that the emi-
gration to the U.S. until the 1980’s was extremely localised around the
southern coast of Guangdong, whose population mainly spoke, and still
speaks, a particular dialect of Cantonese.2 We define cultural exposure
as a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is located in one of the
sending counties of migrants to the U.S. in the 19th century.
With this measure of cultural exposure we are aiming at estimat-
ing the effect of both language similarity and kinship ties. It captures the
effect of language because the linguistic landscape of South China is very
diverse, such that even within few kilometres the local dialects are mu-
tually unintelligible; therefore speaking the same or a similar language
as the diaspora communities can improve the interaction between the
two different groups. While nowadays communication between main-
land Chinese of all areas of origin is facilitated by the near universal
knowledge of Mandarin Chinese, many American-Cantonese emigrated
before the teaching of Mandarin became widespread.3
In addition, our measure captures the effect of networks devel-
2Sections 4.1 and 3.5.2 give a detailed overview of the migration wave from Guang-
dong to the U.S. and the language landscape in Guangdong.
3That language still plays an important role in China today is demonstrated by
for example Chen et al. (2014), who show that immigrants in Shanghai that are more
likely to speak and understand the local dialect are more successful on a number of
dimensions: for example they are more likely to be self-employed and have higher
hourly earnings.
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oped through kinship ties because we focus on the exact counties where
the early migrants to the U.S. originated from. Even after generations,
it is possible that early migrants will still have ties with the relatives
left behind in China. Moreover, anecdotal evidence shows that family
ties are still an important component of ethnic networks, particularly in
China (Gomez and Cheung, 2009).
As a robustness check, we use an alternative measure of cultural
exposure: a dummy variable indicating whether a Chinese firm is lo-
cated in a county where the main language spoken is Cantonese. Com-
paring the results when using these two different measures can shed
some light on the relative importance of language versus kinship ties for
international trade.
Table B.3 shows the average exposure to our three measures at the
industry level as well as the cultural exposure to the network.
3.6.3 Difference-in-Difference Regression
We run difference-in-difference style regressions with a continuous vari-
able (industry exposure) interacted with a dummy variable (cultural ex-
posure) of the following form:
y f ,i,c = β0 + β1network exposurei,c + β2age f ,i,c + θi + pic + e f ,i,c (3.2)
where y is a firm-level outcome of interest, age indicates the age
of the firm, θ and pi are four-digit industry and Chinese county fixed ef-
fects. As our specification does not allow to control for industry-county
fixed effects, we interact county controls with industry fixed effects as a
robustness check, where the county controls included are dummy vari-
ables indicating whether average education, migration and total popu-
lation of the individual counties are below (=0) or above (=1) median.
For most of our analysis we restrict to privately owned, domestic
firms, but we also investigate how results change when we do not apply
these restrictions: we run robustness checks where we include foreign
owned firms, controlling for the amount of foreign capital of each firm.
We cluster standard errors at the four-digit industry level, according to
67
the Chinese industry classification. It should be noted that throughout
the whole analysis we rely on cross-sectional data, as we have firm level
information about Chinese firms in year 2004 only.
Note that both the industry and the geographic exposure, if in-
terpreted individually, might be endogenous; thus, we focus on their
interaction. As we essentially conduct a difference-in-difference analy-
sis across industries and counties with different levels of exposure, our
identifying assumption is that industries in China do not differ system-
atically across Cantonese and non-Cantonese speaking areas.
Although we analyse the effect of the Cantonese network on ex-
ports, there may be network effects on imports from the U.S. to China
as well. We focus on exports rather than on bilateral trade mainly be-
cause our data set does not contain firm level information about imports.
However, it is important to note that the effect of the ethnic networks
may be larger when considering bilateral trade rather than focusing on
exports only.
3.6.4 Identification Concerns
Despite being a single cross-section, our identification strategy basi-
cally functions similar to a difference-in-difference strategy with contin-
uous treatment intensity, as we difference across more affected industries
and across treated and non-treated counties. In a classic difference-in-
difference, the key identifying assumption is the so-called parallel trends
assumption, i.e. that in the absence of treatment, the treated group would
have exhibited the same changes over time as the untreated group. Our
equivalent is that industry-specific effects are the same in treated coun-
ties as in non-treated counties. This might be violated if sending coun-
ties have different characteristics compared to the other counties in the
province, or even compared to other counties within the Cantonese
speaking area. Unfortunately, we cannot provide support for this as-
sumption as is possible in the classic difference-in-difference setting,
where one analyses time-trends before treatment. This is not possible
in our case, as all industries are affected. We try to mitigate some con-
cerns regarding this assumption by including county-level controls and
interacting these with industry level fixed effects. This would for exam-
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ple mitigate the concern that sending counties are more or less educated
and industries that benefit from a more educated work-force also hap-
pen to be more connected. However, there is a limit to controls we can
include and there might be unobservable factors that might be driving
our results.
The identification strategy may give rise to further concerns re-
lated to the potential endogeneity of the network we estimate. Firstly,
endogeneity may occur if more recent migrants decide to migrate to the
U.S. to work in specific industries. This could occur if ethnic Cantonese
migrants connected to certain industries decided to move to the U.S. in
order to create export possibilities. As a result, those recent migrants
would most likely work in the same industry, or related related down-
stream industries, in the U.S.
While this is a potential issue, we mitigate the selective migration
problem by excluding from our measure of industry exposure those eth-
nic Cantonese workers who are not born in the U.S. Given that emigra-
tion from China to the U.S. in recent times was very limited between
1949 and 1977, this strategy should rule out most of the recent migrants.
A further concern is that our result may be driven by non-random
allocation of Cantonese workers across industries due to ethnic Can-
tonese people being skilled in particular industries; for this reason, these
industries would thrive in both countries. If one assumes that those
skills can persist for several generations, this potential issue would be
stronger for the measure of industry network exposure based on Can-
tonese workers in the same industry rather than for the two other mea-
sures, which are based on connections across industries. Moreover, if
this were happening our estimates are likely to be biased downwards,
as part of the control group (the Cantonese speaking counties) would be
affected by the network. As an indirect test, we estimate equation (3.4)
restricting the sample to firms located in Cantonese counties, thus com-
paring the sending counties to other counties within the Cantonese area
of Guangdong. Moreover, adding Chinese county controls interacted
with fixed effects should to some extent take care of county-specific fac-
tors affecting exports in different industries.
One remaining concern is the possibility that American firms choose
to hire ethnic Cantonese workers because of the influence, or pressure,
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of their already existing trading partners in the sending counties or in
Cantonese areas, because of their kinship ties with Cantonese workers
in the U.S. In this case, we would still be capturing a network effect, but
with reverse causality: overseas networks in China would affect the hir-
ing choices of American firms in related industries. Although we cannot
completely rule out this concern, it is unlikely that this channel would
explain the entire differential in export flow from Cantonese firms to the
U.S.
A further concern is that the province of Guangdong hosts a num-
ber "special economic zones" which are aimed at promoting trade; one of
this is the largest city and port, Guangzhou. Although potential differ-
ences cannot be excluded, it is important to note that none of the special
economic zones are located within the sending counties. Moreover, the
county of Guangzhou is excluded from the analysis.
In this section we describe the main results, obtained by estimat-
ing equation (3.4). Table B.6 shows the results when regressing export
status on the three different measures of network exposure, estimated
with linear probability model. Columns 1, 3 and 5, show the estimates
without Chinese county and 4-digit industry fixed effects; we include
them in columns 2, 4 and 6. For the variables measuring network and
industry exposure, we report coefficients indicating the average increase
in the dependent variable corresponding to a one standard deviation
increase in the independent variable. First, notice that industry expo-
sure, whether measured as the number of Cantonese workers in related
retail, downstream manufacturing or same industry, is positively corre-
lated with the probability of the firm being an exporter. Being located
in one of the sending counties of migrants, however, is associated with
a 17-18 percentage point decrease in the probability of exporting, which
reflects underlying differences in factors affecting firms’ export status
across counties. However, we are mainly interested in the coefficients
of the network exposure variables, which we define as the interaction of
the two dimensions.
All of our measures of ethnic network exposure have a positive
and significant effect on the probability of exporting. With fixed effects,
a one standard deviation increase in exposure to retail and wholesale
network is associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in the proba-
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bility of being an exporter, whereas exposure to downstream manufac-
turing network and same industry network are both associated with a 3
percentage point increase.4
Similarly, Table B.10 shows the results on export value condi-
tional on being an exporter. Here our measures of industry exposure
are not consistently positive and significant, but being located in one of
the sending counties always has a large negative effect on export value.
The interaction of the two measures is positive and significant across
all specifications except column 5 (without fixed effects), and the effects
are large: they range from the 5.7% increase in export value with a one
standard deviation increase in exposure to downstream manufacturing
network, to 13.8% for the retail and wholesale network. In Table B.7
we repeat the exercise above, clustering standard errors at the county
instead of the industry level. Reassuringly, results remain robust.
These results indicate that firms having access to a larger network
in the U.S. can gain positive effects in terms of trade, both at the exten-
sive and the intensive margin.
3.7 Results: Exports
3.7.1 Baseline Results
3.7.2 Robustness
In this section we present a set of robustness checks and additional re-
sults regarding exports.
Firstly, we explore how the results are affected when we measure
cultural exposure including all counties where the most widely spoken
language is Cantonese, instead of only the sending counties. Table B.8
shows the results: both the retail and downstream manufacturing net-
work have a positive effect, whereas the effect of the same industry net-
work is not statistically different from zero. The magnitude of the effect
is smaller, which suggests a stronger effect of the network in the sending
counties compared to other Cantonese counties.
4Note that when estimating equation (3.4) with industry and county fixed effects,
the coefficients of the variables industry exposure and cultural exposure are not estimated,
as they vary at the industry and county level respectively.
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Furthermore, we analyse the presence of heterogeneous effects
for firms located in the sending counties compared to firms in the Can-
tonese speaking part of Guangdong. We conduct this exercise for two
reasons. Firstly, to address the identification concern that our results
are driven by ethnic Cantonese having a comparative advantage in cer-
tain economic activities, due to human capital formation or preferences.
Secondly, this allows us to distinguish whether the main driver of the re-
sults is the ethnic and linguistic similarity, which would be shared by all
ethnic Cantonese, or kinship ties, which would only link the American-
Cantonese to the sending counties. The results are shown in Table B.11.
We are able to test for heterogeneous effects by including in one regres-
sion the two network exposure variables, calculated with the measure of
cultural exposure being either a Cantonese or a sending county dummy.
Note that as the sending counties are all within the Cantonese speak-
ing part of Guangdong, the network exposure variable constructed with
the sending county dummy captures the differential effect. The results
show that the differential effect for firms in the sending counties is al-
ways positive and significant, which indicates that firms located there
benefit additionally from the network compared to the other Cantonese
firms. We do however, also find a positive effect for firms in Cantonese
counties for two of the network measures (downstream manufacturing
and related retail and wholesale industries), though smaller in magni-
tude. This suggests that firms sharing a similar language and ethnicity
with the U.S. network can experience beneficial effects even in the ab-
sence of close kinship ties.
The possibility that industry-specific skills of ethnic Cantonese (or
of people originating from the sending counties) might drive the results
would be further reduced if we could include industry-county fixed ef-
fects in our regressions; these would capture specific effects of each in-
dustry within a county. Although our specification does not allow it,
we control for county characteristics interacted with industry fixed ef-
fects. The results are shown in Table B.9, and they indicate that Chinese
county characteristics are not driving our results: the size of the coeffi-
cient is larger compared to the baseline specification.
The export data at the firm level measures total value of exports;
we do not have information about the destination of those goods. In
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order to have a more precise estimate of how networks affect export to
the U.S., rather than to any country, we weigh export value of each firm
by the share of its industry’s exports to the U.S. out of total industry ex-
ports. We would expect larger coefficients if those industries which are
more connected according to our industry exposure variable also sell a
larger share of the total exports to the U.S., because the export value of
firms in those industries would be multiplied by a larger share. The re-
sults of these regressions are show in Table B.13 Note that the coefficients
are positive and significant, and they are also larger in magnitude com-
pared to the baseline specification (columns 1, 3 and 5) and compared
to Table B.9 (columns 2, 4 and 6).
We address one additional concern, namely the possibility that
our measures of industry exposure identify spurious relationships rather
than network effects. This would occur if larger industries were also
employing a higher number of Cantonese workers; therefore the higher
trade flows would be a result of the size of the industry, and not of the
network. To tackle this issue we control for the number of total work-
ers by industry (net of the ethnic Cantonese) interacted with cultural
exposure. Table B.14 shows the results: the coefficients on our ethnic
network exposure variables remain positive and statistically significant,
with the exception of the effect of the retail network on the extensive
margin, which is not statistically significant at the conventional levels
(the p-value is .101).
Finally, we analyse foreign firms further by examining the effect
of networks only on exports of foreign owned firms. Table B.19 shows
that networks increase the value of exports and leave the probability
of exporting unaffected. The size of coefficients for all three measures
(larger than those for domestic firms) indicates a potential effect of for-
eign investment on the intensive margin; however, there does not seem
to be an effect on the extensive margin. This suggests that foreign invest-
ment does not help overcoming fixed costs associated with trade, which
should predominantly affect the probability of exporting.
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3.7.3 Channels
Information vs. Contract Enforcement
As discussed in section 3.3, ethnic networks can facilitate trade by reduc-
ing information barriers or by improving contract enforcement. In order
to further identify the relevant channels at play, we conduct the exercise
suggested by Rauch and Trindade (2002) and investigate whether there
are heterogeneous effects for differentiated goods. Rauch and Trindade
(2002) distinguish between differentiated goods and goods with a refer-
ence price or that are traded on central markets. They argue that infor-
mational barriers should play a more important role for the decision to
export differentiated goods, as for these goods - in contrast to the ref-
erence priced goods - the price is not a sufficient indication of the prof-
itability of exporting. Networks might reduce informational barriers by
sharing knowledge about consumer tastes or by matching buyers and
sellers, both of which are more difficult to ascertain for Chinese firms
in the case of differentiated goods. On the other hand, they claim that
contract enforcement barriers should have the same role for both types
of goods. Rauch and Trindade (2002) do, however, admit that there is
an important caveat to this approach: the complex nature of differenti-
ated goods means that aspects such as quality might be non-contractible.
Thus the ethnic network might play a bigger role by ensuring that infor-
mal contracts are enforced. Furthermore, particularly in the intermedi-
ate goods sector, differentiated goods are more likely to be customised
for each buyer and therefore hold-up problems are more severe.
We use the classification published by Rauch (1999) to identify in-
dustries that produce differentiated products; for our analysis we choose
the most conservative classification. Table B.15 shows the results for the
three measures of network exposure on both the probability of exporting
and the value of exports. Column (1) shows that in related retail indus-
tries, the effect of network exposure on the probability of exporting is
driven by differentiated goods. However, we do not find such differen-
tial effect on the value of exports in column (4). In the case of exposure to
the same industry network a similar pattern can be discerned (columns
(3) and (6)). However, when we consider the network of downstream
manufacturing firms, we observe the opposite pattern, i.e. no additional
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effect on the probability of exporting, but a large positive additional ef-
fect on the value of exports of around 3.6%. These findings indicate that
overall there is a larger effect for differentiated goods, suggesting that
the information channel may play a dominant role.
This is further supported by the fact that we find a similarly sized
effect for all three measures of network exposure. In fact, while infor-
mation could flow equally through the network in downstream man-
ufacturing, related retail and wholesale industries as well as the same
industry, the network in downstream industries (retail and manufac-
turing) should have a stronger effect if contract enforcement issues are
driving our results. The fact that we find no such difference supports the
interpretation of information flows being a main driver of the results.
To further investigate whether contract enforcement plays an im-
portant role by analysing whether results differ if we use instead of the
number of total workers in an industry, the number of self-employed
workers and the number of wage workers in an industry to construct
our measures of exposure. The idea behind this is that if contract en-
forcement is the main channel through which the network works, we
should see a stronger effect when concentrating on the self-employed
workers. The number of self-employed workers should matter more for
contract enforcement, as these workers would have the power to sign
contracts and thus interact directly with firms in China. We concentrate
on the number of workers in related retail and downstream manufactur-
ing industries, as the network in the same industry should not facilitate
contract enforcement. These results are presented in Table ??. The co-
efficients for self-employed and wage workers are remarkably similar
indicating that it contract enforcement is not the main driver of our re-
sults. Instead the results point towards facilitating information flows
being the main channel, as for this channel the position of the workers
is less important.
Technological Knowledge Flows
Another channel highlighted in the literature is that networks facilitate
the flow of technological knowledge. While this is clearly related to
what we referred to as "information flows" in section 3.7.3, it has been
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often regarded as a separate channel, as it focuses on information about
technology and production processes that could be more easily shared
through the network. Even though technological knowledge is not di-
rectly related to trade, it could nevertheless be an important driver of
our results.
We investigate this channel in two ways. We firstly analyse di-
rectly the effect of network exposure on total factor profitability (TFPR),
which is the product of prices and total factor productivity (TFP). The
rationale is the following: If technological knowledge is being transmit-
ted from the U.S. to China, we should see a positive effect on firms’ TFP.
Although we do not observe this directly, as long as prices do not de-
crease more for exposed firms, this positive effect should translate into a
higher TFPR. Table B.17 shows the results for all domestic firms, as well
as for exporting and non-exporting firms. Columns (1) to (3) show that
neither of our three measures of network exposure have a significant ef-
fect on profitability. As industry-specific technological knowledge flows
are likely to be most affected by access to the overseas Chinese network
in the same industry, we would expect this measure to have a larger ef-
fect. However, column (3) shows no significant effect. When analysing
exporting and non-exporting firms separately (columns (5) and (6)), we
find instead that average TFPR is decreased for exporting firms with
greater access to the network in downstream manufacturing industries
and in the same industry; the corresponding effects on TFPR are 1.6%
and 2.0%. The coefficients for non-exporting firms are positive but not
statistically significant. While these results seem counter-intuitive, they
are consistent with the hypothesis that networks decrease the costs asso-
ciated with exporting. If this were the case, we would expect the cut-off
productivity level for which firms find it profitable to start exporting to
be lower for connected than non-connected firms. Thus, in connected
industry-county combinations, less productive firms would select into
exporting, resulting in lower profitability for exporting firms. A similar
effect might also exist for firms entry decisions. As we only observe
private firms that have output greater than 5 million RMB, it is possible
that despite a positive effect on a given firm’s TFP, less productive firms
are able to overcome the size threshold and thus average TFPR remains
unchanged. We investigate this further in section B.5, where we analyse
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the effect on labour productivity for the universe of firms in Guangdong.
As a second exercise, we explore whether the effects are larger
for high-tech industries, where the technological gap between American
and Chinese firms is the largest, and thus knowledge flows through the
network are likely to be strongest. We classify industries according to
the technology intensity definition of the OECD, which is based largely
on R&D spending intensity. Table B.18, shows no additional effect for
high tech industries.
Overall, we find little evidence that technological knowledge flows
are driving our results, though we are unable to establish whether they
have an additional effect on connected firms. Instead, our results are
consistent with networks reducing the profitability threshold of export-
ing.
Foreign Investment
In this section we investigate whether foreign investment has an effect
on exports. As outlined in section 3.3, ethnic networks might encourage
foreign direct investment (FDI). This might itself cause firms to export
more, or increase knowledge transfers. In this case, we should expect
the observed increase in exports to be (at least partly) explained by an
increase in FDI. Although our main analysis focuses on domestically
owned firms, we are also interested in understanding whether the in-
crease in exports for other firms is driven by FDI.
We explore this question by analysing all privately owned firms
while controlling for the share of total equity that comes from a foreign
source. Table B.12 shows the results on both the probability of exporting
in columns (1) to (3) as well as on the logarithm of the value of exports in
columns (4) to (6). The share of foreign capital itself has a positive effect
on both the probability of exporting and the value of exports conditional
on the firm being an exporter, documenting a positive relationship be-
tween foreign ownership and exporting. However, the coefficients of
all three measures of network exposure are similar in magnitude to the
baseline model and highly significant, indicating that the positive effect
of higher exposure to the network cannot be explained by an increase in
foreign capital share.
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Moreover, we regress the share of foreign capital on network ex-
posure (figures B.3 and B.4), which is discussed in more detail in section
3.8. We can only observe a positive effect on non-exporting firms, further
indicating that while networks might increase foreign direct investment,
this is not the most important channel.
3.8 Results: Other Firm Variables
In this section, we analyse how exposure to the American Chinese net-
work affects other firm variables in addition to exports.
Figure B.3 shows the effect of our three measures of network ex-
posure on total output, domestic sales, profits, fixed assets, capital and
the share of capital that is foreign owned. While not all measures have
a significant effect, they nevertheless follow the same pattern. There is
a positive effect on output of 4.9% -5.8% and an increase in profits of
4.3-5.5%. Similarly, fixed assets increase by 5.6-7.1% and total capital by
8.2-10.7%. On the other hand, domestic sales seem to decrease: both the
retail and same industry networks have a large negative effect, of around
13.1 to 15.6%. The effect of the downstream manufacturing network is
similar in magnitude, but the estimate displays very large standard er-
rors. The negative effect on domestic sales, together with a positive effect
on exports, provide suggestive evidence of specialization of connected
firms in exportable varieties, which are less demanded in the domestic
market. The effect on the share of capital that is foreign owned is not
statistically significant.
Figure B.4 splits the sample into exporting and non-exporting
firms and shows that most of the effects are driven by exporting firms.
It is important to keep in mind that exposure to the overseas network af-
fects selection of firms into exporting, and therefore these results cannot
be interpreted as causal. Output, profits, fixed assets and total capital
of connected exporting firms are higher. The decrease in domestic sales
is very large: a one standard deviation increase in our measure of ex-
posure to the network in related retail and wholesale industries reduces
domestic sales by 26.1%. The fact that the effect is the largest for retail
and wholesale exposure is consistent with Chinese firms specialising in
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goods that appeal to American consumers but are not tailored to Chinese
consumers’ tastes. We can also observe that the effect for non-exporting
firms is close to zero or negative in terms of output and domestic sales,
despite being positive (although not always statistically significant) in
terms of fixed assets and total capital. This could be caused by composi-
tional effects, as access to the network may reduce the average produc-
tivity of non-exporting firms by driving more firms to export. Finally,
we also observe a positive effect on the share of foreign capital of non-
exporting firms.
We further investigate how our measures of exposure affect vari-
ables regarding employment. Figure B.5 shows that while total employ-
ment is unaffected, both the share of high skilled workers as a percent-
age of the total workforce and management expenses are higher for con-
nected firms; the size is around 1 percentage point for the first and up
to 8% for the latter. Further, wages per worker are between 1.1 and
1.6% higher. Figure B.6 shows that the effect is again nearly exclusively
driven by exporting firms. These findings are consistent with connected
exporting firms specialising in products of higher quality or with more
complex production processes, which require higher skilled workers.
However, higher management expenses could also be explained by the
fact that exporting requires a greater number of managers as operations
become more complex. Non-exporting firms exhibit a very different
pattern on the other hand. While most effects are not statistically signif-
icant from zero, exposure to the network in downstream manufacturing
industries is associated with a decrease in employment and total wages,
while exposure to the network in the same industry is associated with an
increase of 1 percentage point in the share of high skilled workers. This
may be suggestive of knowledge diffusion about production processes
through the network, which allows firms to complete more complex op-
erative processes and which in turn require more high skilled workers.
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3.9 Alternative Explanations
3.9.1 Specific Skills of Sending Counties
One alternative explanation that could give rise to predictions consistent
with our observations is one of specific skills or technology locking. The
idea is that in the case of increasing returns to scale or the passing down
of specific skills or human capital across generations, initial conditions
can imply that areas or groups have a competitive advantage in certain
industries (Arthur, 1989). In this case, one could imagine that the send-
ing counties as well as the Cantonese areas have specialised in certain in-
dustries, in which they have a competitive advantage and therefore, they
are more likely to export. At the same time, the descendants of these ar-
eas also have a competitive advantage and therefore sort into working in
these industries in the U.S. As mentioned in the historical background
section, the sending counties were quite underdeveloped, agrarian ar-
eas and the emigrants to the U.S., with the exception of a small number
of merchants, were blue collar workers from the agricultural sector. In
the U.S. these individuals first worked in the gold mining sectors and
participated in the building of the railways. Later, the most important
occupations were within laundries and restaurants. [SOURCE]. There is
therefore little history of manufacturing either in China nor in the U.S.
Our results, by contrast, are only within manufacturing. To further test
this alternative explanation, we restrict our analysis to industries that
have not existed historically in the sending counties. Due to the political
instability of the region during the early 20th century, there exists only
anecdotal evidence on the industry composition of these areas. There-
fore, we restrict the analysis to high- and medium-tech industries, which
are all exclusively modern industries. The results are presented in Table
B.20. 5 The results remain mostly robust, though significance is lost in
some cases possibly due to the reduced sample size.
5i.e. examples of such industries includes manufacturing of aircraft and space craft
, IT machinery and cars and the pharmaceutical industry.
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3.9.2 Relocation of Trade
The previous discussion mostly supposed that networks increase trade,
by lowering marginal or fixed costs of trade. However, it is important
to note that our empirical strategy only captures the relative probability
of exporting of areas that were treated compared to those that are not.
Therefore it could capture either that trade remained unchanged in non-
treated areas and increased in the treated areas or instead that trade was
relocated from non-connected areas to connected areas. In this way, we
might be possibly overstating the positive effects of networks on trade
or even capturing pure nepotism, which reduced exports from more
efficient but less connected firms to more connected ones. Such nepotism
is likely to be more important for industries, which are more connected,
hence being consistent with our observations. As we have a single cross-
section, it is very difficult to distinguish between these two effects. It is
therefore important to keep in mind that the effects we observe may not
necessarily be welfare enhancing.
3.10 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse how exports of Chinese firms are affected by
access to the ethnic Chinese network in the U.S. We exploit an historic
migration wave that lasted from the mid-19th century until 1949. The
localised nature of this migration wave, together with the linguistic het-
erogeneity of southern China allows us to implement a difference-in-
difference strategy with continuous treatment intensity: The main ex-
planatory variable of interest is a dummy variable which equals one if
a given firm in Southern China is located in a sending county, i.e. if
the firm has a higher "cultural" exposure to the network, interacted with
the number of American born Cantonese employed in a related indus-
try in the U.S., which measures the "industry exposure". For the latter,
we define ’related industries’ in three different ways: firstly, as the same
industry, secondly, as related retail and wholesale industries and thirdly,
as downstream manufacturing industries.
We find that using all three measures of industry exposure, greater
access to the American-Chinese network translates in significantly higher
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exports, both in terms of the probability of exporting as well as in
the value of exports conditional on exporting. Moreover, we find a
smaller but significant effect of the interaction of industry exposure with
a dummy indicating whether a firm is located in a Cantonese speaking
area. The fact that we find results both for the extensive and intensive
margin indicates that the effects cannot purely be driven by a reduc-
tion in fixed costs. The results remain robust to a number of specifi-
cations. Furthermore, we find evidence that the effects are driven by
differentiated goods, pointing towards networks alleviating information
constraints.
One of the main contributions of paper is to analyse how other
firm variables are affected by higher exposure to the ethnic network. We
find that total factor productivity remains unchanged, and is even re-
duced for non-exporting firms, possibly due to a greater mass of firms
selecting into exporting. Moreover, we observe that connected firms
are larger in terms of output, employment, capital and assets, employ
a larger share of high-skilled workers and have higher managerial ex-
penses. However, we also find that domestic sales decrease with higher
exposure to the network, indicating overall that connected firms are
more likely to specialise in product varieties aimed at the export market
but that are not suitable for domestic consumption. In so far that these
export varieties are of higher quality and require more complex produc-
tion processes, this hypothesis could also help explain the increase in
the share of high-skilled employees and management expenses.
82
Chapter 4
Product Customisation and
Optimal Firm Size
4.1 Introduction
It has become much of a stylised fact in the development economic lit-
erature that industries in developing countries are characterised by a
much larger share of small firms than developed countries (e.g. Gollin
(2008)). But what exactly are the factors that cause this different dis-
tribution? Most of the previous literature has concentrated on produc-
tivity differences in explaining size differences for firms in developed
countries (e.g. Melitz (2003)), and, in the developing country context,
on constraints to firm growth, such as credit constraints or labour con-
straints (e.g. De Mel et al. (2008)) or distortions tilting the playing field
inf favour of small firms (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013). In contrast,
this paper hypothesizes that the difference in firm size indicates that
these firms perform vastly different functions, the profitability of which
depends on transport costs and consumer incomes. More specifically, I
propose that small firms tailor their goods exactly to consumers’ prefer-
ences using more flexible production processes with a higher marginal
cost. In contrast, large firms produce a single variety at a lower marginal
cost. Furthermore, large firms are able to ship their products across lo-
cations. The transportability is key in explaining the size difference:
customised firms are smaller due to higher marginal costs and due to
being limited to single locations.
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The fact that small firms dominate in developing countries has
been well documented in the literature. Gollin (2008) for example high-
lights that the dominance of small firms is not only found in agriculture
and the service sector: even in manufacturing, large fractions of the
workforce are self-employed which often translates into small firm size.
He gives as an illustrating example that in Ghana more than 75 percent
of manufacturing workers are employed in firms with less than 10 work-
ers. In contrast, in the US, like in most rich countries, small firms play
a very minor role. For instance, firms with less than 20 employees make
up only 5 percent of the total manufacturing workforce. This evidence
fro Ghana and the US is in line with a large amount of evidence docu-
menting a negative correlation between GDP per capita and an emphasis
on small scale production across countries but also over time (Poschke,
2014), which suggests that as countries grow richer, small businesses
play a less and less important role. Finally, a large share of the micro
firms, i.e. firms with less than 10 workers are located in rural areas in
developing countries (Ghani et al., 2014, 2012). This is in contrast to ev-
idence from the US, where smaller firms seem to locate in urban areas
(Holmes and Stevens, 2014).
Much of the previous literature has concentrated on explaining
these size differences along two lines: Firstly, explanations that restrict
the growth of small firms from becoming larger, such as for exam-
ple credit constraints (Aghion et al., 2007) or insecure property rights
(De Soto, 1990). The second group of explanations on the other hand,
suppose that large firms are disadvantaged in developing countries, due
to higher fixed costs. These explanations are usually based on a ’dual-
economy model’, which assumes that there are two types of technolo-
gies, modern and traditional, and which are associated with different
sizes and different fixed costs. Due the fact that the modern technol-
ogy’s fixed costs are prohibitively large in developing countries, only
the most productive entrepreneurs find it profitable to set up a firm and
thus the share of large firms is smaller (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). This
dual economy idea is also consistent with the assertion by the McKin-
sey Global Institute (2001) that the most productive firms in developing
countries are as productive as those in developed countries.
My model fits in the dual economy literature, as there are two
84
alternate technologies, one mechanised and one traditional, that are as-
sociated with different marginal costs. However, I add an important as-
pect, namely that (manufacturing) firms of different sizes could be pro-
viding very different type of goods, as has been suggested by Holmes
and Stevens (2012) for the US: While large firms produce a standardised
good that can be transported to several locations, small firms produce a
customised good that is harder to transport. Thus customised firms have
a much smaller size than standardised firms. I use how the profitability
of each technology varies with transport costs and income levels in order
to explain the differences in firm size distributions across countries.
I incorporate this dual technology into a spatial competition model
with heterogeneous firms. Following, Salop (1979), I assume the prod-
uct space is represented by a unit circle and consumers are distributed
uniformly around the circumference. Furthermore, there are a number
of local markets. Each customised firm operates in one of the local mar-
kets. Standardised firms are located in a central location, and can choose
to ship to each local market for a fixed costs, or exit. The only input to
production is labour. Standardised firms different in their productiv-
ity, but are assumed to be always more productive than the customised
firms. In the first stage of the game, standardised firms decide which
markets to ship to. In the second stage, the standardised firms choose
prices for each market. In the final stage, customised firms choose their
prices and demand is realised. I allow firms to choose a different price
for each variety-market pair. However, firms are not allowed to price
discriminate in the sense of charging different prices for the same vari-
ety.
It is important to note that in this model, there may not be a pure-
strategy equilibrium in the pricing stage (d’Aspremont et al., 1979), as
profits may not be continuous nor convex. Thus, I make two simplify-
ing assumptions: Firstly, I fix the location of all standardised firms at a
distance from each other of 1n . Secondly, I only consider cases, where,
in a given market, the customised firm sells to a positive mass of con-
sumers between each two standardised firm i.e. to consumers whose
ideal variety is located between the varieties provided by the standard-
ised firms. This implies that each standardised is only in competition
with the customised firm, which in turn allows me to abstract form the
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strategic interactions between different standardised firms.
The main parameters that affect the market share of customised
and standardised firms are transport costs, income levels and population
size. Population size increases the number of markets each standardised
firm is willing to ship to, by reducing relative fixed costs. Transport costs
affect the effective marginal costs of the standardised firms, and thus
makes them less competitive compared to the customised firms. Thus,
in a given market, standardised firms’ market share is reduced and as
a result the standardised firm ships to fewer markets. Thus, there is a
smaller share of large firms, but also the size of large firms is decreased.
Income, finally, has a non-monotonic effect as on the one hand, it in-
creases the cost advantage of the standardised firms, but on the other
hand, the taste for customisation is allowed to be an increasing function
of income. Under certain parameter restrictions, the model predicts that
at low levels, income decreases the share of small firms, while if income
becomes high enough, the share of small firms increases again. In this
way, the model is able to capture both the evidence from developing
countries, where poorer areas areas are associated with smaller firms
and the evidence from Holmes and Stevens (2014), who observe that in
the U.S. rich and densely populated areas have the largest share of small
firms.
Anecdotal evidence of this mechanism highlighted in my model
can be found in the development literature.Ng’ang’a (2012) for example
claims that
“Salient characteristics of the domestic market oriented industri-
alization industries (such as the woodworking industry in Kenya)
include, high transport costs, which protect them from the com-
petition of import (Oloya 1992). (...). It has been noted that the
expansion in this type of industries in Kenya has been more in the
increase of the number of small firms since the optimum scale of
production is small (Oloya 1992).”
Ove Pedersen (1995) gives even more specific evidence on the dif-
ference in the goods supplied by small and large firms:
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“The building material market (in rural towns in Zimbabwe) is
dominated by standardized mass-produced items distributed both
by local building material dealers and by non-local merchants(...).
Still some small local producers manage to compete. By selling
directly from the workshop they have very low distribution costs;
often they also produce a lower quality and, therefore, cheaper prod-
uct. However, the increasing demand has initiated a certain prod-
uct specialization where the small workshop produces custom-made
window frames, burglar bars or specialized building blocks, which
the large enterprises do not produce.”
This quote demonstrates the core idea behind my model, namely
that even though both kinds of firms might operate in the same mar-
ket and within the same industry, they provide very different goods,
the production of which seems to be linked to different optimal sizes.
Hence, the question why there are so many small firms in developing
countries is linked to the question why there are so many firms produc-
ing customised and not standardised goods.
There has been a general consensus in policy circles that bad
transport infrastructure is a key impediment to growth. This holds even
within countries: for example Stifel and Minten (2008) find that there is
a strong spatial overlay between remote areas and impoverished areas.
While this does not allow us to establish a causal relationship it does
seem indicative that transport costs play an important role. The differ-
ence in transport costs across countries and its impact on firms is also
the focus of Gollin and Rogerson (2014) who investigate in how far high
transport costs can explain the prevalence of the subsistence sector in
Uganda. They find that the transport costs are significantly higher in
Uganda compared to the US (4-10 times higher per kilogramme trans-
ported). Their model predicts that the population active in the subsis-
tence market is highly sensitive both to agricultural productivity and
transportation costs. Transportation costs have also been linked to mis-
allocation, such as by Asturias et al. (2014), who propose that high trans-
portation costs that result from poor infrastructure generate misalloca-
tion by increasing the dispersion in market power across firms in differ-
ent location.
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This paper adds to the literature that identifies demand factors as
a key determinant for firm size and productivity in developing coun-
tries. The two closest related papers are Lagakos (2013) and Kothari
(2014). Lagakos (2013) aims to explain the large productivity difference
in the retail sectors between high and low income countries through
the adoption of two different technologies - a low productivity and low
fixed cost retail technology (e.g. a corner store) or high productivity and
high fixed costs technology (e.g. large retailer). As in this paper, the
profitability of either technology is determined by demand factors that
depend on market size and transport costs. However, there are signifi-
cant differences between this paper and Lagakos (2013), which stem in
part from the fact that I analyse the manufacturing and not the retail sec-
tor. In Lagakos (2013) only the consumers’ (transport) costs are affected
by the technology used, in this paper both consumers and firms pay a
cost (customisation and shipment costs respectively). Thus this model
combines demand with supply factors, in explaining the choice of tech-
nology. Kothari (2014), on the other hand argues that poorer states in
India are characterised by smaller firms because they have high demand
for low quality products, which incur a lower fixed cost and thus can
be produced efficiently in small plants. They find that their model can
explain a significant portion of the cross-country variation. However,
there is no link between transport costs established.
Another related paper is by Holmes and Stevens (2014), who also
try to explain the differences in sizes in the manufacturing sector by a
choice of product or technology, albeit using a very different methodol-
ogy. Similarly to this paper, their technology choice lies between provid-
ing a specialised/customised good or a standardised good. However,
they arrive at very different predictions by the model, namely that cus-
tomised goods are only produced in large and richer markets. In the
developing country context this would imply that the small markets in
rural areas would be supplied exclusively by standardised goods and
thus be characterised by few large firms, which does not seem to match
the data.
Furthermore, this model links to the literature that claims that ag-
glomeration/ urbanisation can lead to growth through structural trans-
formation (Venables 2010, World Bank 2009, Overman and Venables,
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Henderson 2010) and to Gollin et al. (2013), who link urbanisation with
the presence of production of more or less tradable goods, specifically
the link between urbanisation and the structural transformation towards
a larger manufacturing sector.
Finally, methodologically the model presented in this paper is
close to the spatial competition models following the seminal contri-
butions of Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979). However, as I allow for
heterogeneous productivity, the model is closest to Vogel (2008), who
establishes an equilibrium with spatial competition, though I undertake
important simplifications to make the model more tractable.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 up to section
4.4 lay out the model and the equilibrium. Section 4.5 discusses compar-
ative statics, while section 4.5.2 discusses empirical predictions. Section
4.5.2 concludes.
4.2 Setup
There is a central location Z and M local markets. Each local market
is indexed by m = 1, 2, ...M and is located at a distance dm ∈ [0, dmax]
from the central location. There are no consumers located at the central
location. In contrast, each local market is characterised by a mass of
consumers L with wage w. The product space is represented by a circle
with unit circumference. There is a continuum of locations on the circle,
each representing a product variety.
Suppose producers can be of either of two types: standardised
or customised t ∈ s, c. A customised producer can produce all possi-
ble product varieties but can only locate in and sell to one local market.
There are Ns∗ standardised producers. A standardised firm can produce
one single variety in the product space. It is located in the central loca-
tion but can ship to any local market by incurring the transport cost tdm.
As such, define the number of producers of either type that are selling
in each market as Ntm. I assume that there is one customised firm active
in each local market. There are four periods. There Ns standardised
entrants, which upon entry, draw their cost parameter, after which they
decide to either exit or, it they produce, to which markets to ship. In the
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following, second, period standardised firms then choose their prices.
In the final period, customised producers set their prices and demand is
realised.
4.2.1 Consumers
Each local market has a mass of L consumers with wage w. I assume
that wages are constant across markets. Each consumer l has a preferred
variety, which is represented by their location on the circumference of
the circle that represents the product space. Consumers are assumed to
be distributed uniformly around this circle. Each consumer inelastically
demands one unit of the good if the location-adjusted price is less than
their reservation value vm. I assume throughout that reservation values
are sufficiently high such that all consumers in a given market purchases
a good in equilibrium even if there is only a customised firm operating
in the market. A given consumer with ideal variety l in local market m
with a finite set of producers Ntm purchases one good from firm i ∈ Ntm
if
i = arg min
j∈Nm
pj,m + θ|l − j| and pi + θ|l − i| ≤ vm (4.1)
where |l − j| is the shortest arc-length separating firm j from consumer
z. The parameter θ > 0 is the cost per unit of distance in the product
space incurred by the consumer, implying that θ|l − j| is the cost the
consumer incurs from consuming a variety of distance |l − j| from their
ideal variety l. Further, I assume that θ = h(w) = wβ i.e. the cost
from consuming a variety different from the ideal variety is increasing
in wages. Furthermore, assume the following tie breaking rule:
Assumption 1 If the above equation holds with equality, i.e. the adjusted
prices offered by both firms are equal, then the consumer will purchase from the
firm that provides the variety closest to his/her preferred variety. If any two or
more firms offer the same adjusted price for the same varieties, the consumer
randomises over the firms. 1
1The predictions of the model remain unchanged if a different tie breaking rule is
assumed.
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4.2.2 Producers
There are two types of producers: Standardised firms and customised
firms. Labour is the only input in production. Each standardised firm
i ∈ Ns can only produce one variety ai produced according to the pro-
duction function ys,i = Asi w
α, where Asi is the firm specific productivity
and w is the wage. Thus each firm is characterised by a marginal costs
ki = w
α
Asi
. Here, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 Assume that 2α < β i.e. that the taste for customisation θ
increases more with wages than the marginal cost ki.
In addition to marginal costs ki, standardised firms incur a trans-
portation cost of shipping one unit to a given market m of t · dm. Thus,
the cost of producing a good to be consumed in market m at distance
dm from the central location is given by:
ki + t · dm
Finally, standardised firms have to pay a fixed cost for each local market
they are shipping to of fs, which could be seen for example as the cost
of establishing a supply chain.
At the beginning of the first stage, there are Ns standardised firms
2, which draw their productivity parameter Asi from a common dis-
tribution g(Asi ). g(A
s
i ) has positive support over (A
s
min, A
s
max), where
Asmax < Ac and has a continuous cumulative distribution G(Asi ). The
productivity level Asi translate into the marginal cost of ki =
wα
Asi
. After
receiving a low productivity draw, a firm may decide to immediately
exit and not produce. If the firm decides to remain and produce, it is
allocated a variety ai. For simplicity, I assume that all firms’ varieties are
located at an equal distance across the product space i.e. the distance be-
tween firm i and its neighbour i + 1 is given by |ai − ai+1| = 1Ns 3. In the
2I am not able to model entry fully as due to assumptions made later in this section,
profits are independent of the number of standardised firms.
3In this way, I follow Salop (1979). On the other hand, Vogel (2008) proves that if
we allow firms to choose their location, more productive firms actually choose more
isolated locations. For the purpose of this paper however, the exact location plays only
a minor role. In fact, I can show that given that the parameter restrictions I impose
hold, standardised firms are indifferent to their location (It affects only the profits of
the customised firm).
91
same stage, each firm chooses which markets to supply to, Mi and pay
marginal transport cost tdm as well as the fixed cost f )s. Standardised
firms then choose their prices in the third stage. I assume that firms are
not able to price discriminate across consumers within the same mar-
ket, i.e. are restricted to charging the same price for a given variety to
all consumers. However, they are able to price-discriminate across loca-
tions and charge different prices for each local market. Thus, they are
able to choose as many prices prices as local markets they are selling to.
Let ϕsm(a, p) be the set of locations at which consumers in market m buy
from firm i. In this case, profits of the standardised firm are given by:
Πi =
M∗i
∑
mi=1
ϕ(pi)
(
pi − ki − tdm
)− fs (4.2)
On the other hand, each customised firm j can produce all possi-
ble varieties aj,m ∈ [0, 1]. As for standardised firms, I assume that each
firm is only able to charge one price for each variety produced. Thus,
the customised firm is able to choose a set of prices pj,m(aj,m) ∈ [0,∞)
and aj,m ∈ [0, 1] . In turn, customised firms are less efficient at producing
i.e. are characterised by the production function y = Acwalpha, where
Ac < Asmax. Thus, each customised firm is characterised by a cost param-
eter parameter κ = w
α
Ac . Furthermore, I assume that the customised good
is not transportable, i.e. needs to be supplied by a firm in the same local
market as the consumers are located in. This assumption is motivated
by the fact that in producing a customised good requires the movement
of people and not just goods, which incurs a much higher transport cost.
4.The customised firm sets its prices in the final and third stage of the
game, after observing the behaviour of the standardised firms.
It is important to note, however, that abstracting momentarily
from the customised technology, solving for the standardised firm’s op-
timal price is not straightforward. d’Aspremont et al. (1979) have shown
that if locations are endogenous and are decided before prices are set,
there is no subgame perfect equilibrium if firms are located "too closely".
4This is not a crucial assumption; as long as transport costs for the customised
good are sufficiently higher than for the customised good, the results follow through.
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This is caused by the fact that firms profits are non-convex and non-
continuous. The problem is exacerbate when firms are heterogeneous
in terms of productivity as is the case here. There have been a number
of solutions proposed to this problem: from convex transportation costs
(d’Aspremont et al., 1979) to allowing firms to randomise over prices
(Vogel, 2008). As modelling the strategic interactions between standard-
ised firms is not the focus of the paper, I choose the easiest abstractions
and fix locations and limit differences in productivity such that a sub-
game perfect equilibrium exists. This is the case where no standardised
firm is undercut by another standardised firm in each market it chooses
to ship to i.e. each standardised firm supplies to a positive mass of
consumers.
Assumption 3 Assume conditional on shipping to particular market, that no
standardised firm is undercut by another standardised firm for price vector ps.
A firm is undercut if it supplies to no customers in a given market.
Furthermore, I simplify the analysis further by making the follow-
ing assumption:
Assumption 4 Assume that the customised firm is not locally undercut for
any standardised neighbours i and i+1. A customised firm c is locally under-
cut if it makes no sales in the set of of consumers Li,i+1 ∈ [ai, ai+1] for all
standardised firms i = {1, ...n}.
While this is undoubtedly a strong simplifying assumption, the
main implication for the model is that it allows us to ignore the strategic
interactions between the standardised firms, which are not the focus
of this paper. These considerations would not be straightforward, as
profits would become non-continuous and non-convex, as mentioned
previously. I will later show, under which parameter restrictions these
assumptions hold along the equilibrium path.
As discussed previously, the game unfolds in three stages. In
the first stage, standardised firms draw their productivity and decide to
exit or, if they remain active, to which markets to ship. In the second
stage, the price stage, all firms observe number of competitors by type
and their location. Standardised firms then simultaneously choose their
prices for each market , pim ∈ [0,∞). A pure strategy in this stage is
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a mapping from a location-market pair, (l,m), into prices. Finally, in
the third stage, customised firms choose their prices pj,m(aj,m) ∈ [0,∞).
A pure strategy in this stage is a mapping from a location, (l), into prices.
4.3 Within-Market Equilibrium
The solution concept is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium and pro-
ceeds from the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For any set of parameters (t, θ, L, Ns, κ) there exists is a non-
empty set O∗ ∈ Ωn such that ω ∈ O∗ is an SPNE. The set O∗ has there
following properties:
1. Strategies are pure.
2. For any order of the firms around the circle there exits a corresponding
ω ∈ O∗.
3. If no standardised firm ships to market m, firm c’s prices, market share
and profits in market m are given by:
pc(l) = vm
xc,m = 1
Πc,m = vm − κ
4. If at least one standardised firm ships to market m, firm c’s prices, market
share and profits in market m are given by:
pc,m = max
{
min
{
1
2(ki + tdm + κ) + θ|l − ai|, 12(ki + tdm + κ) + θ|ai+1 − l|
}
, κ
}
∀i, i + 1 ∈ Ns
xc,m = max
{
1− N
s
m
θ
(
κ − k¯m + tdm
)
, 1
}
Πc,m =
Ns
∑
i=1
1
2θ
[
ki + ki+1
2
+ tdm + θ
1
Nsm
− κ
]2
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5. Firm i ∈ Nsm’s price, market share and profits in market m are given by:
pi,m = ki +
1
2
(tdm + κ − ki)
xi,m =
κ − ki − tdm
θ
Πi,m =
 12θ
[
κ − ki − tdm
]2 if dm ≥ κ−kit
0 otherwise
As can be seen in point (3), if there is no standardised firm active
in market m, by assumption the customised firm serves all consumers
and hence its market share is equal to one. As it can perfectly price
discriminate, it charges each consumer his or her reservation price. If
however, at least one standardised firm operates in market m, prices,
market shares and profits of the customised firm are given by the equa-
tions in point (4). The market share of the customised firm in this case
depends on the average cost advantage of the standardised firms, i.e.
κ− k¯m − tdm and the number of standardised firms. The cost advantage
of the standardised firms depends in turn on their average marginal
costs as well as on the transport costs. It can easily be seen that in mar-
kets that are at a higher distance from the central location i.e. have a
higher dm and if transport costs are higher , the customised firm will
have a higher market share. Finally, the market share of the customised
firm also positively depends on θ i.e. the taste for customisation of the
consumer. Again, the customised firm can perfectly price discriminate
i.e. it will set prices such that the consumer is indifferent between con-
suming form it or the standardised firms, as long as prices are above
its marginal cost. Thus, for each consumer it will charge the maximum
of either its marginal cost or the price of the closest standardised firm
plus the utility the consumer would lose by consuming the standardised
good instead of its ideal variety. The market share, prices and profits of
the standardised firm in any market it decides to be active in is given by
point (5) of the equilibrium proposition. Prices are given by the marginal
cost plus a mark -up, which is equal to half of the difference in marginal
costs between the customised and standardised firm. The market share
of the standardised firm, clearly mirrors that of the customised firm: i.e.
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it depends positively on the cost advantage over the customised firm,
as I previously limited myself to the cases where the customised firm is
the relevant competitor. If the cost advantage of the customised firm is
large, even consumers whose ideal variety is relatively distant to that of
the standardised firm will purchase the latter product. If however, the
cost advantage is relatively low, then only consumers whose ideal vari-
ety is close to the one produced by the standardised firm will purchase
from it, even though the standardised firm remains cheaper. In addition,
how many consumers purchase from the standardised firm depends on
the taste of customisation of the consumers. The higher θ, the less the
price advantage of the standardised firm can compensate consumers for
the decreased utility received from consuming the standardised product
instead of their ideal variety. A formal proof of the proposition can be
found in the appendix.
4.4 Stage 1: Shipping Decision
Recall, that there are Ns standardised firms in the central location. At
the beginning of the first stage, each standardised firm draws their pro-
ductivity level Ai from a common distribution g(A) with a support
over (Amin, Amax), which translate into the firm-specific cost parame-
ter ki =
walpha
Ai
After drawing their cost parameter, each entrepreneur
decides the markets, M∗i , to which they want to ship to, or exits. I as-
sume firms exit when they do not find it profitable to ship to a market
at zero distance from the central location. If a standardised firm decides
to ship to a local market it incurs a fixed cost fs for each market. This
can be thought of as the cost of establishing a supply chain. Total profits
across all markets for firm i are given by:
Πi =
M∗i
∑
m=1
Πi,m − fs (4.3)
where Πi,m are the profits earned in each local market, where
local profits are given by equation C.13. It is clearly optimal for firm i
to ship to all markets where marginal profits are greater than zero i.e.
Πi,m − fs > 0. Thus, there standardised firm i ship to all markets that
96
are at a distance dm such that:
dm ≥ 1t
(
κ − ki −
√
2θ fs
L
)
(4.4)
This implies that that the higher the transport costs, the smaller
the expected market size in terms of consumers (L) and the higher the
taste for customisation (θ), the smaller the distance the standardised firm
is willing to ship. Furthermore, more productive firms (with a lower ki)
ship to markets that are located further from the central location. Thus
more productive firms are not only larger due to having a higher market
share within each market, but also as they ship to a larger number of
markets.
Suppose there exists an equilibrium where a positive mass of
firms exit, while a positive mass of firms choose to ship to at least one
market. This implies, that an entrant remains active if and only if its
productivity parameter Ai is sufficiently high. Therefore, there exists a
cutoff marginal cost, A∗ ∈ (Amin, Amax) such that for any Ai < A∗ the
firm decides to sell to no market. This implies that its profit Πi,m of a
market at the closest distance net of the fixed cost fs is equal to zero.
This is the strongest, when the distance is equal to zero. This cut-off
level of marginal costs is given by:
As∗ = w
κ −
√
2θ fs
L
(4.5)
Similarly, we can find a cutoff marginal costs for each local market
such that any firm with a marginal cost higher than As∗m will not ship to
market m, and which is given by:
As∗m =
w
κ − tdm −
√
2θ fs
L
(4.6)
The exact number of firms active in each market is stochastic.
However, the expected number of firms that will be active in market
m, is given by:
E(Nsm) = N
s · P(Asi ≥ As∗m )
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These conditions are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Any standardised firm i will exit if its productivity is below the
cutoff productivity level:
As∗ = w
κ −
√
2θ fs
L
Conditional on remaining active, standardised firm i ships to all markets, which
are at a distance dm from the central location such that:
dm ≥ 1t
(
κ − ki −
√
2θ fs
L
)
And the expected number standardised firm shipping to each local market is
given by:
E(Nsm) = N
s · P
(
Asi ≥
w
κ − tdm −
√
2θ fs
L
)
4.5 Comparative Statics
In this section, I analyse the key parameters of the model affect the mar-
ket share of customised firms (as given by equation C.15) and the num-
ber of standardised firms selling to a given market (as given by equation
4.4). This allows me to infer the effect on the average size of standard-
ised firms. The variables of interest are specifically transport costs (t),
population (L) and wages (w). In this section, for simplicity, I assume
that Ai is distributed uniformly U ∼ [Amin, Amax]. In this case, the ex-
pected number of firms is given by equation 4.4. Average marginal costs
of standardised firms in market m is then given by:
k¯m =
1
2
[
κ − tdm −
√
2θ fs
L
− w
Amin
]
(4.7)
and the expected number of firms is given by:
E(Nsm) = N
s ·
(
Asmax −
w
κ − tdm −
√
2θ fs
L
)
· 1
Amax − Amin (4.8)
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Transport Costs t
Transport costs affect the market share of customised firm c in market m
the following way:
δxc,m
δt
= −δE(N
S
m)
δt
1
θ
· (κ − k¯i − tdm) + E(N
s
m)
θ
dm +
E(Nsm)
θ
δk¯m
δt
(4.9)
Equation 4.9 shows that transport costs increase the market share
of customised firms (and thus decreases the share of standardised firms)
in two ways: Firstly, it makes the standardised firms less competitive
compared to the customised firms, thus increasing the share of produc-
tion undertaken by customised firms within a given market for a given
number of active firms. Secondly, it decreases the number of standard-
ised firms that find it profitable to ship to a given market, as increased
transport costs increase the cutoff productivity level A∗sm , which in turn
decreases the expected number of standardised firms with a productiv-
ity level as well as Ai > A∗sm :
δA∗m
δt
= dm · w
(κ − tdm −
√
2θ fs
L )
2
> 0 (4.10)
However the increase in the cutoff productivity also has a negative effect
on customised firm c’s market share through the improved productivity
of the operating standardised firms, implying that the average marginal
cost of a market decreases i.e. δk¯mδt . However, assuming a uniform distri-
bution, it is easy to show that the first two effects dominate and this can
be simplified to:
δxc,m
δt
= − δE(N
S
m)
δt
1
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· (κ − k¯i − tdm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
E(Nsm)
θ
dm
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(4.11)
Thus areas with higher transport costs should have a higher share
of their production taking place in customised firms and thus should
have a higher share of small firms.
99
Population L
Population on the other hand has a positive effect on the market shares
of either type, predominantly though the selection of firms that ship to
a given market: if population size of each market increases, the produc-
tivity level required such that profits earned in each market cover the
fixed costs is decreased, which in turn decreases the cutoff productivity:
δA∗m
δt
= − w
(κ − t2dm −
√
2θ fs
L )
2
·
√
2θ fs
L2
< 0 (4.12)
This, however, as in the case where transport costs changed, af-
fects the average productivity of the standardised firms that do ship to a
given market, only in this case in the opposite direction. As less produc-
tive firms find it profitable to operate in a market, the average marginal
cost will increase. The overall effect is characterised by the following
expression
δxc,m
δL
= − δE(N
S
m)
δL
1
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· (κ − k¯m − tdm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
E(Nsm)
θ
δk¯m
δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(4.13)
where the first term captures the negative effect through the in-
creased number of standardised firms that operate in a market, and the
second effect captures the positive effect due to the increased marginal
costs. In the case, where Ai follows a uniform distribution, this simpli-
fies to:
δxc,m
δL
= −E(N
s
m)
θ
√
2θ fs
L2
κ − 12 k¯m − tdm
w
A∗m − wAmax
< 0 (4.14)
where clearly the competitional effect dominates the productivity effect.
Wages w
Finally, we analyse what happens when income increases, in our case
captured by wages. On the one hand, wages increase the relative cost-
advantage of standardised firms vis-a-vis customised firm, as the pro-
ductivity is assumed to be labour augmenting. On the other hand, the
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wage or income is also assumed to increase the consumers’ taste for
customisation.
Due to these opposing effects, the impact of increases of wages
on the market share of customised firms is more complex. Therefore, I
instead analyse the effect on the market share of give standardised firm
i, which is independent of the number of standardised firms (given the
restrictions I imposed). Recall that the market share of the standardised
firm is given by:
xi,m =
wα
Ac − w
α
Asi
− tdm
θwβ
Thus the market share of the standardised firm changes with
wages in the following way:
δxc,m
δw
=
α
(
wα−1θwβ − θβwβ)( 1Ac − 1Asi
)
− βwβ−1tdm(
θwβ
)2
As I assumed that 2α < β, there exists a cutoff wage w∗x such that
for w < w∗x xi,m is increasing in w, while for w > w∗x, xi,m is decreasing
in w. w∗x is given by:
w∗x =
 βtdm
(β− α)( 1Ac − 1Asi )
 1α (4.15)
Similarly for profits, we can find a cutoff wage w∗pi, such that below
this cutoff wage, profits are increasing in wages, and then are decreasing.
w∗pi is thus given by:
w∗pi =
 βtdm
(β− 2α)( 1Ac − 1Asi )
 1α (4.16)
Thus, for w < w∗pi, profits are increasing in wages, and thus the
cutoff productivity level for each market is decreasing in wages. This
implies, that the number of firms E(Nsm) is increasing. However, when
wages continue rising such that w > w∗pi, then profits of the standardised
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firm are decreasing in wages, and thus the cutoff profitability for each
market is increasing. As such, the number of standardised firms in each
market is decreasing.
4.5.1 Discussion
One of the main reasons why the firm size distribution has attracted
such attention in development economics, is that it is associated with
misallocation, which in turn is seen to be a main driver of lower ag-
gregate TFP (Hsieh and Klenow, 2007; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013).
Thus, it is interesting whether this is supported by my model. Average
market productivity is given by:
A¯ =
Amax∫
A∗
Ai
M∗i
∑
m=1
xi,m di +
M
∑
m=1
xc,m Ac (4.17)
As, by assumption Ac < Amin, a higher market share of cus-
tomised firms is associated with lower aggregate productivity. Thus,
as long as wages are below w∗pi, poorer markets are characterised by a
larger market share for customised firms. As incomes increase, produc-
tivity is affected through two channels: On the one hand, increases in
income reduce the market share of the customised firms, and thus in-
crease productivity; but on the other hand, increases in income decrease
the cutoff productivity level, which in turn decreases aggregate produc-
tivity. It is important to note that this is a partial equilibrium model, and
thus the channel at play here goes in the opposite direction: it is not the
dominance of small firms that leads to lower income, but instead lower
incomes are causing the smaller firms’ technology to be relatively more
profitable and thus aggregate productivity is lower. More importantly,
however, in my model lower measured, or mechanical, productivity does
not necessarily translate into lower consumer welfare. As the customised
firm sets its prices in a way such that all consumers that purchase the
customised good are indifferent between buying from it or from the
standardised firm with the lowest adjusted price. Thus, if small firms
are replaced by larger firms, which seems to increase consumer welfare
through lowering prices, consumers are in fact left indifferent.
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4.5.2 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide an alternative hypothesis for the dominance
of small and micro-enterprises in developing countries: I propose that
small and large firms not only use different technologies, as is proposed
by the dual-economy literature, but also differ in the type of good they
provide. Small firms produce using a more flexible production tech-
nology, which allows them to tailor or customise their goods to each
consumer. On the other hand, large firms use a more standardised tech-
nology, that limits them to producing a single variety at a lower marginal
cost. The relationship between technology and size not only comes from
the higher marginal cost of the customised technology but also form that
fact that in contrast to customised firms, standardised firms are able to
ship their goods across locations.
I build a spatial competition model with heterogeneous produc-
tivity, in which firms can be of two types, representing the two technolo-
gies. I show that markets with higher transport costs and lower popula-
tion are characterised by fewer standardised and thus fewer large firms.
Conditional on entry, standardised firms are smaller and serve also a
smaller share of the market, despite the inherent productivity distribu-
tion remaining unchanged. Increases in income on the other hand have
a non-monotonic effect: Income affects firms in two ways, as I allow in-
come to affect not only the marginal cost differential between customised
and standardised firms but also the taste for customisation of the con-
sumer. Thus, while for low income levels increases in income increase
the share of goods that are being produced using the standardised tech-
nology, after a certain threshold, the customised technology becomes
profitable again and the market share increases again.
An important implication of my model is that while measured
productivity is indeed lower in small firms than in large firms, this does
not imply necessarily that consumers are better off when the market
is dominated by standardised firms. This implies that differences in
measured productivity do not necessarily translate into differences in
welfare.
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Appendix A
Farmer Bargaining Power &
Relational Contracts
A.1 Tables
Timeline
1895 Taiwan becomes Japanese Colony
1900 First modern mill founded
1905 Sugar Industry Incentive Regulations passed
1918 First Rice Riots in Japan
1925 Ponlai Rice introduced in Taiwan
1931 Second Rice Riots in Japan & Second Rice Act passed
and Conquest of Manchuria
1937 Outbreak of Second Sino-Japanese War
1939 Outbreak to World War II
1945 Japanese Capitulation & Taiwan returned to China
Table A.1: Timeline
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Year Average price/
ton (in Baht)
1927 116.9
1928 118.3
1929 122.9
1930 100.3
1931 58.1
1932 56.3
1933 48.8
1934 60.5
1935 61.6
1936 68.3
1937 62.7
1938 59.9
Table A.2: Thailand Prices of Rice on World Market
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Total Lending & Inputs (log) Monetary Loans (log) Inputs Provided (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
post* paddy -.196*** -.142* - .105 -.286*** -.209 -.066 -.036
(.073) (.083) (.093) (.134) (.131) (.076) (.096)
post .338***
(.100)
paddy .169
(.341)
Factory FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
prefecture Trends N Y Y Y Y Y Y
prefecture Controls N N Y N Y N Y
Mill Controls N N Y N Y N Y
N Mills 39 38 33 38 33 38 33
N Observations 360 360 331 360 291 360 291
R2 .029 .892 .825 .820 .827 .897 .900
Table A.4: Loans Issued and Inputs Provided - Logged Total
Notes: The dependent variables are expressed as the total amount divided by the area
on which sugarcane is being cultivated in the same year. The independent variable
has been normalised such that one unit equals one standard deviation. prefecture con-
trols include prefecture population, the population employed in agriculture, number
of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill controls are age as well as parent
company equity, the number of factories owned by the parent company and total size
of the command area, which are all interacted with a post-1931 dummy. All standard
errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Total Lending & Inputs Monetary Loans Inputs Provided
Y/hectare Y/hectare Y/hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post* paddy -18.596** -18.595 -14.936** -21.051** 2.828 2.599
( 8.055) ( 11.391 ) (5.978) (9.086) (3.295) (5.482)
post 18.609 18.610 9.716 20.973 -3.173 -2.394
(13.016) (18.408) (10.385) 14.274 ( 5.0575) (7.702)
paddy 153.097*** 108.454*** 33.790***
(49.355) (38.558) (12.082)
Factory FE N Y N Y N Y
N Mills 38 38 38 38 38 38
N Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76
R2 .180 .945 .157 .939 .164 .864
Table A.5: Loans and Inputs Provided - Pre and Post Comparison
Notes: Years are collapsed to a one pre-1931 and one post-1931 time periods. The
dependent variables are expressed as the total amount divided by the area on which
sugarcane is being cultivated in the same year. The independent variable has been
normalised such that one unit equals one standard deviation. All standard errors are
robust. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
Monetary Loans Inputs Provided
Working Capital Miscellaneous Fertilizer Seeds
Y/hectare Y/hectare Y/hectare Y/hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
post* paddy -21.168*** -20.786*** -4.425 -6.043* 2.556 2.163 -1.367 .545
(8.173 ) (7.155) (3.231) ( 3.591) (3.496) ( 3.660) ( 2.051) (2.471)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Mill Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
N Mills 38 33 38 33 38 33 38 33
N Observations 360 291 360 291 360 291 360 291
R2 .487 .809 .529 .487 .796 .722 .766 .745
Mean 90.31 90.311 10.34 10.34 96.00 13.88 13.88
Table A.6: Loans Issued and Inputs Provided by Type
Notes: The dependent variables are expressed as the total amount divided by the area
on which sugarcane is being cultivated in the same year. The independent variable
has been normalised such that one unit equals one standard deviation. Prefecture con-
trols include prefecture population, the population employed in agriculture, number
of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill controls are age as well as parent
company equity, the number of factories owned by the parent company and total size
of the command area, which are all interacted with a post-1931 dummy. All standard
errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Total Lending & Inputs (log) Monetary Loans (log) Inputs Provided (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
price* paddy -36.131*** -7.498 -3.381 -15.611** -12.351** 8.228** 9.306***
(7.793) (9.111) (7.678) (6.370) (5.718) (3.876) ( 3.520)
price 7.609
(.853)
paddy 206.898***
(46.334)
Factory FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls N N Y N Y N Y
Mill Controls N N Y N Y N Y
N Mills 39 38 33 38 33 38 33
N Observations 360 360 331 360 291 360 291
R2 .175 .847 .845 .827 .812 .806 .820
Table A.7: Baseline Specification Using Rice Prices
Notes: The dependent variables are expressed as the total amount divided by the area
on which sugarcane is being cultivated in the same year. The independent variable
has been normalised such that one unit equals one standard deviation. Prefecture con-
trols include Prefecture population, the population employed in agriculture, number
of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill controls are age as well as parent
company equity, the number of factories owned by the parent company and total size
of the command area, which are all interacted with a post-1931 dummy. All standard
errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Monetary Lending
(Y/hectare)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
post* paddy -18.820*** -15.960** -20.427*** -18.820*** -22.221***
( 6.769) (6.282) ( 5.127) (6.769) (7.165)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls N N N N Y
Mill Controls N N Y N N
Prefecture*Year FE N Y Y N N
Mill Trends N N N Y Y
N Mills 38 38 33 38 33
N Observations 360 360 291 360 291
R2 .829 .877 .878 .829 .851
Table A.8: Baseline specification with Prefecture-Year Fixed Effects and
Linear Mill Trends
Notes: The dependent variables are expressed as the total amount divided by the area
on which sugarcane is being cultivated in the same year. The independent variable
has been normalised such that one unit equals one standard deviation. Prefecture con-
trols include Prefecture population, the population employed in agriculture, number
of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill controls are age as well as parent
company equity, the number of factories owned by the parent company and total size
of the command area, which are all interacted with a post-1931 dummy. All standard
errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Log Total Lending & Inputs Log Monetary Loans Log Inputs Provided
(1) (2) (3)
paddy*1929 -.072 -.193 .126
(.169) (.230) (.197)
paddy*1930 .045 .068 .082
(.139) (.200) (.144)
paddy*1932 -.539** -.896** -.286
(.271) (.411) (.220)
paddy*1933 -.394* -.924** -.008
(.216) (.394) (.205)
paddy*1934 -.395* -.829** -.469
(.234) (.465) (.348)
paddy*1935 -.533* -1.057** -.139
(.275) (.475) (.250)
paddy*1936 -.517 -1.018* -.101
(.321) (.552) (.271)
paddy*1937 -.143 -.494 .039
(.299) (.521) (.302)
paddy*1938 -.018 -.424 .237
(.293) (.488) (.333)
paddy*1939 -.062 -.517 .305
(.266) (.493) (.280)
Factory FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends Y Y Y
N Mills 38 38 38
N Observations 360 360 360
R2 .841 .829 .830
Table A.9: Time-varying Treatment Effects
Notes: The dependent variables are expressed as the total amount divided by the area
on which sugarcane is being cultivated in the same year. The independent variable
has been normalised such that one unit equals one standard deviation. Prefecture con-
trols include Prefecture population, the population employed in agriculture, number
of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill controls are age as well as parent
company equity, the number of factories owned by the parent company and total size
of the command area, which are all interacted with a post-1931 dummy. All standard
errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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All Fields Paddy Fields Dry Fields
(Log Area in Hectares)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post* paddy -.081 -.070 -.470*** -.511*** .125** .215***
(.064) (.077) (.172) (.169) (.061) (.058)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls N Y N Y N Y
Mill Controls N Y N Y N Y
N Mills 38 33 38 33 38 33
N Observations 362 293 362 293 362 293
R2 .913 .906 .811 .810 .848 .856
Mean 1649.189 574.787 1074.40
Table A.10: The Effect on the Area Cultivated by Field Type
Notes: The independent variable has been normalised such that one unit equals one
standard deviation. Prefecture controls include Prefecture population, the population
employed in agriculture, number of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill
controls are age as well as parent company equity, the number of factories owned by
the parent company and total size of the command area, which are all interacted with
a post-1931 dummy. All standard errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001
**p>0.05 *p>0.10
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All Fields Paddy Fields Dry Fields
(Log Ton/Hectares)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post* paddy -.077*** -.071* -.115** -.144* -.069*** -.081**
(.026) (.038) (.052) (.085) (.024) (.033)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls N Y N Y N Y
Mill Controls N Y N Y N Y
N Mills 38 33 38 33 38 33
N Observations 362 293 362 293 362 293
R2 .607 .613 .327 .334 .788 .823
Mean 65.972 75.851 58.461
Table A.11: The Effect on Yields by Field Type
Notes: The independent variable has been normalised such that one unit equals one
standard deviation. Prefecture controls include Prefecture population, the population
employed in agriculture, number of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill
controls are age as well as parent company equity, the number of factories owned by
the parent company and total size of the command area, which are all interacted with
a post-1931 dummy. All standard errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001
**p>0.05 *p>0.10
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,Cane Input Sugar Output Sugar Yield Harvest Duration Share of Days Capacity
Log ’00 tons Log tons % Days Inactive Log Tons/Day
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post* paddy -.035 -.022 .346 -3.582 2.18** -.015
( .083) (.078) (.486) (4.642) (1.054) (.049)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mill Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
N Mills 38 33 38 33 38 33
N Observations 293 293 293 291 293 293
R2 .848 .845 .694 .714 .977 .837
Mean 1429 1841 12.10 133.89 43.61 917.24
Table A.12: Production Outcomes
Notes: The independent variable has been normalised such that one unit equals one
standard deviation. Prefecture controls include Prefecture population, the population
employed in agriculture, number of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill
controls are age as well as parent company equity, the number of factories owned by
the parent company and total size of the command area, which are all interacted with
a post-1931 dummy. All standard errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001
**p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Fertilizer Seeds
Yen per hectare cultivated with cane
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post× paddy 2.556 2.163 4.760 -1.367 .546 4.936
(3.496) (3.661) ( 4.528) (2.051) (2.471) (3.028)
Factory & Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends Y Y N Y Y N
Controls× post N Y Y N Y Y
Prefecture × Year FE N N Y N N Y
N Mills 38 33 33 38 33 33
N Observations 358 291 291 358 290 290
R2 .796 .853 .864 .766 .745 .810
Mean 95.99 13.88
Notes: Prefecture controls include prefecture population, the population employed in
agriculture, number of cattle owned and total land under cultivation. Mill controls are
age as well as parent company equity, the number of factories owned by the parent
company and total size of the command area, which are all interacted with a
post-1931 dummy. All standard errors are clustered at the factory level. ***p>0.001
**p>0.05 *p>0.10
Table A.14: Effect on Inputs Provided
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Total Lending by Mills to Farmers
Yen per hectare cultivated with cane
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post×paddy×Capital .027 -.023 .096
(.184) (.119) (.096)
post× Capital .384 .186 -.259
(.600) (.521) (.474)
post×paddy× # of Factories -.102 -.335 .246
(.798) (.503) (.384)
post× # of Factories 2.021 1.244 -.639
(2.040) (1.759) (1.759)
post× paddy -28.323*** -26.218*** -22.144*** -26.260*** -26.698*** -21.383***
(9.869) (9.098) (4.770) (9.254) (9.005) (4.892)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends Y Y N Y Y Y
Prefecture×Year FE N N Y N N Y
N Mills 29 29 29 29 29 29
N Observations 305 272 310 272 309 246
R2 .841 .829 .794 .815 .891 .799
Notes: Capital is measured in the year 1921 and expressed in million Yens. All
standard errors are clustered at the factory level. Column(3) F-test of excluded
instruments is 17.52. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
Table A.15: Heterogeneous Effects by Size
Total Lending & Inputs Monetary Loans Inputs Provided
Logged Value Yen/hectare Logged Value Yen/hectare Logged Value Yen/hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post×paddy×court .1602* 14.881 .318* 15.756* .126 -4.105
(.097) ( 11.979) (.179) (9.318) (.091) (9.861)
post× paddy -.296** -44.161** -.938* -46.802*** -.414 8.941
(.136) ( 17.841) (.527) ( 13.826) (.255) (12.660)
post× court -.498* -24.12** -.650** -31.798 -.177 20.809
(.283) (36.442) (.256) (28.741) (.138) (18.661)
Factory FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
N Mills 29 29 29 29 29 29
N Observations 305 272 310 272 309 246
R2 .841 .829 .794 .815 .891 .799
Mean 209.74 209.74 102.93 102.93 106.89 106.89
Notes: All standard errors are clustered at the factory level. Column(3) F-test of
excluded instruments is 17.52. ***p>0.001 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
Table A.16: Heterogeneous Effects by Presence of Court
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A.2 Figures
Figure A.1: Agricultural Activity in Taiwan 1905
118
Figure A.2: Correlation between Average and Minimum Rice Prices
119
Figure A.3: Average Value of Loans and Inputs Provided
The total value of loans and inputs for mills with less than median share of paddy
fields is normalised to equal the other group in the year 1929. Values are expressed in
loged Yen.
120
Figure A.4: Time-varying Treatment Effect Estimates on Log Inputs Pro-
vided
Notes: The outcome variable is the log value of all inputs provided. Confidence inter-
vals shown are at the 99%, 95%, 90% and 80% levels. The reference year is 1931.
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Figure A.5: Correlation Between Fertiliser Provided and Actual Con-
sumption
Notes: Both variables are expressed in Japanese Yen.
122
Figure A.6: Correlation between Cane and Rice Suitability
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Appendix B
The Benefits of the Bamboo
Network in International Trade
B.1 Profitability (TFPR)
In addition to analysing the effect of better access to the American Chi-
nese network on exports, we also investigate the effect on a number
of other firm variables. While most of these are easily observed in the
Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises, we need to construct our own
measure of total factor productivity, as described in this section.
We do not have information about quantities produced, and in-
stead rely on revenue data; thus, we are unable to accurately measure
total factor productivity and instead are limited to estimating total rev-
enue productivity. Revenue productivity however is only an imperfect
approximation of actual total factor productivity: firms can have a high
factor productivity because they are more efficient, or because they have
higher idiosyncratic demand and thus are able to charge higher prices.
We model production with a simple Cobb-Douglas production
function:
Yf ,i,c = A f ,i,cK
αki
f ,i,cL
αli
f ,i,cM
α;i
f ,i,c (B.1)
Where Yf ,i,c is output produced by firm f in industry i in county
c, K f ,i,c is capital, L f ,i,c is labour and M f ,i,c are all intermediate products
used in production. We then follow the Foster et al. (2008) and calculate
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firm level total factor productivity as:
t f pr f ,i,c = y f ,i,c − αki k f ,i,c − αli l f ,i,c − α;im f ,i,c (B.2)
where the lower-case letters indicate logarithms of establishment-
level TFPR, value of output, labor inputs, capital stock and intermediate
inputs respectively, and αj(j = {l, k, m}) are the factor elasticities for the
relevant inputs. Output is measured as total value of output produced;
capital is measured as the net value of all fixed assets, while labour
input is measured as the number of employees. Intermediate inputs are
measured as the total value of all intermediate industrial inputs.
It is important to note that the amount of inputs used is clearly en-
dogenous to the firm specific productivity level. Thus we cannot identify
the input elasticities for each firm. Instead we use average cost shares of
inputs in each industry to calculate the elasticities. The cost shares for
labour and materials are calculated using expenditure from the survey
at the industry level, while the cost share of capital is calculated as the
average amount of capital stocks times the respective capital rental rates
for each firm’s corresponding two digit industry, taken from US data in
the absence such data being available for China.
B.2 Creating Industry Exposure Measure
B.2.1 Linking Industries in China to the U.S.
In this paper, we suppose that a Chinese firm f in industry i can be ex-
posed to the Cantonese U.S. network in three different ways: through
American-Cantonese workers employed in the same industry i (referred
to as "same industry"), through workers employed in a retail or whole-
sale sector that sell goods produced by industry i ("retail and wholesale")
and finally though workers active in other downstream manufacturing
sectors that use industry i’s products as intermediate inputs ("manufac-
turing").
Calculating the number of ethnically Cantonese American work-
ers employed in the same industry is relatively straightforward. The main
challenge is converting the industry classification used in the 2000 U.S.
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Census to the classifications used in our Chinese data. We start by con-
verting the U.S. data to the International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (ISIC), which allows us to identify industries up to the four-digit
level, using conversion tables provided by the United States Census Bu-
reau. However, while the Chinese industry classification scheme is mod-
eled after the ISIC system, it is not identical and, to our knowledge, there
is no official conversion. Thus we develop our own conversion scheme,
by matching industries by their description. Despite also being reported
at the four-digit level, the number of industries in the Chinese classifica-
tion is larger than in the ISIC. Overall, we are able to match 687 out of
709 Chinese industries to 189 ISIC industries.
In order to calculate our second measure of industry exposure,
the number of workers in a downstream retail or wholesale industry, we
need to link Chinese industries to American retail industries. Ideally,
we would make use of information how much each American retail or
wholesale industry imports from each Chinese industry. As we do not
have access to this information, we instead match manufacturing to retail
and wholesale industries using industry descriptions. For more details
on this process see Appendix B.2.2.
Thirdly, we match industries in China with American manufac-
turing industries that are likely to use the Cantonese firms’ products as
intermediate inputs. In order to establish which firm purchases which
inputs and thus linking Chinese industries to related downstream in-
dustries, we use the information provided by the Input-Output tables
compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the year 2002. These
tables give detailed information of the inputs purchased for each six
digit industry according to the North American Industry Classification.
We thus calculate for each industry the weighted average of Cantonese
workers that purchases its products according to the share of total sales
of industry i.
B.2.2 Chinese Manufacturing Industries to U.S. Whole-
sale and Retail Industries
To calculate the measure of industry exposure described in Section 4.1
we need to match manufacturing industries in China with their likely
126
wholesale and retail counterpart in the U.S. Ideally, to perform this
matching we would have information about imports and exports that
reveal the top industries which import manufacturing data.
In the absence of that, we need to impute which manufacturing
industries match with which retail industries. We achieve this by first
isolating key words in the description of the manufacturing industry in
China. As a next step, we then match these key words to the description
of the corresponding NAICS retail and wholesale industry. For exam-
ple, in the case of a tobacco and cigarette manufacturer in China, we
then conduct a search for the key words in the NAICS database for re-
tail and wholesale industries whose description contained related words
to Tobacco. In this case we link tobacco production to the wholesale
industry 424940 "Tobacco and Tobacco Product Merchant Wholesalers"
and 424590 "Other Farm Product Raw Material Merchant Wholesalers"
which includes "Auction markets for tobacco" in their description, as
well as the retail industry 453991 "Tobacco Stores". Of course these are
imperfect measures of the retailers and wholesalers truly stocking these
products, as we usually exclude generalised retailers.
In this way our matching may be subject to measurement error.
In an attempt to reduce it, when we construct the industry exposure
measure we take the average number of Chinese workers that work in
the industries which are matched to each Chinese industry code.
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B.3 Tables
Number of Immigrants Percentage
Taishan 44,131 47.7
Xinhui 13,858 15.0
Kaiping 13,350 14.4
Enping 3,754 4.1
Heshan 2,574 2.8
Siyi 77,667 84.0
Panyu 6,415 6.9
Nanhai 480 0.5
Shunde 420 0.5
Sanyi 7,315 7.9
Zhongshan 5,899 6.4
Other 1607 1.7
Total: 92488
Table B.1: Origin of Canadian-Chinese by County in China
Notes: Data from Yu (2011).
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Mean Median SD Min Max N
Export Status .500 0 .500 0 1 34,558
Export Value (’000 RMB) 37311.29 0 502314.9 0 1.50e+07 34,525
All Firms
Employment (N. workers) 288.530 121 816.850 1 71915 34,525
Share of High Skilled Workers(%) .038 .008 .089 0 1 34,525
Total Wages (’000 RMB) 4470.353 1478 29928.25 6 4158034 34,525
Management Expenses (’000 RMB) 3580.832 979 39077.91 0 5078518 34,525
Profits (’000 RMB) 4108.157 226 83596.41 -278790 7728064 34,525
Output (’000 RMB) 85368.06 18540 938114.4 0 1.09e+08 34,525
Domestic Sales (’000 RMB) 83475.68 18008 925507.6 0 1.09e+08 34,525
Fixed Assets (’000 RMB) 24737.29 2932 551633.3 0 9.60e+07 34,525
Total Capital (’000 RMB) 19458.72 3600 277759.9 0 4.87e+07 34,525
Foreign Capital Share (%) .104 0 .296 0 1 34,379
State Owned Dummy .051 0 .219 0 1 34,525
Exporting Firms
Employment (N. workers) 439.233 200 1066.735 2 71915 17,232
Share of High Skilled Workers(%) .032 .008 .070 0 1 17,232
Total Wages (’000 RMB) 6627.220 2398 27344.32 24 2204273 17,232
Management Expenses (’000 RMB) 5129.092 1387.5 54399.75 0 5078518 17,232
Profits (’000 RMB) 5509.688 260 94274.87 -246506 7728064 17,232
Output (’000 RMB) 119333.8 23501 975514.4 0 7.30e+07 17,232
Domestic Sales (’000 RMB) 42492.64 147.5 517657.9 1 3.97e+07 17,232
Fixed Assets (’000 RMB) 25285.13 4150.5 154693.3s 0 9111732 17,232
Total Capital (’000 RMB) 24297.66 6626.5 110130.8 0 8842600 17,232
Foreign Capital Share (%) .050 0 .199 0 1 17,232
State Owned Dummy .023 0 .153 0 1 17,232
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics: Firms Characteristics
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this
paper. When applicable the data is shown in 2004 RMB, at which point 1USD =8.28
RMB. Source: 2004 Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises.
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Mean Median SD Min Max N
Cultural Exposure
Sending Counties Dummy .144 0 .351 0 1 34,525
Cantonese Counties Dummy .681 1 .466 0 1 34,525
Industry Exposure
Cantonese Workers Retail and Wholesale 253.311 144.763 285.397 2.367 2789.528 31,026
Cantonese Workers Downstream Manufacturing 4112.293 2109.71 6210.863 22 25698.23 34,083
Cantonese Workers Same Industry 283.737 118.306 412.163 .322 8462.154 34,112
Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics: Cultural and Industry Exposure
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the main independent variables
variables used in this paper. Sources: 2004 Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises.
Cantonese Workers
Restaurants and Other Food Services 47,199
Colleges and Universities 26,132
Hospitals 24,494
Elementary and Secondary Schools 20,436
Electronic Components and Products Manufacturing 14,070
Other Information Services 13,396
Computer systems design and related services 12,262
Construction 11,483
Grocery Stores 11,372
Securities, commodities, funds, trusts, 10,739
and other financial investments
Table B.4: Top 10 U.S. 4 Digit Industries by Number of Cantonese
Workers
Notes: U.S. 2000 Population Census data.
130
Cantonese Workers
Carpets and rugs manufacturing 14
Logging 18
Tobacco Manufacturing 22
Railroad rolling stock manufacturing 22
Support activities for agriculture and forestry 24
Tire manufacturing 24
Farm supplies wholesalers 25
Not specified metal industries 37
Other transportation equipment manufacturing 38
Structural clay product manufacturing 41
Table B.5: Last 10 U.S. 4 Digit Industries by Number of Cantonese
Workers
Notes: U.S. 2000 Population Census data.
Retail and Wholesale Manufacturing Same Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .045* .029**
(.026) (.012)
Workers Related Retail .094***
(.013)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing * Sending .057*** .030***
(.008) (.004)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing .039***
(.007)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .061*** .030***
(.017) (.009)
Workers Same Industry .042**
(.017)
Sending Counties -.177*** -.184*** -.175***
(.022) (.019) (.019)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y N Y N Y
County FE N Y N Y N Y
N of observations 22,413 22,413 24,069 24,069 24,043 24,043
R-Squared 0.0762 0.2878 0.0458 0.2927 0.0443 0.2918
Table B.6: Extensive Margin: Probability of Exporting
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating firms export status. Stan-
dard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. The
variables denoted as workers refers to the number of Cantonese workers in each 4-digit
industries in the U.S. The coefficients of the variables network and workers correspond
to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the independent
variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
131
Probability of Exporting Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .029*** .138***
(.010) (.040)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending .030*** .057*
(.011) (.033)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .030** .079**
(.014) (.040)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 22,393 24,041 24,017 11,259 11,777 11,777
R-Squared 0.2871 0.2919 0.2911 0.1501 0.1544 0.1544
Table B.7: Baseline Specification - Standard Errors Clustered at County
Level
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the county level. Controls are
at the county level and include total county population, emigration (%), and university
attendance (%). The coefficients of the variables defined as network correspond to
the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the independent
variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
Probability of Exporting Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Related Retail×Cantonese .023*** .080***
(.008) (.030)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing×Cantonese .017*** .047**
(.003) (.019)
Workers Same Industry×Cantonese .007 .022
(.010) (.044)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 22,393 24,041 24,017 11,259 11,777 11,777
R-Squared 0.2872 0.2917 0.2908 0.1500 0.1545 0.1542
Table B.8: Exports - Network Exposure for Cantonese Counties
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese indus-
try level. In these regressions, network exposure is constructed as industry exposure
times a dummy variable which indicates whether a county’s main language belongs
to the Cantonese language group. The coefficients of the variables defined as workers
correspond to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the
independent variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Probability of Exporting Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .038** .159***
(.015) (.043)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending .036*** .062***
(.004) (.024)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .037*** .084**
(.010) (.035)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls×Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 22,234 23,861 23,837 11,083 11,572 11,572
R-Squared 0.3235 0.3301 0.3293 0.2028 0.2092 0.2093
Table B.9: Baseline Specification with County Controls Interacted with
Industry Fixed Effects
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry
level. Controls are at the county level and include total county population, emigration
(%), and university attendance (%). The coefficients of the variables defined as network
correspond to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the
independent variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
Retail and Wholesale Manufacturing Same Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .148*** .138***
(.041) (.037)
Workers Related Retail .050**
(.024)
Workers Same Workers * Sending .086*** .057***
(.021) (.020)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing -.019
(.020)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .052 .079**
(.051) (.032)
Workers Same Industry .054
(.039)
Sending Counties -.328*** -.250*** -.210***
(.094) (.079) (.080)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y Y N Y Y
County FE N Y Y N Y Y
N of observations 11,314 11,314 11,834 11,834 11,834 11,834
R-Squared 0.0185 0.1561 0.0146 0.1599 0.0157 0.1599
Table B.10: Intensive Margin: Export Value
Notes: The dependent variable is log of export value. Standard errors in parenthesis
and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. The variables denoted as work-
ers refers to the number of Cantonese workers in each 4-digit industries in the U.S.
The coefficients of the variables network and workers correspond to the changes in the
dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the independent variable. ***p>0.01
**p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Probability of Exporting Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Related Retail×Sending .022* .112***
(.013) (.039)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing×Sending .025*** .042*
(.004) (.021)
Workers Same Industry×Sending .029*** .076**
(.008) (.035)
Workers Related Retail×Cantonese .019*** .061*
(.007) (.032)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing×Cantonese .013*** .039**
(.004) (.020)
Workers Same Industry×Cantonese .002 .011
(.010) (.051)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 22,393 24,041 24,017 11,259 11,777 11,777
R-Squared 0.2874 0.2920 0.2911 0.1505 0.1546 0.1544
Table B.11: Exports - Heterogeneous Effects for Sending Counties
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry
level. The coefficients of the variables defined as workers correspond to the changes in
the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the independent variable. ***p>0.01
**p>0.05 *p>0.10
Probability of Exporting Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .032*** .146***
(.012) (.034)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending .029*** .072***
(.004) (.019)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .028*** .102***
(.009) (.030)
Foreign Capital (%) .035*** .035*** .035*** .320*** .317*** .317***
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.026) (.025) (.025)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 25,650 27,473 27,449 13,947 14,576 14,576
R-Squared 0.2794 0.2857 0.2849 0.1901 0.1910 0.1911
Table B.12: Control for Foreign Capital
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry
level. The coefficients of the variables defined as network and foreign capital correspond
to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the independent
variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .146*** .180***
(.037) (.040)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending .058*** .082***
(.020) (.023)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .087*** .121***
( .032) (.035)
Foreign Capital (%) .026*** .320*** .319***
(.027) (.027 ) (.027)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Controls×Industry FE N Y N Y N Y
Domestic Firms Only Y N Y N Y N
N of observations 11,641 14,176 11,641 14,176 11,641 14,176
R-Squared 0.6150 0.6442 0.6184 0.6473 0.6246 0.6088
Table B.13: Exports Adjusted by Share of Industry Exports to the US
Vs. World
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry
level. Controls are at the county level and include total county population, emigration
(%), and university attendance (%). The coefficients of the variables defined as network
correspond to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the
independent variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
Probability of Exporting Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .028 .129***
(.017) (.041)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending .036*** .082***
(.004) (.020)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .038*** .097***
(.008) (.031)
Non-Cantonese Workers Related Retail×Sending .002 .015
(.010) (.035)
Non-Cantonese Workers Downstream Manufacturing×Sending -.025*** -.160***
(.008) (.053)
Non-Cantonese Workers Same Industry×Sending -.029* -.139
(.017) (.086)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 22,393 24,041 24,017 11,259 11,777 11,777
R-Squared 0.2871 0.2920 0.2912 0.1502 0.1548 0.1545
Table B.14: Control for Industry Size
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry
level. In these regressions, network exposure is constructed as industry exposure times
a dummy variable which indicates whether a county’s main language belongs to the
Cantonese language group. The coefficients of the variables defined as network and
workers correspond to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change
in the independent variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Probability of Exporting Log Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending -.007 .281
(.022) (.207)
Workers Retail* Sending × Differentiated .043* -.142
(.025) (.211)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending .005 .058***
(.039) (.021)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending × Differentiated .023 .036**
(.040) (.016)
Workers Same Industry * Sending -.030 .130
(.024) (.367)
Workers Same Industry * Sending × Differentiated .060** -.038
(.026) (.368)
Sending × Differentiated .004 .014 .004 .203 .157 .176
(.024) (.029) (.024) (.244) (.139) (.183)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 25,650 27,473 27,449 13,947 14,576 14,576
R-Squared 0.2751 0.2813 0.2805 0.1446 0.1473 0.1472
Table B.15: Heterogeneous Effects for Differentiated Goods
Notes: Differentiated goods are identified using the classification scheme published
by Rauch (1999), using the conservative classification. Standard errors in parenthesis
and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. The coefficients of the variables
defined as network correspond to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1
SD change in the independent variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
Probability of Exporting Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Network Retail (Self-employed) .010 .152***
(.010) (.043)
Network Manufacturing (Self-employed) .030** .059*
(.012) (.034)
Network Retail (Wage Workers) .030*** .136***
(.010) (.039)
Network Manufacturing (Wage Workers) .031*** .056*
(.012) (.033)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 19,145 24,041 22,393 24,041 10,246 11,777 11,259 11,777
R-Squared 0.2754 0.2919 0.2871 0.2919 0.1413 0.1544 0.1501 0.1544
Table B.16: Self-employed vs. Wage Workers
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the county level. The coefficients
of the variables defined as network correspond to the changes in the dependent variable
caused by a 1 SD change in the independent variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Probability of Exporting Log Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .032** .131***
(.015) (.042)
Workers Retail* Sending × High Tech -.009 .062
(.021) (.122)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending .036*** .051**
(.004) (.023)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending × High Tech .031 .184
(.060) (.400)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .033*** .066**
(.011) (.032)
Workers Same Industry * Sending × High Tech .004 .122
(.032) (.193)
Sending × High Tech .039 .043 .041* -.063 -.107 -.108
(.026) (.029) (.024) (.206) (.217) (.157)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 22,393 24,041 24,017 11,259 11,777 11,777
R-Squared 0.2872 0.2921 0.2805 0.1502 0.1544 0.1545
Table B.18: Heterogeneous Effects for High Tech Industry
Notes: High-tech is a dummy variable equal to 1 for ISIC 3.1 industry codes 24, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 352, 353, 359, 2423, based on the technology intensity definition
published by the OECD. Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit
Chinese industry level. The coefficients of the variables defined as network correspond
to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the independent
variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Probability of Exporting Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .020 .209**
(.022) (.089)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending .009 .169*
(.016) (.094)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .017 .214*
(.024) (.119)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 3,172 3,332 3,332 2,593 2,694 2,694
R-Squared 0.2174 0.2343 0.2343 0.2607 0.1544 0.2623
Table B.19: Exports - Foreign Owned Firms
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry
level. The coefficients of the variables defined as network correspond to the changes in
the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the independent variable. ***p>0.01
**p>0.05 *p>0.10
Probability of Exporting Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .054** .106
(.025) (.110)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing* Sending .126** .343
(.055) (.024)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .021 .340**
(.029) (.136)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls×Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 8,876 9,113 9,113 5,113 5,209 5,209
R-Squared 0.2104 0.1605 0.2322 0.1887 0.1605 0.1611
Table B.20: High Medium Technology Industries Only
Notes: Note that in this case we have considered all firms (foreign owned and domes-
tically owned) in order to keep the sample size large. Standard errors in parenthesis
and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. The coefficients of the variables
defined as network correspond to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1
SD change in the independent variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
139
B.4 Figures
Figure B.1: Correlation between Workers and Self-employed Workers
- Downstream Manufacturing
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Figure B.2: Correlation between Workers and Self-employed Workers
- Related Retail
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Figure B.3: Firm Outcomes: Output, Assets and Capital
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. This
graph plots the coefficients of the variable network exposure estimated in equation (4)
for the three different measures of industry exposure; the coefficients correspond to the
effect of a 1 SD change in the measure of network exposure. The confidence intervals
given are at the 99%, 95% and 90% level.
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Figure B.4: Firm Outcomes: Output, Assets and Capital by Export
Status
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. These
graphs plot the coefficients of the variable network exposure estimated in equation (4)
for the three different measures of industry exposure; the coefficients correspond to the
effect of a 1 SD change in the measure of network exposure. The confidence intervals
given are at the 99%, 95% and 90% level.
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Figure B.5: Firm Outcomes: Employment and Expenses
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. This
graph plots the coefficients of the variable network exposure estimated in equation
(4) for the three different measures of industry exposure; the coefficients correspond
to the effect of a 1 SD change in the measure of network exposure. The variable
average yearly wage indicates the yearly average wage paid per worker. The confidence
intervals given are at the 99%, 95% and 90% level.
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Figure B.6: Firm Outcomes: Employment and Expenses by Export
Status
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. These
graphs plot the coefficients of the variable network exposure estimated in equation
(4) for the three different measures of industry exposure; the coefficients correspond
to the effect of a 1 SD change in the measure of network exposure. The variable
average yearly wage indicates the yearly average wage paid per worker. The confidence
intervals given are at the 99%, 95% and 90% level.
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B.5 Economic Census Data
In addition to analysing the effect on other firm variables for large man-
ufacturing firms, we analyse data from the Economic Census of China
to document the effects on small firms and firms in other sectors.
The Chinese Economic Census of 2004 is also compiled by the
National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC and was accessed through the
China Data Center at the University of Michigan. It contains informa-
tion on the universe of all registered Chinese firms and thus contains a
large number of observations. In contrast to the Survey of Industrial En-
terprises, the census covers all industries and thus allows us to analyse
also effects on services. Note that this data set nests the previous one.
However, it contains only few firm-level variables, namely: employee
number, revenues, 4 digit industry classification, ownership type and
exact location. For privacy reasons, employee number and revenues are
only given in bandwidths. We aggregate the location up to the county
level to match it with our independent variable measuring network ex-
posure. Again, we exclude all state-owned firms. This gives us 243,205
firm-level observations, out of which around 15% are at least partially
foreign owned. As Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of firms according
to ownership. As can be seen, most foreign owned firms are owned by
individual or corporations based in Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan. Table
B.21 show the summary statistics for this data set.
Mean Median SD Min Max N
Firm Level Statistics
Employee Number 275.4835 10 3153.054 10 50000 243205
Revenue 1393.8407 75 8194.665 15 200000 243205
County Level Statistics
Number of Firms 13.55497 3 47.00418 1 2440 17945
% Firms < 10 Workers 57.38828 66.66667 40.94633 0 100 17945
% Firms > 10, < 250 Workers 28.86719 11.20332 35.32179 0 100 17945
% Firms > 250 Workers 13.74453 0 27.65033 0 100 17945
Table B.21: Descriptive Statistics: Chinese Economic Census
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this
paper. Data from the Chinese Economic Census of 2004.
Table B.22 shows the effect on the log number of employees by
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sector. Note that while we can construct a measure of network expo-
sure within the same industry for all industries in our sample, we are
only able to calculate the number of workers in related retail and down-
stream manufacturing industries for manufacturing plants, as the other
industries do not produce tradable goods. Column (1) shows that a
one standard deviation increase in exposure to the network in the same
industry increases employment for all firms by 2.7%. Column (4), (5)
and (6) display the effect for manufacturing, services and retail firms re-
spectively. The effect is significant only for the manufacturing sector, in
which it is an around 7.5% increase. Column (2) and (3) show that our
other measures of network have a similar effect on manufacturing firms.
Figure B.7 delves deeper into the effect of network exposure on the size
distribution of firms, and shows that the main increase in average size
appears to be driven by a decrease in the share of firms with less than
20 workers and an increase in the share of firms that have between 20-50
workers.
Furthermore, the effects on revenues per worker are shown in
Table B.23. Here, we find no effect of an increased exposure to the re-
tail and downstream manufacturing industry network. We do however
observe a negative overall effect of increased access to the network in
the same industry in the US, and column (4) shows a positive effect for
manufacturing firms: a one standard deviation increase in the measure
of exposure increases revenue per worker by 3.5%. However, this effect
is evened out by the negative effect on firms in the retail sector, as is
shown in column (6).
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Log Number of Employees
All Firms Manufacturing Services Retail
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers Retail* Sending .069*
(.038)
Workers Same Workers Downstream Manufacturing * Sending .094***
(.015)
Workers Same Industry * Sending .027*** .075** .004 .002
(.007) (.036) (.018) (.004)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 234,542 108,304 146,724 109,755 30,205 94,394
R-Squared 0.3389 0.2155 0.2853 0.2147 0.1032 0.1187
Table B.22: Log Employment by Sectors - Economic Census Data
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry
level. The variables denoted as workers refers to the number of Cantonese workers in
each 4-digit industries in the U.S. The coefficients of the variables network and workers
correspond to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the
independent variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Figure B.8 shows the effect of all three measures on manufacturing
firms of different sizes. While exposure to the same industry network
increases the revenue per worker for small and medium sized manufac-
turing firms, exposure to the network in retail and wholesale industries
has no significant effects, and in the case of downstream manufacturing,
there is only a significant positive effect for firms employing between 50
and 500 workers. While there seems no significant effect for large firms,
it is important to keep in mind that the bandwidths in which revenues
and employment are noted become less precise at higher levels.
Log Revenue per Workers
All Firms Manufacturing Services Retail
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Network Related Retail .018
(.020)
Workers Downstream Manufacturing * Sending .016
(.013)
Workers Same Industry * Sending -.030** .035** .005 -.029*
(.013) ( .014) (.015) (.016)
Age Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N of observations 234,542 109,755 109,755 109,755 30,205 94,394
R-Squared 0.3389 0.2155 0.2853 0.2147 0.1032 0.1187
Table B.23: Log Revenue per Worker by Sectors - Economic Census
Data
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry
level. The variables denoted as workers refers to the number of Cantonese workers in
each 4-digit industries in the U.S. The coefficients of the variables network and workers
correspond to the changes in the dependent variable caused by a 1 SD change in the
independent variable. ***p>0.01 **p>0.05 *p>0.10
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Figure B.7: Economic Census: Effect on Size Distribution - Manufac-
turing
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. This
graph plots the coefficients of the variable network exposure estimated in equation (4)
for the three different measures of industry exposure; the coefficients correspond to the
effect of a 1 SD change in the measure of network exposure. The confidence intervals
given are at 90% level.
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Figure B.8: Economic Census: Effect on Revenue per Worker by Firm
Size - Manufacturing
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit Chinese industry level. This
graph plots the coefficients of the variable network exposure estimated in equation (4)
for the three different measures of industry exposure; the coefficients correspond to the
effect of a 1 SD change in the measure of network exposure. The confidence intervals
given are at 90% level.
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Appendix C
Product Customisation and
Optimal Firm Size
C.1 Proof
The proof follows through backward induction.
C.1.1 Stage 4: Customised Firm’s Pricing Decision
The set of players is the set of standardised firms Ns and customised
firms Nc = M. Each firm i ∈ Nc maximises its profit. Firm types (s,c)
are common knowledge at the beginning of the pricing stage.
At this stage all players have complete information. As standard-
ised firms can choose a different price for each local market, and cus-
tomised firms only operate in one market, I can analyse the problem for
each market separately. I focus on a given market in the post-entry sub-
games. However, a similar game is played in each market. Thus, I drop
the subscript indicating the local market in the following two sections
unless required for clarity.
In this stage, the customised firm chooses the set of profit max-
imising prices as a function of the number of standardised firms ship-
ping to the local market , Ns, their location in the product space a(a1, ...aNs),
their cost parameter k(k1, ...kNs) and their prices p(p1, ...pNs). Given this
information, customised firms choose a continuum of prices, as they are
able to choose a different price for each variety.
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Let the set of consumers that purchase from the customised firm
j in a given market be denoted by ϕcm,j(p). The profit of customised firm
j in market m is thus given by:
Πj =
∫ 1
0
(pj,l − κ)Fj,l(p) dl where Fj,l(p) =
1 if l ∈ ϕcm,j(p)0 otherwise
Market Shares and Profits
Suppose that at least one standardised firm ships to market m. Label
the customised firm as c. Starting at a random point on the circle, la-
bel each standardised firm i = {1, ..., N} such that firm i’s neighbour
in the clockwise direction is labeled as i + 1 and in the anti-clockwise
direction as i − 1. As explained in the previous section, to make the
analysis tractable, I consider only the case where no standardised firm
is undercut by another standardised firm in each market it operates in,
i.e. all standardised firms sell to a positive mass of consumers conditional
on shipping to a given market unless they are undercut by the customised
firm. I start by analysing which consumers located between firm i and
i+1 choose to purchases from the customised firm and then aggregate
this over all pairs of standardised neighbours in the market to obtain the
total market share of the customised firm c.
Denote the location of firm i and i + 1 by ai and ai+1 respectively.
First suppose that in the absence of a customised firm operating in the
market, there existed a consumer xi,i+1 located between ai and ai+1 such
that any consumer with a larger distance from firm i purchases from firm
i+1, while any consumer with a distance smaller purchases from firm i.
Call this consumer the marginal consumer. This marginal consumer is
relevant for the analysis in this section to understand which firm the
customised firm is competing with.
In this case, each consumer located between ai and xi,i+1 will pur-
chase from firm c if:
pc(l)l∈[ai,xi,i+1] ≤ pi + θ|l − ai|
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Similarly, suppose that there is also a marginal consumer xi−1,i
located between firm i and firm i-1. In this case, any consumer located
between xi−1,i and ai will purchase from firm c if:
pc(l)l∈[xi−1,i,ai] ≤ pi + θ|l − ai|
Note that as the customised firm can choose a different price for each
variety, we cannot say more at this point about the set of consumers who
purchase from the customised firm without restricting the set of prices.
Note for example, that the customised firm does not necessarily sell to a
compact set of consumers between firm i and i+1.
Profits of the customised firm in this case become:
Πc = ∑N
s
i=1
{
xi,i+1∫
xi−1,i
(
pc(l)− κ
)
· Fc,i(l) dl
}
where Fc,i(l) =
1 if pc(l) ≤ pi + θ|l − ai|0 otherwise
Note that if no standardised firm ships to market, any consumer
will purchase from firm c if pc(l) ≤ vm
Pricing
Note that the customised firm can choose a different price for each vari-
ety and thus chooses an infinite number of prices. It can be shown that if
at least one standardised firm is active in market m, the optimal pricing
schedule of the customised firm as a function of the preferred variety of
consumer l follows the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal pricing schedule of the customised firm for each
variety l ∈ [ai, xi,i+1] for any firm i and i+1 is given by:
pc(l) = max {pi + θ|l − ai|, κ} (C.1)
Proof: To show that this pricing schedule is optimal, suppose that l ∈
[xi−1,i, xi,i+1] is such that piθ|l − ai| > κ and therefore, according to the
proposition above the customised firm sets pc(l) = piθ|l − ai|. Given
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the tie-breaking rule that has been assumed, in this case, consumer l
purchases the good from firm c. Profits from this particular consumer
l are then given by pic(l) = piθ|l − ai| − κ, which are by assumption
greater or equal to zero. I show that there is no profitable deviation: If
firm c raises the price for consumer l, the consumer would then switch to
purchase from firm i, according to the preferences outlined. In this case,
profits would be equal to zero. If on the hand, firm c lowers it’s price,
consumer l continues to purchase from firm c, but profits are strictly
decreased. Thus there is no profitable deviation for l ∈ [xi−1,i, xi,i+1] if
piθ|l − ai| ≥ κ.
Now suppose that piθ|l − ai| < κ and thus the customised firm
c sets pc(l) = κ accordingly. In this case, the consumer will purchase
from firm i, as piθ|l − ai| < pc(l). Thus Fc,i(l) = 0 and as a result
profits of firm c are equal to zero. If firm c now raises its prices, the
consumer will continue to purchase from firm i and profits remain at
zero. If firm c, however, lowers pc(l), either profits remain equal to zero
if pc(l) > piθ|l − ai|,as the consumer again continues to purchase from
firm i or if firm c lowers its prices such that pc(l) > piθ|l − ai| , the
consumer switches to purchase from firm c. In this case, though, profits
become negative as now prices are below marginal costs i.e. pc(l) ≤ κ.
The same argument follows for consumers located between the marginal
consumers of any firm i ∈ Ns. Thus, there exist no profitable deviation
from the pricing schedule as outlined by Proposition 6.
If no standardised firm is active in market m, firm c sets its price
equal to the reservation price of the consumer pc(l) = vm. Thus as
a result, the market share of the customised firm is equal to one and
profits are given by Pic,m = vm − κ.
C.1.2 Stage 3: Standardised Firm’s Pricing Decision
In this stage, in each market all standardised firms active in the said
market simultaneously choose their prices as a function of the varieties
produced and their marginal costs. Each firm i ∈ Ns maximises its
profit. I solve this stage in three steps. First, I calculate market shares
and profits in the case where no standardised firm is undercut by an-
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other standardised firm and the customised firm supplies to a non-zero
mass of consumers between all standardised firms. In a second step, I
then establish restrictions on marginal costs and locations such that pre-
vious assumptions hold in equilibrium. In the third step, I then calculate
optimal prices.
Market Shares and Profits without Undercutting
Suppose no standardised firm is undercut. As before, suppose that there
existed a consumer xi,i+1 located between ai and ai+1 such that
pi + θ|xi,i+1 − ai| = pi+1 + θ|ai+1 − xi,i+1|
As each standardised firm can choose a single price, the left hand side is
strictly monotonically increasing in the distance from ai, while the right
hand side is strictly monotonically decreasing in the distance from ai,
such a consumer exists as long as pi ≤ pi+1 + θ|ai+1 − ai|. This implies
that in the absence of the customised firm any consumer located between
ai and xi,i+1 purchases the variety provided by firm i. Solving for xi,i+1
gives
xi,i+1 =
ai+1 + ai
2
+
pi+1 − pi
2θ
Further, suppose that there exists a consumer xi,c such that:
pi + θ|xi,c − ai| − e = pc(xi,c)
Recall that the customised firm’s optimal strategy is to set its price equal
to the maximum of the standardised price plus the cost to the con-
sumer of purchasing a variety different to its own or its marginal cost
κ. Therefore, the above equation can only hold if pc(xi,c) = κ, i.e. the
standardised firm anticipates that it will only be able outprice the cus-
tomised firm for consumers that are located at a distance from firm i
such that adjusted price of firm i is smaller or equal to the customised
firms marginal cost. For any price pi + θ|xi,c − ai| > κ, the optimal strat-
egy of the customised firm is to set pc(l) = pi + t+ θ|xi,c− ai| and due to
the tie-breaking rule, the consumer will purchase from the customised
firm instead.
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Therefore, xi,c is given by:
xi,c = ai +
κ − pi
θ
− e
As e can be arbitrarily small, I dropped it for ease of presentation.
In the absence of the previous assumptions, the standardised firms
market share would be given by the set of consumers that are located
between ai and the closer of the two marginal consumers. Thus the lo-
cation of if |xi,c and |xi,i+1 allow us to distinguish who the standardised
firm i is in competition with: if |xi,c − ai| < |xi,i+1 − ai| then the salient
competitor of firm i is the customised firm, and if |xi,c− ai| ≥ |xi,i+1− ai|
it is standardised firm i+1. In the latter case, the customised firm would
serve no consumers between the locations ai and ai+1. The same consid-
erations hold for consumers located between firm i and firm i-1.
However, I restrict to cases where in equilibrium, the customised
firm supplies to a positive mass of consumers located between each
standardised firm i and i+1. This is the case, if we have |xi+1i,c − ai| <
|xi,i+1 − ai| and |xi−1i,c − ai| < |xi−1 − ai|. In this case, using the market
shares calculated above, the expression for profits of the standardised
firm becomes:
Πi,m =
2
θ
L(κ − pi)(pi − ki − tdm) (C.2)
Note how in this case, the profits of firm i are independent of the be-
haviour of its neighbours i+1 and i-1.
Condition for No Undercutting
In this section, I define the restrictions such that no standardised firm
is undercut by another standardised firm, nor a customised firm lo-
cally undercut in equilibrium. Recall that I defined a customised firm
c as locally undercut if it makes no sales in the set of of consumers
Li,i+1 ∈ [ai, ai+1] for all standardised firms i = {1, ...n}. I defined a
standardised firm i as being undercut in a given market if it makes no
sales in equilibrium in that market.
Proposition 4 Suppose that locations and marginal costs are such that ki ≤
k j − θ|ai − aj|. In this case, no standardised firm is undercut. Moreover, if
157
κ < ki+1+ki2 + θ
1
2Nsm
, the customised firm is locally undercut for no standardised
firms i and i+1.
κ < ki+1+ki2 + θ
ai+1−ai
2 Proof: Suppose standardised firm i deviates and
undercuts standardised firm j. This implies that firm i charges a price
no greater than pi + θ|ai− aj| = k j. The only case in which this deviation
would be profitable is if this price charged is larger pi ≥ ki + tdm. Thus
no standardised firm undercuts another standardised firm if the distance
between the varieties supplied by the two firms is large enough relative
to the difference in productivity, i.e. have:
ki ≥ k j − θ|ai − aj|
Now, suppose standardised firm i does not find it profitable to
undercut either of its standardised neighbours 1, but instead deviates
and locally undercuts the customised firm c between i and i+1. Firm
i locally undercuts the customised firm if it charges a price such that
for all consumers l ∈ [ai, xi,i+1], pi + θ|l − ai| < κ, which would lead all
consumers located between ai and ai+1 to buy either from standardised
firm i or i+1. Note that profits of this deviation depend on the price
charged by firm i+1 through the location of xi,i+1. The upper bound on
this price, however, is the highest, when the price charged by firm i+1 is
the lowest, i.e. pi+1 = ki + tdm. At the same time, it is also necessary to
have pi ≥ ki + tdm for this to be a profitable deviation for firm i, which
is the lowest if the distance of the given market to the central location is
the smallest i.e. zero. Thus, no standardised firm i will find it profitable
to locally undercut the customised firm if ki + tdm + θ|xi,i+1 − ai| < κ,
which then becomes:
κ <
ki+1 + ki
2
+ θ
ai+1 − ai
2
As the distance between any firm i and i+1 is equal to 1Nsm , I make
for all markets m ∈ M, the following assumption:
Assumption 5 Let locations and marginal costs be such that ki ≥ k j − θ|ai −
aj| and κ < ki+1+ki2 + θ 12Nsm .
1Note that undercutting a standardised neighbour i+1 automatically implies locally
undercutting the customised firm between firm i and i+1
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Note however, that I do not restrict that the standardised firm is
being undercut by the customised firm. Due to the fact that the salient
competitor for each standardised firm is the customised firm, allowing
this does not complicate the analysis significantly. Note that the cus-
tomised firm could find it profitable to undercut standardised firm i if
the distance of the given market to the central location is large enough
such that:
dm ≥ κ − kit
Pricing
Given the restrictions imposed in the previous section, profits are con-
tinuous and convex. Thus, the optimal price is found through simple
profit maximisation and are pinned-down by the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Given that no firm is undercut and the customised firm sells to
a positive mass of consumers, standardised firm i’s optimal price is given by:
p∗i =
1
2
(ki + tdm + κ) (C.3)
As a result market shares are given by:
xi =
κ − ki − tdm
θ
(C.4)
Note that in this case, the optimal price is given by an average
of the firms own marginal cost and the marginal cost of the customised
firm. Given the optimal price, profits are given by:
Πi,m =
L 12θ
[
κ − ki − tdm
]2 if dm ≥ κ−kit
0 otherwise
(C.5)
In this case profits and prices are independent of the distance between
the standardised firms, and only depend on the marginal cost of the
customised firm.
Given the above pricing strategy of the standardised firms, the
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market share of the customised firm is given by:
xc,m = L
Ns
∑
i=1
1
θ
[
ki + ki+1
2
+ tdm +
θ
Nsm
− κ
]
(C.6)
which can be rewritten as:
xc,m = max
{
1− N
s
m
θ
(
κ − k¯m − tdm
)
, 1
}
(C.7)
where, k¯m is the average marginal cost of the standardised firms
that is active in market m. Profits of the customised firm are then given
by the integral
Πc,m = L∑N
s
i=1
xi,i+1∫
ai
(
1
2(ki + tdm − κ) + θ|l − ai|
)
dl +
ai+1∫
xi,i+1
(
1
2(ki + 1+ tdm − κ) + θ|l − ai|
)
dl
which simplifies to:
Πc,m = L
Ns
∑
i=1
1
2θ
[
ki + ki+1
2
+ tdm +
θ
Nsm
− κ
]2
(C.8)
as the distance between the varieties produced by any firm i and
i+1 is assumed to be 1Nsm . Thus, the customised firms profits depend pos-
itively on the marginal cost of the standardised firms i and i+1 as well
as on the distance between firm i and i+1’s location.
C.2 Proof
The proof follows through backward induction.
C.2.1 Stage 4: Customised Firm’s Pricing Decision
The set of players is the set of standardised firms Ns and customised
firms Nc = M. Each firm i ∈ Nc maximises its profit. Firm types (s,c)
are common knowledge at the beginning of the pricing stage.
At this stage all players have complete information. As standard-
ised firms can choose a different price for each local market, and cus-
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tomised firms only operate in one market, I can analyse the problem for
each market separately. I focus on a given market in the post-entry sub-
games. However, a similar game is played in each market. Thus, I drop
the subscript indicating the local market in the following two sections
unless required for clarity.
In this stage, the customised firm chooses the set of profit max-
imising prices as a function of the number of standardised firms ship-
ping to the local market , Ns, their location in the product space a(a1, ...aNs),
their cost parameter k(k1, ...kNs) and their prices p(p1, ...pNs). Given this
information, customised firms choose a continuum of prices, as they are
able to choose a different price for each variety.
Let the set of consumers that purchase from the customised firm
j in a given market be denoted by ϕcm,j(p). The profit of customised firm
j in market m is thus given by:
Πj =
∫ 1
0
(pj,l − κ)Fj,l(p) dl where Fj,l(p) =
1 if l ∈ ϕcm,j(p)0 otherwise
Market Shares and Profits
Suppose that at least one standardised firm ships to market m. Label
the customised firm as c. Starting at a random point on the circle, la-
bel each standardised firm i = {1, ..., N} such that firm i’s neighbour
in the clockwise direction is labeled as i + 1 and in the anti-clockwise
direction as i − 1. As explained in the previous section, to make the
analysis tractable, I consider only the case where no standardised firm
is undercut by another standardised firm in each market it operates in,
i.e. all standardised firms sell to a positive mass of consumers conditional
on shipping to a given market unless they are undercut by the customised
firm. I start by analysing which consumers located between firm i and
i+1 choose to purchases from the customised firm and then aggregate
this over all pairs of standardised neighbours in the market to obtain the
total market share of the customised firm c.
Denote the location of firm i and i + 1 by ai and ai+1 respectively.
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First suppose that in the absence of a customised firm operating in the
market, there existed a consumer xi,i+1 located between ai and ai+1 such
that any consumer with a larger distance from firm i purchases from firm
i+1, while any consumer with a distance smaller purchases from firm i.
Call this consumer the marginal consumer. This marginal consumer is
relevant for the analysis in this section to understand which firm the
customised firm is competing with.
In this case, each consumer located between ai and xi,i+1 will pur-
chase from firm c if:
pc(l)l∈[ai,xi,i+1] ≤ pi + θ|l − ai|
Similarly, suppose that there is also a marginal consumer xi−1,i
located between firm i and firm i-1. In this case, any consumer located
between xi−1,i and ai will purchase from firm c if:
pc(l)l∈[xi−1,i,ai] ≤ pi + θ|l − ai|
Note that as the customised firm can choose a different price for each
variety, we cannot say more at this point about the set of consumers who
purchase from the customised firm without restricting the set of prices.
Note for example, that the customised firm does not necessarily sell to a
compact set of consumers between firm i and i+1.
Profits of the customised firm in this case become:
Πc = ∑N
s
i=1
{
xi,i+1∫
xi−1,i
(
pc(l)− κ
)
· Fc,i(l) dl
}
where Fc,i(l) =
1 if pc(l) ≤ pi + θ|l − ai|0 otherwise
Note that if no standardised firm ships to market, any consumer
will purchase from firm c if pc(l) ≤ vm
Pricing
Note that the customised firm can choose a different price for each vari-
ety and thus chooses an infinite number of prices. It can be shown that if
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at least one standardised firm is active in market m, the optimal pricing
schedule of the customised firm as a function of the preferred variety of
consumer l follows the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The optimal pricing schedule of the customised firm for each
variety l ∈ [ai, xi,i+1] for any firm i and i+1 is given by:
pc(l) = max {pi + θ|l − ai|, κ} (C.9)
Proof: To show that this pricing schedule is optimal, suppose that l ∈
[xi−1,i, xi,i+1] is such that piθ|l − ai| > κ and therefore, according to the
proposition above the customised firm sets pc(l) = piθ|l − ai|. Given
the tie-breaking rule that has been assumed, in this case, consumer l
purchases the good from firm c. Profits from this particular consumer
l are then given by pic(l) = piθ|l − ai| − κ, which are by assumption
greater or equal to zero. I show that there is no profitable deviation: If
firm c raises the price for consumer l, the consumer would then switch to
purchase from firm i, according to the preferences outlined. In this case,
profits would be equal to zero. If on the hand, firm c lowers it’s price,
consumer l continues to purchase from firm c, but profits are strictly
decreased. Thus there is no profitable deviation for l ∈ [xi−1,i, xi,i+1] if
piθ|l − ai| ≥ κ.
Now suppose that piθ|l − ai| < κ and thus the customised firm
c sets pc(l) = κ accordingly. In this case, the consumer will purchase
from firm i, as piθ|l − ai| < pc(l). Thus Fc,i(l) = 0 and as a result
profits of firm c are equal to zero. If firm c now raises its prices, the
consumer will continue to purchase from firm i and profits remain at
zero. If firm c, however, lowers pc(l), either profits remain equal to zero
if pc(l) > piθ|l − ai|,as the consumer again continues to purchase from
firm i or if firm c lowers its prices such that pc(l) > piθ|l − ai| , the
consumer switches to purchase from firm c. In this case, though, profits
become negative as now prices are below marginal costs i.e. pc(l) ≤ κ.
The same argument follows for consumers located between the marginal
consumers of any firm i ∈ Ns. Thus, there exist no profitable deviation
from the pricing schedule as outlined by Proposition 6.
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If no standardised firm is active in market m, firm c sets its price
equal to the reservation price of the consumer pc(l) = vm. Thus as
a result, the market share of the customised firm is equal to one and
profits are given by Pic,m = vm − κ.
C.2.2 Stage 3: Standardised Firm’s Pricing Decision
In this stage, in each market all standardised firms active in the said
market simultaneously choose their prices as a function of the varieties
produced and their marginal costs. Each firm i ∈ Ns maximises its
profit. I solve this stage in three steps. First, I calculate market shares
and profits in the case where no standardised firm is undercut by an-
other standardised firm and the customised firm supplies to a non-zero
mass of consumers between all standardised firms. In a second step, I
then establish restrictions on marginal costs and locations such that pre-
vious assumptions hold in equilibrium. In the third step, I then calculate
optimal prices.
Market Shares and Profits without Undercutting
Suppose no standardised firm is undercut. As before, suppose that there
existed a consumer xi,i+1 located between ai and ai+1 such that
pi + θ|xi,i+1 − ai| = pi+1 + θ|ai+1 − xi,i+1|
As each standardised firm can choose a single price, the left hand side is
strictly monotonically increasing in the distance from ai, while the right
hand side is strictly monotonically decreasing in the distance from ai,
such a consumer exists as long as pi ≤ pi+1 + θ|ai+1 − ai|. This implies
that in the absence of the customised firm any consumer located between
ai and xi,i+1 purchases the variety provided by firm i. Solving for xi,i+1
gives
xi,i+1 =
ai+1 + ai
2
+
pi+1 − pi
2θ
Further, suppose that there exists a consumer xi,c such that:
pi + θ|xi,c − ai| − e = pc(xi,c)
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Recall that the customised firm’s optimal strategy is to set its price equal
to the maximum of the standardised price plus the cost to the con-
sumer of purchasing a variety different to its own or its marginal cost
κ. Therefore, the above equation can only hold if pc(xi,c) = κ, i.e. the
standardised firm anticipates that it will only be able outprice the cus-
tomised firm for consumers that are located at a distance from firm i
such that adjusted price of firm i is smaller or equal to the customised
firms marginal cost. For any price pi + θ|xi,c − ai| > κ, the optimal strat-
egy of the customised firm is to set pc(l) = pi + t+ θ|xi,c− ai| and due to
the tie-breaking rule, the consumer will purchase from the customised
firm instead.
Therefore, xi,c is given by:
xi,c = ai +
κ − pi
θ
− e
As e can be arbitrarily small, I dropped it for ease of presentation.
In the absence of the previous assumptions, the standardised firms
market share would be given by the set of consumers that are located
between ai and the closer of the two marginal consumers. Thus the lo-
cation of if |xi,c and |xi,i+1 allow us to distinguish who the standardised
firm i is in competition with: if |xi,c − ai| < |xi,i+1 − ai| then the salient
competitor of firm i is the customised firm, and if |xi,c− ai| ≥ |xi,i+1− ai|
it is standardised firm i+1. In the latter case, the customised firm would
serve no consumers between the locations ai and ai+1. The same consid-
erations hold for consumers located between firm i and firm i-1.
However, I restrict to cases where in equilibrium, the customised
firm supplies to a positive mass of consumers located between each
standardised firm i and i+1. This is the case, if we have |xi+1i,c − ai| <
|xi,i+1 − ai| and |xi−1i,c − ai| < |xi−1 − ai|. In this case, using the market
shares calculated above, the expression for profits of the standardised
firm becomes:
Πi,m =
2
θ
L(κ − pi)(pi − ki − tdm) (C.10)
Note how in this case, the profits of firm i are independent of the be-
haviour of its neighbours i+1 and i-1.
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Condition for No Undercutting
In this section, I define the restrictions such that no standardised firm
is undercut by another standardised firm, nor a customised firm lo-
cally undercut in equilibrium. Recall that I defined a customised firm
c as locally undercut if it makes no sales in the set of of consumers
Li,i+1 ∈ [ai, ai+1] for all standardised firms i = {1, ...n}. I defined a
standardised firm i as being undercut in a given market if it makes no
sales in equilibrium in that market.
Proposition 7 Suppose that locations and marginal costs are such that ki ≤
k j − θ|ai − aj|. In this case, no standardised firm is undercut. Moreover, if
κ < ki+1+ki2 + θ
1
2Nsm
, the customised firm is locally undercut for no standardised
firms i and i+1.
κ < ki+1+ki2 + θ
ai+1−ai
2 Proof: Suppose standardised firm i deviates and
undercuts standardised firm j. This implies that firm i charges a price
no greater than pi + θ|ai− aj| = k j. The only case in which this deviation
would be profitable is if this price charged is larger pi ≥ ki + tdm. Thus
no standardised firm undercuts another standardised firm if the distance
between the varieties supplied by the two firms is large enough relative
to the difference in productivity, i.e. have:
ki ≥ k j − θ|ai − aj|
Now, suppose standardised firm i does not find it profitable to
undercut either of its standardised neighbours 2, but instead deviates
and locally undercuts the customised firm c between i and i+1. Firm
i locally undercuts the customised firm if it charges a price such that
for all consumers l ∈ [ai, xi,i+1], pi + θ|l − ai| < κ, which would lead all
consumers located between ai and ai+1 to buy either from standardised
firm i or i+1. Note that profits of this deviation depend on the price
charged by firm i+1 through the location of xi,i+1. The upper bound on
this price, however, is the highest, when the price charged by firm i+1 is
the lowest, i.e. pi+1 = ki + tdm. At the same time, it is also necessary to
have pi ≥ ki + tdm for this to be a profitable deviation for firm i, which
2Note that undercutting a standardised neighbour i+1 automatically implies locally
undercutting the customised firm between firm i and i+1
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is the lowest if the distance of the given market to the central location is
the smallest i.e. zero. Thus, no standardised firm i will find it profitable
to locally undercut the customised firm if ki + tdm + θ|xi,i+1 − ai| < κ,
which then becomes:
κ <
ki+1 + ki
2
+ θ
ai+1 − ai
2
As the distance between any firm i and i+1 is equal to 1Nsm , I make
for all markets m ∈ M, the following assumption:
Assumption 6 Let locations and marginal costs be such that ki ≥ k j − θ|ai −
aj| and κ < ki+1+ki2 + θ 12Nsm .
Note however, that I do not restrict that the standardised firm is
being undercut by the customised firm. Due to the fact that the salient
competitor for each standardised firm is the customised firm, allowing
this does not complicate the analysis significantly. Note that the cus-
tomised firm could find it profitable to undercut standardised firm i if
the distance of the given market to the central location is large enough
such that:
dm ≥ κ − kit
Pricing
Given the restrictions imposed in the previous section, profits are con-
tinuous and convex. Thus, the optimal price is found through simple
profit maximisation and are pinned-down by the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Given that no firm is undercut and the customised firm sells to
a positive mass of consumers, standardised firm i’s optimal price is given by:
p∗i =
1
2
(ki + tdm + κ) (C.11)
As a result market shares are given by:
xi =
κ − ki − tdm
θ
(C.12)
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Note that in this case, the optimal price is given by an average
of the firms own marginal cost and the marginal cost of the customised
firm. Given the optimal price, profits are given by:
Πi,m =
L 12θ
[
κ − ki − tdm
]2 if dm ≥ κ−kit
0 otherwise
(C.13)
In this case profits and prices are independent of the distance between
the standardised firms, and only depend on the marginal cost of the
customised firm.
Given the above pricing strategy of the standardised firms, the
market share of the customised firm is given by:
xc,m = L
Ns
∑
i=1
1
θ
[
ki + ki+1
2
+ tdm +
θ
Nsm
− κ
]
(C.14)
which can be rewritten as:
xc,m = max
{
1− N
s
m
θ
(
κ − k¯m − tdm
)
, 1
}
(C.15)
where, k¯m is the average marginal cost of the standardised firms
that is active in market m. Profits of the customised firm are then given
by the integral
Πc,m = L∑N
s
i=1
xi,i+1∫
ai
(
1
2(ki + tdm − κ) + θ|l − ai|
)
dl +
ai+1∫
xi,i+1
(
1
2(ki + 1+ tdm − κ) + θ|l − ai|
)
dl
which simplifies to:
Πc,m = L
Ns
∑
i=1
1
2θ
[
ki + ki+1
2
+ tdm +
θ
Nsm
− κ
]2
(C.16)
as the distance between the varieties produced by any firm i and
i+1 is assumed to be 1Nsm . Thus, the customised firms profits depend pos-
itively on the marginal cost of the standardised firms i and i+1 as well
as on the distance between firm i and i+1’s location.
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